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ABSTRACT

THE ONTOLOGY OF NOT-BEING
IN ARISTOTLE AND HIS PREDECESSORS

By
Abraham Jacob Greenstine
August 2020

Dissertation supervised by Professor Polansky
Aristotle is not thought to have a theory of not-being, but, in this project, I show
that there are several distinct ways of not-being established in his writings. As being is said
according to what is in-itself, what is accidentally, what is true, and what is actualized, so
not-being is determined as the privative, the false, or potentiality. In each of these cases, I
articulate what it means that it is a way of not-being, and how it is also a way of being.
Aristotle’s theory is put in contrast to his predecessors, especially Parmenides and Plato,
whose ontologies are centered around either denying not-being any status or making it into
a first principle.
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Chapter 1
In Pursuit of Not-Being

Heracles: Being and not-being are considered separate.
Admetus: You judge this way, Heracles, I another.
Euripides, Alcestis 528-529

i. A Questionable Concept
The first problem is that the expression “not-being” sounds peculiar. Even for the metaphysically
inclined, those for whom being is a worthwhile topic of discussion, “not-being” sounds like a
solecism.1 Part of the problem is the term’s elliptical character, calling for another word to
complete its sense, as an unfinished cadence demands its postponed resolution. Rather than notbeing as such, we can accept not being something or other: Matelda is not in the room, Virgil is
not alive. Part of the problem is its ambiguity: what is the force of “not” in this context, and what
is the sense of “being” here? Talk of not-being as such sounds like babble.
Perhaps even worse than hearing the expression “not-being” is taking it to indicate a serious
concept. To what could it possibly refer? What meaning could it have? Everything that is must be
in some way, and if something is simply not-being, then presumably it does not exist at all, and
we need not worry about it. We might doubt whether things are as they seem, but it seems that notbeing cannot be. We might be better off inquiring about the number of possible bald people in our

1

Those who suppose that “non-being” sounds any better than “not-being” are fooling themselves. I discuss the choice
of “not-being” over “non-being” in Section iii of this Chapter.

1

doorway than researching not-being.2 Perhaps, then, the good, philosophical thing to do would be
to warn us who wonder about not-being: “lasciate ogne speranza, voi ch’intrate.” 3
Indeed, one of the first philosophical texts does just this. Parmenides, whose On Nature
first introduced into the Greek language the elliptical expression we translate as “not-being,” at
least had the good sense to forbid any research into it:
[…] for this may never be made manageable, that not-being is.
But, you, from this way of inquiry restrain your understanding […] 4
Still, while his first readers seem to have heeded his prohibition, it must have soon sounded like a
challenge. By the time Aristotle is writing philosophers are hypothesizing and defending their own
conceptions of what not-being is. Rather than instilling silence, Parmenides’ poem inaugurates the
problem of not-being in philosophy.

ii. Why Aristotle?
If we are to become as pilgrims who, instead of heeding Parmenides’ prohibition, stroll past it, we
need someone that can help us navigate the terrain of the concept not-being. We can only
philosophize with inherited concepts. Even if we want to say something original, we must mostly
make do with the words and ideas already there. Thus, any serious philosophic project must
carefully consider the historical dimension of the concepts at hand. The imperative to investigate
this history is not due to a fetishization of antiquity or of etymology, but rather arises from the

2

Quine 4.
Dante III.9.
4
Parmenides fr. 7.1-2, οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα· ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα. For
the Greek text see Palmer Presocratic Philosophy 350-387, or Kurfess 51-54; fr. 1 = DK 28B1. Note: all translations
from the Greek are my own unless otherwise noted. Greek editions and other translations consulted are listed in the
Bibliography.
3
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commitment to understand knowledge as situated: problems and questions have a history. The
presumption that we can ignore this dimension is unacceptable: our words say more than we mean,
resonating with texts and problems, which were significant before our time.
For this reason, we turn to Aristotle as our guide, and it is by means of his corpus that we
investigate the problem of not-being. When examining the history of our philosophic questions
and concepts, we cannot ignore the figure of Aristotle. In his writings, problems are reconfigured,
sciences are invented, and compelling solutions are proposed. Much of our philosophic lexicon we
can trace back to Aristotle’s writings, if not to his outright invention of new terms, then to his
powerful alteration of inherited ones. By returning to Aristotle we can investigate our concepts at
a transformative moment, along with the problems that required their use and metamorphosis.
Yet Aristotle is not typically understood as having a developed theory on not-being. Of
course, he mentions it here and there, but there is no sustained engagement with the idea, as we
find in Parmenides’ On Nature or Plato’s Sophist. Further, there never could be a science of notbeing for Aristotle. Perhaps if he had endorsed a more robust theory of separate forms, as Plato
does in the Sophist, there could be an investigation into what not-being is. Or were there some
supreme instances of what is not, as there is a primary sense of what is, there might have been a
single science of not-being. But as it stands, not-being offers no clear and definite object for
research, and thus no science of not-being is possible.
Nevertheless, as we review Aristotle’s different discussions on not-being, we see a
constellation of original strategies for articulating and understanding this concept. These variously
situated arguments and considerations do indeed cohere into a novel theory of not-being. For
Aristotle, not-being in some sense must be; we all the time speak of things failing to be or to
belong. Yet there is not a single kind of thing that is not; there is no idea of not-being. Hence the
3

difficulty of asking “what is not-being?” The better question is perhaps “how can something notbe?” Here we find not a single way of not-being, but several ways in which things are said to not
be.
As an inflection of his doctrine of the four ways of being, Aristotle distinguishes three ways
of not-being: not-being as a privation (what is not-something), not-being as the false (what is nottrue), and not-being as what is potentially (what is not-actualized). Each of these ways of not-being
has its own problems, and I shall treat each separately.
Aristotle incorporates his new understanding of not-being into some of his most important
concepts and arguments. While he does not eliminate not-being, he does perhaps elide it into these
three more determinate concepts – privation, falsity, and potentiality. Yet this is not a matter of
replacing each instance of the indeterminate expression “not-being” with one of these more
determinate notions. Rather, not-being is an ingredient in the creation of these concepts. We should
understand Aristotle as both appropriating and integrating the sense of not-being while
constructing these three determinations. Here we can see why Aristotle’s role in the ancient debates
on not-being has been overlooked: he shifts the coordinates and alters the terms of the inherited
problem of not-being away from not-being as such. As a result, Aristotle changes the earlier debate
so much that post-Aristotelian philosophy generally no longer faces not-being as the ontological
problem to be solved. One can, instead, do ontology without talking about not-being.
The project, then, is to articulate what for Aristotle not-being can be and the role of notbeing in Aristotle’s philosophy.

4

iii. Why the Predecessors?
The question remains: why should we care about not-being at all? I will answer this by considering
Aristotle’s predecessors’ writings on the topic in Part I of this project. I should note at the outset:
I am not looking to give an ambitious “reevaluation” of the predecessors’ positions. The concern
is more with how Aristotle takes up Parmenides, Democritus, etc. than with their doctrines for
their own sake (we might further note that scholars perhaps exaggerate the difference between
Aristotle’s pre-Socratics and the pre-Socratics themselves).
Taken together, the predecessors might seem to exhaust the alternatives for positions on
not-being. Parmenides is the first philosopher to take up the topic of not-being, specifically by
prohibiting all investigation into it. Gorgias, accepting Parmenides’ premise that not-being cannot
be, defiantly argues for the preposterous position that nothing is, οὐδὲν ἔστιν. Democritus and
Plato each seems to concede some of Parmenides’ arguments, but they both conclude that notbeing must be and must be determined in some way. Democritus, inverting one of the arguments
of the Eleatic Melissus, claims that since motion is, not-being must be, and is to be conceived as
void. For the Eleatic Stranger in Plato’s Sophist the problem is not motion, but instead images and
falsity: he argues that although utter-not-being cannot be, some more determinate not-beingsomething must be if falsity is to exist. Thus, for the Stranger, not-being paradoxically is as much
of a form of things as being itself is.
Hence the predecessors produce a metaphysical impasse. Is all talk of not-being a false
path that pulls one away from the truth, as in Parmenides? Or is not-being necessary as a physical
principle, as in Democritus, or as a formal principle, as in Plato? Perhaps we should agree with
Gorgias, and simply posit that nothing is. Among these positions, Aristotle might not have much
to contribute other than refining the views inherited from someone else.
5

Yet, for Aristotle, Parmenides and all who followed him were too hasty in assuming that
being and not-being each have a single meaning. None of the predecessors who talk about notbeing gets out of this Eleatic paradigm. For Parmenides and Melissus, this singularity of being
leads them to reject any sort of not-being. But even the atomists and Plato each endorses a sort of
fundamental principle of not-being in order to maintain an Eleatic sense of being-itself while also
accounting for a world of diversity and change. For Aristotle, this whole Eleatic framework needs
to be revised. Being is said in several ways – there is no single being-itself – and thus not-being is
not fundamental. Instead, with Aristotle we will find ways of not-being determined by the more
primary, affirmative, ways that beings are.

iv. The Language of Not-Being
Before we consider all these articulations of not-being, we must both examine the Greek way of
speaking of “not-being” and defend some of our own translation choices. There are idiosyncrasies
of the ancient Greek language that play an important role in these philosophic debates. We also
noted already that in English the phrase “not-being” sounds like a solecism. Thus we should
consider some issues of translation. In this Section, then, we will focus on the language of not being – the Greek and English ways to articulate what is not.

Negating in Ancient Greek
To appreciate the ancient Greek arguments regarding not-being, we must get a sense for their
idiom. There is difficulty even in English in easily referring to “what is not,” and this can be
compounded between languages. The Greek language, at least in the mouths of philosophers, is
adaptable to the strangeness of reflective inquiry. Words can be readily extracted from their typical
6

grammatical context and nominalized, as in the case of Aristotle’s categories: οὐσία (from the
feminine present participle of “to be”), 5 ποσόν (“so much,” or quantity) ποιόν (“of a sort,” or
quality), πρός τι (“in reference to something,” or relation), etc. A typical way to nominalize in
Greek is to combine the definite article and an adjective to make a substantive expression: so from
καλόν, “beautiful,” to τὸ καλόν, “the beautiful (thing)” or even just “beauty.” This can be done
with participles as well, so that from the participle (ὄν) of the word “to be” (εἶναι), we get τὸ ὄν
(“being,” or “what is”), τὰ ὄντα (“beings”), as well as our crucial expression for “not-being,” or
“what is not,” τὸ μὴ ὄν. This procedure can become quite complicated, as in the case of Aristotle’s
expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, “what it is to be,” sometimes hastily and misleadingly translated as
“essence” by modern scholars.
The key concept of this project is expressed by the substantive τὸ μὴ ὄν. While there is
only one primary negative particle in English, “not,” in ancient Greek there are two: οὐ and μή.6
These are the basis for a host of compounds, like οὐδέ and μηδέ (“but not,” or “not even”), or
οὐδείς and μηδείς (“not one,” or “none”). Each of these has its own appropriate grammatical
context, that is, cases in which one would use the one particle and never the other. For instance, to
negate most statements expressed by independent clauses one uses οὐ, but to negate an
independent clause expressing a wish, or a command, one would use μή. 7 Οὐ generally is more
forceful than μή, which is often related to some inner mental state. There is no parallel pair –
precise or rough – of particles in English, where negating can only be done with “not” and related
words (“no,” “never,” etc.). “Not” is versatile, capable of being either absolute or relative,

5

Often translated as “substance,” “being,” or sometimes “essence,” I leave the term οὐσία untranslated in this project.
There is also the alpha-privative prefix, which uses α- or αν- to express that the prefixed word is negated or absent.
7
Smyth 2702-3.
6

7

objective or subjective, determinate or indeterminate. Simplifying things for us, in the
philosophical discussions about not-being τὸ μὴ ὄν is the preferred phrase, and one does not find
τὸ οὐκ ὄν.8

The Question of “Existence” in Ancient Greek
As with our verb “to be” the Greek εἶναι can perform a number of different semantic and
syntactical functions. For instance, it can suggest an identity between two things: “Virgil is the
striped cat.” Or the verb can be used to attribute a predicate to a subject: “Virgil is striped,”
“Matelda is playful.” All of these are cases of 2-place being, where the verb has two variables, “x
is y.”9 Often in Greek, and especially for Aristotle, this 2-place predication implies the existence
of the subject: to say that “Virgil is striped” is to say “Virgil exists and is striped.” 10 There are also,
in both English and Greek, cases of 1-place being. Often in English we use the word “exist,” which
cannot take a complement (that is, it is incompletable) for these cases (“Virgil is – he exists”). The
expression τὸ μὴ ὄν, taken up simply, is an instance of 1-place being: there is no complement for
the participle ὄν. Thus, we might be tempted to understand τὸ μὴ ὄν as simply referring to
something that does not exist, translating it as “the not existent,” “the inexistent,” or perhaps even
“inexistence.”
One problem with translating τὸ μὴ ὄν as “the not existent” is that 1-place being in ancient
Greek can be ambiguous or completable in ways that the English word “exist” is not. There are
certainly texts in classical Greek philosophy where 1-place being seems to mean “exist.” Perhaps

8

In Thucydides 2.44, οἱ οὐκ ὄντες, literally “those who are not,” means “the dead.” Cf. Smyth 2734.
For this topic, cf. Kahn 62-74, Brown “The Verb ‘to be’”, Burnyeat “Apology 30b2-4,” Matthen “Greek Ontology,”
and Menn Aim and Argument Ig1 36-41.
10
Cf. Bäck Predication.
9
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the most important is Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II.1. Here Aristotle distinguishes different
sorts of inquiries, separating the question of “if something is” (εἰ ἔστι) from the questions into “the
that” (τὸ ὅτι), “the why” (τὸ διότι), and “what something is” (τί ἐστιν). So he says: “I mean if
something is or not simply, but not if [it is] white or not.” 11 We should notice here that Aristotle
finds it necessary to clarify what the apparently simple expression “if something is” means, adding
the adverb “simply” and the contrastive example of predicative, 2-place being. These clarifications
would be unnecessary if εἰ ἔστι simply meant “if something exists.” This suggests that “is,” even
in cases of 1-place being, need not have a simple existential sense. Furthermore, to understand the
meaning of the second clause – “but not if [it is] white or not” – we must supply the “something
is,” ἔστι, from the first. These two clauses are meant to be contrasting, but Aristotle still uses a
single instance of the verb “to be” for both. Hence, even here where Aristotle is unequivocally
talking about existential propositions, the very same 1-place ἔστι used in an existential proposition
can become a predicative 2-place “is” in the next clause. 12 “Is,” ἔστι, is both ambiguous and
completable in a way that “exists” is not. So even in cases where εἶναι, “to be,” may mean “to
exist,” translating it this way is misleading at best.
Further, there are cases of 1-place being for the Greeks that do not have a simple existential
meaning. For instance, Aristotle’s first formulation of the principle of non-contradiction is “it is
impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and also not belong to the same thing in
the same respect,” 13 yet a few lines later he restates this same principle as “it is impossible at the
same time to be and not be.” 14 If these two statements are supposed to be expressing the same

11

Post. An. 89b33, τὸ δ' εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἁπλῶς λέγω, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ λευκὸς ἢ μή.
Cf. Burnyeat “Apology 30b2-4” 16.
13
Meta. Γ.3 1005b19-20, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό.
14
Meta. Γ.4 1006a3-4, ἀδυνάτου ὄντος ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. Cf. Matthen 113-114.
12
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principle, as they seem to be, then we should not interpret “to be and not be” in the second
statement as simply existential. Even if there is an existential dimension to this latter statement,
“existence” here would have to be thought of as something belonging to something else (perhaps,
for instance, form belonging to matter). So, whether we suppose that “to be” in this statement is
meant ambiguously or has some other sense (e.g. a veridical sense), it is apparent that “to exist” is
the wrong translation, unable to adequately express the meaning of εἶναι operative in the Greek
text.
Perhaps the most important factor is that Aristotle himself, when considering the ways in
which things are said to be, does not feel it necessary to establish or articulate a distinct notion of
existence. This does not imply that Aristotle never means “exists” when he writes “is,” for we just
saw he recognizes existential statements and questions. But it does indicate that a distinct concept
of existence is not especially important for Aristotle’s ontology.
Fortunately, the English “to be” covers much the same range of the Greek εἶναι, despite
some awkward phrases here or there. Nothing is lost if we wholly abstain from translating εἶναι
(and its forms) with forms of “to exist,” and instead consistently translate it with forms of “to be.”
Of course, εἶναι may have different senses in different contexts, but we should not decide in
advance what the sense will be. Burnyeat makes this point when addressing the related question
of the meaning of ὕπαρξις:
Evidently, the import of ὕπαρξις varies with, and depends upon, its larger context.
It nominalizes whichever use of ὑπάρχειν is in play. Certainly, it has a use, as οὐσία
does, which corresponds to our ‘existence’ and is most naturally translated that

10

way. But if this use is a function of context, it should not be represented as a prior
lexical meaning brought to the context.15
Likewise for our project, the sense of τὸ μὴ ὄν varies with different meanings of εἶναι, but there
are also texts where “not-being” truly means “inexistent.” 16 Elsewhere, though, in Aristotle and
his predecessors τὸ μὴ ὄν has different or stranger meanings, and it is these texts that are of the
most interest for us.

Non-Being, Not-Being, and What is Not
Before ending our considerations of the language of τὸ μὴ ὄν we must clarify some decisions of
our English translations. We have argued against translating τὸ ὄν as “the existent” and τὸ μὴ ὄν
as “the inexistent.” The translation that suggests itself for τὸ μὴ ὄν is “not-being.” Yet there are
two further possible alternatives we must consider: “non-being” and “what is not.” Here I argue
against using “non-being,” and defend using both “not-being” and “what is not” to translate and
discuss τὸ μὴ ὄν and related Greek expressions.
The terms “non-being” and “not-being” are mostly synonymous, with either one or the
other coming into favor over the past couple hundred years. 17 To me it seems that today “nonbeing” is in favor, both generally and in the context of ancient scholarship, but not exclusively.
“Non” and “not” are obviously linked etymologically, but “non” is always a prefix (akin to “un”), while “not,” while less commonly used as a prefix, is typically used as the ordinary adverb of

15

Burnyeat “Apology 30b2-4” 16
For example, Int. 11 21a19-33.
17
Consider the first quotation under “non-being” in the Oxford English Dictionary (emphasis added): “As grete
maistrie it is to kepe, to defende, and to preserue a þing from nouȝt beyng, or noon beyng, which is kyndely fallyng
þidirward, as it is to brynge hym forþ from noun beyng if it be not” c1443 R. Pecock Reule of Crysten Religioun
(1987) 57 (MED).
16
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negation (i.e. the negative particle). For us, this difference is crucial: both οὐ and μή are particles,
not prefixes. “Non-being,” whatever its virtues as a term, overly nominalizes and substantializes
τὸ μὴ ὄν, suggesting that we are dealing with some entity, thing, object, “non-being.” Further, the
expression “non-being” is not completable: a complement to the phrase cannot be added (e.g. one
would not say “non-being grey”). Given our above discussion of the completability of “being” in
Greek, this is reason enough to avoid this translation.
As τὸ ὄν is sometimes translated “being,” sometimes as “what is,” so too we might translate
τὸ μὴ ὄν either as “not-being” or as “what is not.” Our main objections to the expression “nonbeing” were that it: (1) fails to translate μή as a particle, (2) overly substantializes the concept of
τὸ μὴ ὄν, and (3) is incompletable. The expression “what is not,” by contrast, does neither (1) nor
(3), and may in fact be better than “not-being” with regard to (2). Like “not-being,” “what is not”
keeps the force of μή, translating it as “not.” Further, “what is not” is readily completable, e.g.
“what is not striped,” “what is not finished.” As a relative clause, “what is not” perhaps suggests
some sort of substantial object: the “what” might imply that there is some existent or thing, which
is not. But, I think that if we kept ourselves to exclusively using one or another of these phrases –
“not-being” or “what is not” – this uniformity of expression would put us in a greater danger of
substantializing τὸ μὴ ὄν. By using both “not-being” and “what is not” we avoid monotony, and
there are some cases where the translation “what is not” fits the context better. Moreover, by using
both we give expression to the different shades of meaning present in the Greek terms but not
identical with any single English phrase. Using the phrases “what is” and “what is not” reminds
us that τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν are not some things, Being and Non-Being, but are rather ways of
speaking about what it is to be and not to be, being and not being, what is and what is not. For all
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of these reasons I will use both “not-being” and “what is not” to translate τὸ μὴ ὄν and related
negations of being in this project.
I propose that “not-being” keeps the negating force of τὸ μὴ ὄν, insofar as μή in most
contexts is simply translated as “not.” Further, “not-being” is, to my ears, a somewhat stranger
expression, less nominalized and closer to the Greek participial phrase. Moreover, “not-being” is
completable: one can easily add a complement (“not-being” can become “not-being grey,” or “notbeing a cat” with the simple addition of the pertinent predicate). Finally, while “not-being” sounds
a bit more awkward than “non-being,” I maintain that this too is a virtue: the Greek τὸ μὴ ὄν is
itself somewhat strange, and a degree of weirdness keeps us from becoming overly complacent
with our concepts. 18

18

Although we prefer “not-being” to “non-being,” this is not a total rejection of the prefix “non-.” There are many
instances where it is preferable to use, e.g. “the principle of non-contradiction.”
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PART I

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING:
THE DEBATE IN ARISTOTLE’S PREDECESSORS
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Chapter 2
The Eleatic Origins of Not-Being

i. The Eleatics: Parmenides and Melissus
Parmenides of Elea’s On Nature ironically initiates the debate over not-being. It does this by
explicitly foreclosing the possibility of speaking of or thinking about what is not. Of course, this
foreclosure means that Parmenides does not – cannot – investigate not-being, except to exclude it
from investigation. Yet this ban on not-being is no minor aside or passing remark, but instead it
determines the structure of the poem, and is a crucial premise in Parmenides’ arguments about
what is. For this reason, later thinkers pushed against this ban. Rather than silence talk of notbeing, Parmenides provokes it.

Three Ways
At the beginning of On Nature, Parmenides journeys to the presence of an unnamed goddess, who
shows Parmenides three ways or paths of investigation, which are determined by the pair
being/not-being. The first is the way of what “is and is not not to be,” 19 that is, the inquiry into
being, what is, τὸ ἐόν.20 This is “the path of assurance, for it follows the truth,”21 and later
commentators accordingly call it a way of truth.

19

Parmenides fr. 2.3 ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι.
For a consideration of what “being” might mean for Parmenides, cf. Palmer Presocratic Philosophy 106-136, Kirk
et al. 239-262 Barnes Presocratic Philosophers 122-157, McKirahan 145-173.
21
Parmenides fr. 1.4, πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος, ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ.
20
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The second way, mentioned only once in the surviving fragments, is of what “is not and
must not be.”22 Yet this turns out to be no way at all: it “is a path totally incomprehensible.” 23
According to Parmenides, not-being can neither be known (γιγνώσκειν) nor referred to (φράζειν):
these are just not achievable (ἀνυστός).24 We recognize this as a particular instance of Parmenides’
general assumption that effective speech, genuine thought, and true reality are linked together,
such that what holds for each holds for the others:25 not-being, insofar as it is not, cannot be thought
nor indicated, and hence we cannot investigate it. The truth of the first path is, consequently, twice
established: on the one hand, according to its own necessity, insofar as it is the way of what is and
must not not be; on the other hand, according to the impossibility of the alternative, insofar as the
way of not-being is foreclosed.
While Parmenides claims that these first two possibilities are the “only ways of inquiry for
thinking,” 26 later in On Nature a third way is introduced, the one of those “who have supposed that
to be and not to be are the same and not the same.” 27 While the second way concerned not-being
as such, this third way mixes being and not-being, such that being is not, or not-being is. While
we could not even begin down the second path, the third, “where mortals knowing nothing / roam
two-headed,” 28 is often taken. Indeed, after pursuing the first way (the Ἀλήθεια), Parmenides
himself is led down this third path, for the goddess tells him that he must

22

Parmenides fr. 2.5, οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι.
Parmenides fr. 2.6, παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν.
24
Parmenides fr. 2.7-8.
25
Consider Parmenides fr. 3.1, “for the same is for thinking and being,” τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι. Or 8.34,
“the same is there for thought and that on account which there is thought,” “ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι
νόημα.”
26
Parmenides fr. 2.2, ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι.
27
Parmenides fr. 6.8-9, οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται / κοὐ ταὐτόν. There is some uncertainty of
whether this third path is indeed different from the second, the path of what is not; yet that would mean that Parmenides
confuses the proposition that not-being is not with the claim that being is not, or that not-being is. Cf Palmer
Presocratic Philosophy 65-73.
28
Parmenides fr. 6.4-5, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν / πλάττονται, δίκρανοι.
23
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[…] learn all,
both the unmoved heart of well-rounded truth
and the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no true assurance. 29
This way is accordingly named the Δόξα, for it concerns δόξαι, beliefs, how things seem to us.
Although these δόξαι lack truth and are mere semblance, by following the third path Parmenides
is assured that “never will any knowledge of mortals surpass you.” 30 Aristotle later suggests that
on this third path Parmenides follows the appearances: here he investigates being according to
sensation, κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, while the truth is according to the account, κατὰ τὸν λόγον.31 Indeed,
Parmenides contends that “much-experienced habit”32 leads us to mix being and not-being, and
that this way involves “aimless sight and echoing hearing.” 33 Further, it is worth noting that,
although the Δόξα is established in terms of a confusion of being and not-being, of the scant
surviving fragments of the Δόξα itself, Parmenides does not mention either not-being or being, 34
instead presenting a strictly physical account of cosmology and human generation.
We should notice that, in discussing the paths of inquiry, Parmenides thrice invokes notbeing, and thrice excludes it. (1) The path of truth is characterized with the formula “is and is not
not to be,” such that τὸ ἐόν is necessary, that is, it cannot not be. (2) Not-being as such cannot be
comprehended, cannot be investigated, and cannot be spoken; it is not, and the path to it is no path
at all. (3) Any apparent mixture of being and not-being is mere semblance, which can only lead to
belief.

29

Parmenides fr. 1.28-30, χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι / ἠμὲν ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ / ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας,
τῇς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.
30
Parmenides fr. 8.61, οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσηι.
31
Meta. A.5 986b31-4.
32
Parmenides fr. 7.3, ἔθος πολύπειρον.
33
Parmenides fr. 7.4, νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν.
34
Except, perhaps, at Parmenides fr. 8.40, if we are to count this line as part of the Δόξα.
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These three invocations and exclusions of not-being are apparently paradoxical, as later
thinkers will complain: how is it possible to say that not-being is not, if we cannot successfully
speak of not-being at all?

Not-Being and the Unchanging Permanence of Being
However, beyond the articulation of these three ways, there is another, even more decisive role for
not-being in Parmenides’ On Nature. While the way of truth, the Ἀλήθεια, concerns the attributes
of τὸ ἐόν, being, several the arguments along this way rely on the impossibility of μὴ ἐόν, notbeing. In this way, the ban on not-being not only demands that we restrict our thinking to being
itself, but it also determines what being itself is.
In Fragment 8, the exposition of the way of truth, Parmenides shows that τὸ ἐόν is
ungenerated and imperishable (or “deathless”), whole and continuous (that is, both complete at
every moment and physically undivided), motionless, and perfectly round. 35 These demonstrations
build on one another, such that we can recognize being’s motionlessness as a consequence of its
being ungenerated, imperishable, complete, and continuous. Yet assumed in most of these
arguments – sometimes tacitly, but often explicitly – is the impossibility of mixing being and notbeing.
Let us here look a little closer at the longest section of the argument, the demonstration that
τὸ ἐόν is ungenerated and imperishable (that is, it neither comes into being nor ever stops being).
Parmenides first argues that if being is, it must be wholly complete and entire whenever it is. For,
if not,

35

Cf. Palmer Presocratic Philosophy 137-59.
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How, from where, did it grow? From not-being I will not let
you say or think: for neither said nor thought
is it that it is not. And what need could have urged it,
later than earlier, begun from nothing, to develop?
Thus it must either wholly be or it is not at all.36
We have two arguments here. First, being cannot grow, because it would have to have not been,
which is impossible. Second, if being comes from what is not, there is no reason why it should
grow at some one moment rather than any other – here is perhaps the earliest Greek appeal to a
principle of sufficient reason. From both arguments, the same conclusion follows – if τὸ ἐόν is, it
is in its entirety. Yet if at any point τὸ ἐόν were not, then it could never come to be, for:
Not ever from not-being will the force of assurance permit
something to come to be beyond it: because of this, neither coming to be
nor perishing has Justice allowed, slackening her shackles,
instead she holds tight. […] 37
Nothing can come from not-being. So not only is it impossible for τὸ ἐόν to grow, it could not
come to be at all, either gradually or all at once, from what is not. Instead being can only be
preceded by being, and if being is it must continue to be. Hence either τὸ ἐόν always was and will
be, or it is not. We are at a κρίσις, a judgment or decision:
[…] And the decision over these comes down to this:
it is or is not; but in fact it has been decided, just as is necessary,

36

Parmenides fr. 8.7-11, πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὐδ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω / φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ
νοητόν / ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ' ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν / ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν; / οὕτως
ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστιν ἢ οὐχί.
37
Parmenides fr. 8.12-15, οὐδέ ποτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς / γίγνεσθαί τι παρ' αὐτό· τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε
γενέσθαι / οὔτ' ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδηισιν, / ἀλλ' ἔχει.
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to dismiss the one as unthought and unnamed (for it is not a true
way), so that the other is and is real.38
Parmenides reminds us that we already made this decision: this is the decision that led us down
the path of truth at the start. Not-being is not: it cannot be spoken, or thought, and it certainly is
not real. In the apparent choice between being and not-being, only being is a genuine possibility.
Therefore, being must be, it must always have been, and it must continue to be: it is ungenerated
and imperishable. Closing the argument, Parmenides eliminates two remaining possibilities, and
restates his conclusion:
And how could being come to be later? And how could it have been?
For if it used to be, it is not, nor is it, if ever it still is going to come to be:
so coming-to-be is extinguished and destruction is unheard of. 39
It can neither be the case that τὸ ἐόν somehow once was and is no longer, nor that now it is not but
will be later. Each of these alternatives would imply that τὸ ἐόν is not – again, something that is
impossible.
In this argument, Parmenides links both the coming-to-be and the passing-away of being
to not-being. If something comes to be, it must not have been; if it ends, it no longer will be. And
if neither generation nor destruction is possible, then it seems that change is impossible, and in fact
Parmenides proposes that being must be immobile and at rest.
We are faced with two seemingly intolerable alternatives – either change is not, or notbeing is. The latter seems unreasonable, while the former is belied by appearances. Hence, we

38

Parmenides fr. 8.15-18, ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῶιδ' ἔστιν·/ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· κέκριται δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη,
/ τὴν μὲν ἐᾶν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθής / ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ' ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι.
39
Parmenides fr. 8.19-21, πῶς δ' ἂν ἔπειτα πέλοι τὸ ἐόν; πῶς δ' ἄν κε γένοιτο; / εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ', οὐκ ἔστ(ι), οὐδ' εἴ ποτε
μέλλει ἔσεσθαι. / τὼς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ ἄπυστος ὄλεθρος.
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recognize why Parmenides’ philosophy is divided into the Ἀλήθεια – where, attending to what
must be, he demonstrates that change is impossible – and the Δόξα – where, attending to how
things seem, he acknowledges the appearance of a mixture of being and not-being. Yet most postParmenidean philosophers are dissatisfied with this solution, and want to insist that change is real,
and not mere semblance – even if, to make this claim, they need to court not-being.40

Not-Being and the Singularity of Being
According to Parmenides, not only is τὸ ἐόν temporally unchanging, but it is also completely
unified, spatially homogenous, continuous, limited, and round. For the most part the
demonstrations of these attributes do not explicitly appeal to the ban on not-being, Parmenides
instead proposing premises like “being approaches being,” 41 and that if it lacked anything, “being
would lack everything.” 42 The exception is in the final argument of the way of truth, where he
argues that being must “resemble the mass of a rounded globe”: 43
[…] for that it is neither any greater
nor any smaller, here or there, it is necessary;
for neither is there not-being, which would prevent it from reaching
unity, nor is being such that it might be being
more here and less there. Since it is all inviolable,

40

Anaxagoras is an interesting counter example here, because he apparently wants to argue for an understanding of
change that does not involve any postulate of not-being. He does so by arguing that anything that comes into being
must have been present there all along, imperceptibly mixed into the body it came from. See Phys. I.4.
41
Parmenides fr. 8.25, ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
42
Parmenides fr. 8.33, ἐὸν δ' ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο.
43
Parmenides fr. 8.43, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι.
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for it is equal from every side, it reaches alike into limits.44
Thus, there is a complicity between the rejection of not-being and the impossibility of finding
differences or plurality in τὸ ἐόν. If being were not continuous and one, its pieces would have to
be divided by not-being. If being were not everywhere alike, then it would be distinguished from
itself only insofar as one part of being would not be. Just as change is rejected, so too are
multiplicity and difference.

Parmenidean Restrictions
We fall into error, then, whenever we think that being changes, that things come into being or pass
away, that there are distinctions among the things that are, or that being is multiple. Except for
being, “nothing else either is or will be.” 45 When we speak of change, not-being, plurality, or
anything else, we are confusing empty names for real being. 46
Of course, it is clear that Parmenides must speak about not-being, even if it is only to ban
it. The impossibility of what is not demands that we confine our thinking to what is: only the truth
is genuinely available for thought. Yet even on this way, the exclusion of not-being determines the
attributes of being. Parmenides’ need to develop a way of truth in which being is known
accidentally makes not-being thematic and even (negatively) determinative. Not-being as banned,
as foreclosed, is one of the decisive concepts of On Nature. Moreover, although Parmenides
abstains from articulating what not-being might be, the functions of not-being in the poem – per

44

Parmenides fr. 8.44-9, τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον / οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῆι ἢ τῆι. / οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐὸν
ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἱκνεῖσθαι / εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ' ἐὸν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος / τῆι μᾶλλον τῆι δ' ἧσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν
ἐστιν ἄσυλον·/ οἷ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἶσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει.
45
Parmenides fr. 8.36, οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἢ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται.
46
Cf. Parmenides fr. 8.38-41.
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se impossible, only seemingly mixed with being, linked to change, multiplicity, and difference –
are in the background of future forays into the philosophy of what is not.

Melissus and the Void
We should mention here one further significant argument that links motion and not-being. This is
the argument of Melissus, another so-called Eleatic, insofar as his philosophy hews close to that
of Parmenides of Elea. Like Parmenides, Melissus argued that being is one, change is impossible,
and so on. He departs from Parmenides by contending that being must be unlimited (while
Parmenides thought it was limited and round). 47 More importantly for us, he developed an original
argument for the impossibility of change of place that indirectly gives us a new way of thinking
about not-being. Starting from the continuity of being, Melissus proposes that being is completely
full, “for the empty is nothing.”48 Yet, as full, being cannot move, “for it does not yield
anywhere.” 49 Something could move into emptiness, τὸ κενόν, “the void,” since it yields. But
emptiness is not, being is full, and thus motion is impossible. Melissus further concludes that
density and rarity are not, for these likewise depend on some sort of emptiness. While this
argument ultimately leads to the same immobilist conclusions as Parmenides’ philosophy,
Melissus articulates a new way of conceptualizing not-being: τὸ κενόν, emptiness, the void. While
the void is rejected by Melissus as nothing, ancient atomists accept the void as a fundamental part
of what is. Indeed, of all of the ancient notions of not-being, the void may be the most famous,
especially given the modern ascendancy of atomic theory.

47

Meta. Α.5 986b9-987a1.
DK 30B7.7, τὸ γὰρ κενεὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν.
49
DK 30B7.7, ὑποχωρῆσαι γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδαμῆι.
48
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ii. The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus
Parmenides’ prohibition of not-being in On Nature immediately influences subsequent Greek
philosophy. This Eleatic ban is in effect for philosophers like Anaxagoras and Empedocles, who
attempt to articulate a physics that allows for change while avoiding not-being, and for sophists
like Gorgias and Euthydemus, who, as we will see in the next Section, used the prohibition on notbeing to defend unbelievable conclusions. Yet while these thinkers grant that not-being is not, the
ancient atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, “say that the elements are the full and the empty,
calling the former being and the latter not-being”.50 It is thus plausible that they are the first Greek
philosophers to posit that not-being must somehow be.

The Eleatic Basis of Classical Atomism
Our familiar picture of atomism – a physics of particles in space – might not seem to have much
overlap with Parmenides’ appearance-denying ontology. Nevertheless, the first atomists develop
their position by means of a deliberate modification of Eleatic philosophy. The atomists agree with
the Eleatics that being must be solid, full, indivisible, unaffected, unchanging, and eternal.51 They
also accept the Eleatic conclusion that if there is any sort of motion or division of being, then notbeing must be. 52 Where they break from the Eleatics is that the atomists do suppose that there are
many beings, moving about, differing from one another, and changing. Thus they postulate that
not-being is.

50

Meta. A.4 985b5-6, στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναί φασι, λέγοντες τὸ μὲν ὂν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν.
DK 67A6, 14, 68A37, 57.
52
DK 67A7, 8, 19, 68A38.
51

24

In particular, the atomists take Melissus’ arguments not as a reductio ad absurdum against
the possibility of motion, but as a positive demonstration. Since motion is, the void must be.
Aristotle tells us that the atomists “profess void to be an interval in which there is nothing of
perceptible body.”53 This void is a kind of localized or situated emptiness, a space where a body
is absent, a place with literally nothing in it. Thus Democritus “calls place by these names, ‘the
void,’ ‘the nothing,’ and ‘the indefinite’ [or ‘the infinite’].” 54 It is common for early Greek
philosophers to suppose that for something to be, it must be somewhere; 55 so it is not surprising
that this first positive instance of not-being is determined as spatially located.

The Role of the Void
Setting aside what the void is per se, we should also consider how the atomists use the void in their
explanations. By positing that not-being is as emptiness or void, the atomists believe they can
account for change, multiplicity, diversity, and the cosmos itself, while retaining a restrictive,
nearly Eleatic sense of being.
For the atomists, as for the Eleatics, to be is to be eternally one, to never change or be
affected, to be completely full everywhere it is, and to thus be indivisible and uncuttable (ἄτομος):
that is, to be is to be eternally, unchangeably, and atomically. However, while the Eleatics argue
that there is only one such eternal atomic being, Leucippus and Democritus suppose that there are
many atomic beings, with each of these atoms having the attributes of unity, indivisibility,
unalterability, etc.56 For the Eleatics, there can only be one being, for if there were multiple beings

53

Physics IV.6 213a27-9, οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι βούλονται κενὸν εἶναι διάστημα ἐν ᾧ μηδέν ἐστι σῶμα αἰσθητόν.
DK 68A37, προσαγορεύει δὲ τὸν μὲν τόπον τοῖσδε τοῖς ὀνόμασι τῶι τε <κενῶι> καὶ τῶι <οὐδενὶ> καὶ τῶι
<ἀπείρωι>.
55
See, for instance, MXG 6 979b24-6, or Plato Parmenides 138a-b, 145b-e.
56
DK 67A7, 68A37.
54
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they would have to be separated by what is not: the atomists grant this conclusion, but disagree
with the premise that not-being cannot be. An individual atom, insofar as it has no void, certainly
could not be divided; 57 but there is void between atoms. Leucippus contends that the multiplicity
of appearances depends on a multiplicity of beings, 58 and in fact the atomists contend that our
infinitely large and varied cosmos requires that there are infinitely many atoms59 – and that there
is an infinite void to separate them from one another.
In addition to being plural, the atomists’ atoms are differentiated from one another by
means of the void. Within the void atoms can be differentiated by their positions (as w differs from
ʍ), or by their arrangement in relation to other atoms (as AN differs from NA). 60 Moreover, atoms
themselves differ in shape and size. According to Leucippus and Democritus, atoms need not be
round or any other specific shape, and in fact they grant that atoms are any and all shapes. 61 (The
atomists do seem to assume that, although atoms can vary in size, 62 they cannot just be any given
size, for empirical reasons: we never encounter a large atom.) 63 Again, the being of atomic
differences in shape depends on the being of the not-being: for Parmenides, the homogeneity of
what is and absence of what is not implies that being is uniform in shape, that is, round (whereas
for Melissus the absence of void meant that being is indefinitely large and without shape). As with
Parmenides’ being, the atomists’ individual atom is internally homogenous everywhere that it is;
but because there are places where an atom is not (and void, instead, is), material or qualitative
homogeneity does not demand spatial or formal uniformity. Atoms can be round, hooked, lopsided,
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DK 67A14.
DK 67A8, 68A38.
59
DK 67A8, 14, 15, 68A38.
60
DK 67A6.
61
DK 67A15.
62
DK 68A47.
63
DK 67A7 68A37.
58
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or any other shape.64 Atomic differences are crucial for Leucippus and Democritus, for only by
means of them can we account for the diversity we find in appearances.
Again: the void is the condition for atomic movement. Atoms themselves do not alter, come
into being, or perish – like the being of Parmenides, they are eternally what they are. Nevertheless,
they move locally, changing their position and arrangement in the void (which, as not-being,
cannot hinder motion in any way). This local motion is the foundation of all other change. 65 When
it seems that something is coming-into-being or growing, this happens because of the combination
of atoms into a certain arrangement; when the same thing shrinks or perishes, these atoms separate
from one another. Likewise, when it seems that something alters without growing or shrinking,
the atoms that compose this thing are changing their arrangement and relative position. We should
notice that with this explanation of coming into being and passing away as the combination and
separation of atoms, the atomists follow the Eleatic elimination of genuine or simple generation
and destruction: no true being, that is, no atom, comes into or goes out of being. Things appear to
be generated and destroyed, but this generation and destruction are only apparent, resulting from
combinations of beings, rather than pertaining to the beings themselves. Not-being, as void, is a
condition for the possibility of motion, and thus all apparent alteration, generation, and destruction;
but being still cannot be generated from nothing, or perish to nothing.

Appearance and Reality in Eleaticism and Atomism
With these remarks, we can recognize how ancient atomism diverges from Eleaticism. The Eleatics
propose that being, as single, homogeneous, and unchanging, is fundamentally inconsistent with

64
65

DK 68A37.
DK 67A7, 97 68A37.
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the diversity, multitude, and movement of appearances. The atomists accept much of the Eleatic
arguments about the nature of being. But for Democritus and Leucippus, even if appearances are
deceptive, they cannot be inconsistent with reality. One could never derive multiplicity from unity,
diversity from uniformity, or motion from rest; and since appearances are evidently multiple,
diverse, and mobile, so too must reality be. Hence the atomists postulate the reality of these
determinations while keeping their atoms as Eleatic as possible – individually singular, internally
homogeneous, admitting no alteration, generation, or destruction. And, with the Eleatics, they
accept that these postulates are only possible if not-being – the void – is.
Although for the atomists reality must be consistent with appearances, they ultimately share
with Parmenides the distinction between what truly is and what seems to be: “it is necessary for
humanity to know by this measure that it is removed from reality” 66 Atoms and void are themselves
imperceptible, and can only be thought.67 For the atomists, perceptible bodies are nothing other
than the combination of a variety of atoms in the void, and the attributes of a body are a
consequence of the properties (shapes, sizes, arrangements, and positions) of the atoms, which
compose that body.68 But our senses themselves will never lead us to this understanding; they are
deceptive, making us believe in the reality of perceptible qualities, of generation and corruption,
of anything other than atoms and void. 69 For this reason the atomists are sometimes cast as early
reductivists, arguing that the wealth of experience can be reduced to two material principles: “by
custom sweet, by custom bitter, by custom hot, by custom cold, by custom color; in reality, atoms

66

DK 68B6, <‘γιγνώσκειν τε χρή>, φησίν, <ἄνθρωπον τῶιδε τῶι κανόνι, ὅτι ἐτεῆς ἀπήλλακται’>.
Cf. DK 68A59.
68
DK 67A6, 97 68A37.
69
DK 68B9, 11.
67

28

and void.” 70 Still, compared to the incompatibility of truth and appearance that seems to be a
consequence of Eleaticism, the strategy of classical atomism seems downright concessive to
appearances.

No More Than Not-Being
We find in the classical atomism of Leucippus and Democritus the postulate of the reality of notbeing as emptiness or void, a concept borrowed from Melissus. This is a spatially localized notion
of not-being, not-being as place absent being, the nothingness that is the interval between the things
that are. By deploying these binary principles – full/empty, being/not-being – the atomists can
retain an Eleatic account of being (atoms as singular, indivisible, full, eternal, unaffected), while
also explaining appearances (as changing, plural, diverse). While atoms and void obviously have
different attributes, in ontological terms they are on equal footing: “[the atomists] say that being
is no more than not-being.”71 We find this claim in one of Democritus’ strangest fragments, “no
more is hing [τὸ δέν] than nothing [τὸ μηδέν].” 72 The expression τὸ δέν, one of Democritus’ names
for atoms, is a neologism derived by removing the μη- from μηδέν (that is, the “not” from
“nothing,” thus the translation of δέν as “hing”), in a way that is probably meant to evoke ἕν
(“one”). Beings, “hings,” are, no more than not-being, nothing, is.
With this “no more” we encounter some ontological problems: if both atoms and void are
– if both have being – how does atomic being relate to the unqualified being that is shared between
being and not-being? Indeed, granted that we can develop some sort of intuition of emptiness (sort
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of), the atomists do not really address how not-being can be, nor how it is possible to think or say
what is not. They reject Parmenides’ ban on not-being, but the surviving atomist fragments do not
address any of Parmenides’ arguments on this point: the intuition that not-being is impossible, and
not-being can neither be thought nor spoken of. This gap need not undermine the atomist project:
as far as we can tell, they are simply more concerned with developing an account of reality that
accords with our senses than with resolving the logical difficulties of postulating that not-being is.
Yet in the next Section we will discover that there are major logical issues with not-being, whether
it is banned or posited.

iii. The Sophists: Gorgias, Euthydemus, and Dionysodorus
Consider the sole fragment of Xeniades of Corinth: “all are false, every appearance and belief lies,
and everything that is generated is generated from not-being and everything that perishes perishes
into not-being.” 73 All we know of this figure is that he was either a predecessor or contemporary
of Democritus. Almost the entirety of this text could be strict Eleaticism: not-being is the source
of all coming into being and the end of all perishing, appearances and beliefs are deceptive. Yet
the fragment begins with the quite anti-Eleatic, self-contradicting assertion that everything is false.
Of course, we cannot be certain of the meaning or motivation behind this fragment. But it is
possible that Xeniades here articulates a response to the Eleatics: if in truth being is single,
immobile, undivided, etc., then everything must be false because everything is plural, moving,
divisible, etc. If truth is so restricted, then reality itself must be false.
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The ancient sophists, various self-proclaimed teachers of wisdom, virtue, debating, or
speech-making, are especially attentive to questions of truth and falsity (Protagoras even named
his work Truth),74 although often this interest is for the sake of undermining the distinction
between the two. Given that the Eleatics and atomists had such a narrow way of truth, with
Xeniades here apparently abandoning it altogether, maybe it is unsurprising that some of the
sophists tackled Eleaticism.

Gorgias on Nothing
Perhaps the most ostentatious sophistic engagement with the Eleatics is the rhetoric teacher
Gorgias’ treatise named On Not-Being, Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. This text is lost, and our information
about it survives in two reports, those of pseudo-Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus.75 In On NotBeing Gorgias seeks to establish three apparently preposterous conclusions: nothing is; if
something is, it is unknowable; if something is and is knowable, it is inexpressible. 76
Of course, it is doubtful that Gorgias believed any of this – these conclusions do not even
seem to leave room for belief! Perhaps, then, this sophistic tour de force was meant to impress
potential students with a display of technique and argumentation, showing Gorgias’ ability to
persuade us of conclusions that are obviously untenable. Whatever the larger purpose of this work,
here we are interested in the way it leverages a concept of what is not to support preposterous
conclusions.
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Although the treatise is known by the name On Not-Being, the first thing Gorgias attempts
to show is that nothing is, οὐδὲν ἔστιν, neither being nor not-being.77 In fact, he agrees with the
Eleatics on at least this: what is not cannot be. If not-being were, it would simultaneously both be
and not be, which is “absurd,” ἄτοπος.78 In addition to reproducing Eleatic arguments, Gorgias
also proposes some of his own, although most of these are obscure – or maybe just poor arguments.
According to Gorgias, if not-being were, then its opposite, being, would not be.79 According to
pseudo-Aristotle’s report Gorgias suggests that what is not might have being, but this hypothesis
is meant to undermine the reality of both being and not-being. He notes that just as being is being,
not-being is not-being; thus, both what is and what is not are self-identical. Both, then, have being
in the same way.80 But if there were both being and not-being, then being would no more be than
not-being. But not-being is not, and so being would also not be.81 Likewise, if what is and what is
not were the same thing, then what is cannot be, because it is the same as what is not.82 Lastly, he
claims that if they are the same, they cannot both be. 83
To complete his proof that nothing is, Gorgias needs to also show that being cannot be.
This is the most important section of the demonstration, for the Eleatics would easily concede that
not-being cannot be, but they would not accept the claim that being is not. Happily, the records of
this portion of Gorgias’ arguments are slightly more extensive, although they are still
underdeveloped. As the focus is on being, rather than not-being, we can take this in outline. His
general strategy is to show that if being were, it would have to be either generated or ungenerated,
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and either one or many – and none of these alternatives is possible. These arguments borrow
heavily from the Eleatics, and so it is unsurprising that in them Gorgias makes two explicit appeals
to the impossibility of not-being. First, being cannot be generated from what is not, for “nothing
could come to be from nothing” 84 – a popular formulation of the Parmenidean thesis that change
cannot come from what is not. Second, if being is nowhere, then it is not; for, following Zeno,
Gorgias assumes that what is must be somewhere, and what is nowhere is not. 85 For these and
other reasons, Gorgias contends that being cannot be. Consequently, there cannot be anything:
there is not what is, there is not what is not, and there is not both what is and what is not.

Even If Something Is…
In the remaining sections of the treatise, Gorgias’ arguments are qualified by “even-if” clauses:
even if something is, it cannot be thought; even if something is and can be thought, it cannot be
expressed. Gorgias begins from Parmenides’ affirmation that being can and must be thought (and
not-being cannot be thought): “for it is necessary that what is thought is, and not-being, if indeed
it is not, is not thinkable.” 86 However, Gorgias contends, this leads to a major absurdity: “nothing
would be false.” 87 For if thinking were necessarily about being, then thinking would per se be true,
no matter how ridiculous the thought. That there are chariots driving over the ocean, or that I might
be made of glass – if it can be thought, then it must be, and the thought is true. It would not matter
that we neither see nor hear chariots on the ocean: I do not hear colors, or see sounds, so why
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would I expect to sense thoughts? 88 Yet this is absurd, there must be falsity, and thus we do not
only think what is.
Additionally, according to Sextus, Gorgias provides a second argument, which has the
advantage over the last in that it does not presuppose that thought is only of beings, but has the
disadvantage of being a worse argument. Gorgias claims that if beings are thought, then not-beings
must be not-thought, insofar as being and not-being are opposites, and opposites have contrary
predicates.89 Thus every thought would have to be, which again leads to absurdities, “for Scylla
and Chimaera and many of the not-beings are thought.” 90 Sextus reports that ultimately Gorgias
hoped to show with these arguments that “the things that are thought are not-beings,” 91 and thus
that beings are not thought.
Finally, according to Gorgias, even if something is, and is thought, it still cannot be
expressed (that is, spoken of, or referred to). Since this demonstration of this does not appeal to
not-being at all, we will not say much for it. Gorgias proposes two reasons why we cannot speak
of being: “because things are not expressions, and because nobody means [or has in mind] the
same thing as somebody else.” 92 These claims belie some interesting problems about the status of
language and of meaning (how can language, which is heterogeneous with the things of the world,
refer to these things? how can two people mean the same thing?), but Gorgias does not go so far
as to say that expressions, λεκτά, are not-beings.

Gorgias’ Immanent Critique of the Eleatics
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In Parmenides’ On Nature, being must be, it must be thought, and it must be said. Not-being cannot
be, cannot be said, and cannot be thought. Gorgias takes up this Eleatic linkage of being, thinking,
and speaking, so as to eliminate the possibility of all three. We might think of On Not-Being as
one of the first attempts at immanent critique: Gorgias adopts many of the premises and strategies
of the Eleatics to reach three conclusions the Eleatics would absolutely reject. Both Plato and
Aristotle have similar approaches in refuting Parmenides.
Gorgias adopts the Eleatic determinations of not-being (impossible, ungenerative,
nowhere, unthinkable, unspeakable), but he also adds to them. He posits that not-being is the
opposite of being (and draws some unconvincing conclusion from this – opposites need not have
entirely opposite predicates). While the Eleatics usually speak about not-being in the singular (a
prominent exception would be fr. 7.1 of Parmenides’ On Nature, quoted above in Chapter 1
Section i), Gorgias speaks of not-beings, unreal things like the Chimaera or chariots that drive
across the ocean. He even contends that the objects of thought are not-beings (a proposal which
seems to be ignored by the classical Greek philosophers). Much of the arguments in On Not-Being
depend on the impossibility of not-being, but not-being seems to appear everywhere. Taking to an
extreme the Eleatic’s seemingly ever-more-restrictive concept of what is, Gorgias ends up with an
ever-expanding conception of what is not. While this prohibitively narrow understanding of being
and unmanageably broad understanding of not-being might suit the rhetorician striving to display
his superiority to philosophers, this situation does not suit the philosophers striving to articulate
the way things are.
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Everything is True?
Perhaps the most disruptive of Gorgias’ claims about not-being is one he does not actually accept:
if we cannot think not-being, then nothing can be false. He rejects this notion in favor of the
(somehow to him more palatable) claim that being cannot be thought. Still, other sophists
embraced this rejection of falsehood: Gorgias’ student Antisthenes thought that contradiction is
impossible, for every speech must refer to some being, and thus be true. 93 (Although he also
thought that “nothing was worth saying except the proper account of something,” 94 but just because
it might be the case that only true things are worth saying, we should not thus infer that only true
things can be said.)
Or consider Plato’s Euthydemus, when the brothers and self-proclaimed teachers of virtue
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus defend themselves by denying the possibility of either lying or
contradiction. To lie (ψεύδειν) is to say something false (ψεῦδος), and speaking falsely is speaking
something that is not; but we cannot speak what is not, which is nowhere; rather, all of our speech
is of what is, and thus is true. 95 Further, if every statement is of what is, then two people could
never be in contradiction, for they are both speaking about beings: if they are speaking about the
same being, then they are saying the same thing and thus not in contradiction with each other; but
even if they are not speaking of the same thing, there is no contradiction, because they are talking
about different beings.96 With this last argument, the impossibility of speaking what is not mixes
with something like Protagorean relativism. For Dionysodorus, any apparent contradiction is
instead two people speaking truly about different beings. For Protagoras, “of all things the measure
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is human, of the beings that they are, of not-beings that they are not.” 97 That is, all judgments are
relative to whoever does the judging. Such a conclusion would never suit the Eleatics, nor indeed
any philosopher who hopes to distinguish the genuine truth from lies and falsehoods.
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Chapter 3
Plato’s Idea of Not-Being

i. Philosophy in Dialogue
Writing about Plato’s dialogues always comes with a peculiar set of problems. Because Plato is
not a character in any of the dialogues, we are unable to directly establish what he believes. Plato’s
dialogues display sophistical arguments that undermine the very project of philosophy, but also
the investigations of philosophers who are dedicated understanding the truth of things. Plato gives
voice to both: to both the sham teachers and the genuine lovers of knowledge, to both sophistry
and philosophy. In the dialogues we find Socrates, separating knowledge and belief, Timaeus,
accounting for the cosmos, Parmenides, reviewing speculative hypotheses about the one, and the
unnamed Eleatic Stranger, hunting for a definition of sophistry.
These protagonists, pursuing a range of questions with a variety of methods, all touch on,
either in depth or peripherally, the problem of not-being. As the last Chapter has shown, by Plato’s
time this problem was at play in the questions of physics (with considerations of motion, change,
and empty place), logic (with falsity, contradiction, and belief), and ontology (with what is and
what is not as such). Plato, no slouch, tackles all of these; indeed, his writings on these topics are
more voluminous than what survives from all the other predecessors, combined. Yet there is a
degree of dramatic tension in these texts, for the protagonists occasionally speak against one
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another: Parmenides criticizes young Socrates, the Eleatic Stranger claims to break with his teacher
Parmenides. 98 This can lead one to despair of finding any unified doctrines in Plato.
Of Plato’s dialogues, the Sophist certainly has the most extensive and explicit discussion
of not-being. The interlocutors violate the Parmenidean ban on speaking about not-being, and they
refute Gorgias’ contention that falsity is impossible. In so doing, they establish not-being as a
single form that everything shares in – including being itself. Ultimately, they conclude that the
nature of not-being must be understood as difference from being. This dialogue thus deserves some
special attention, and in the next Section I will consider how it gets to this idea of not-being.
From there, we will review the other texts in the Platonic corpus where not-being seems to
be at issue: the conversation about belief and knowledge at the end of Book V of the Republic, the
fifth and sixth hypotheses of the Parmenides, and the discussion of χώρα in the Timaeus. We will
also briefly consider the possibility of a principle of not-being in the so-called “unwritten
teachings.”
With all of this behind us, we will be able to make sense of a Platonic doctrine of an idea
of not-being. This idea, for Plato, must be distinguished from any concept of not-being as what
simply is not – something that is wholly unintelligible. But, properly understood, the idea of notbeing is real for Plato. Indeed, it is constitutive: of falsehoods and images, of the sensible world of
becoming and difference, and maybe even of the real formal beings themselves.
I will end this Chapter with a consideration of Plato’s stance on Eleaticism. The dialogues
certainly make much use of Eleatic ideas and distinctions. But in the Sophist and the Parmenides
we see a tension between our two Eleatic protagonists, with the Stranger from the former breaking
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with Parmenides for his written arguments on not-being. But the character of Parmenides in Plato’s
dialogue seems to be entertaining hypotheses that largely reflect the conclusions of the Stranger. I
argue that this is Plato’s suggestion that his philosophy, with its proper understanding of not-being,
is in fact a neo-Eleaticism, truer to Parmenides’ principles than Parmenides himself is.

ii. The Sophist
The main interlocutors of the Sophist are a guest from Elea and Theaetetus, a bright, young
mathematician, with the elder Socrates and a crowd of others listening. Plato never names the
Eleatic Stranger, but he claims to be a former student of Parmenides. 99 The conversation concerns
sophistry, and the interlocutors are attempting to find an account of the sophist’s art. 100 After
discussing a number of alternatives, the interlocutors posit that sophistry is a kind of image-making
art, one that produces false speech in place of truth. 101 But here the Eleatic Stranger finds himself
at an impasse: Parmenides’ injunctions against not-being are incompatible with the account of
sophistry as producing images or inducing false beliefs. 102 To say or believe something false is to
say or believe something that is not; but, according to Parmenides, it is impossible to say what is
not; therefore, we cannot say something false and everything we say is true. Above we noted that
Gorgias uses this argument, perhaps for eristic purposes (as do the fraternal sophists of Plato’s
Euthydemus), and that his student Antisthenes seems to outright embrace the impossibility of
falsehood.
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The Eleatic Challenge
The Stranger does not suppose that his young interlocutor is especially familiar with either the
Eleatic position or its sophistic appropriation, and he thus gives several arguments showing the
difficulties at hand. While Parmenides’ On Nature presupposes that not-being could neither be
thought nor spoken, the Eleatic Stranger articulates three impasses that undermine the possibility
of saying not-being, understood as “what in no way is,” or “utter-not-being.”103
The first impasse supposes that speech must say something (that is, indicate or refer to
something).104 Yet the name “not-being” cannot refer to any being, or indeed to any “something”
at all, insofar as “some” is always said of being. 105 Therefore, when we pronounce “not-being” we
are saying nothing, that is, we fail to speak.106
The second impasse supposes that number, as something that is, can only be attached to
something that is, and so we cannot attribute any numerical attributes to what is not.107 But
whenever we say “what are not” (“not-beings,” in the plural) or “what is not” (“not-being,” in the
singular) we are implicitly including a numerical attribute, be it plurality or unity. 108 Consequently,
we cannot consistently say “not-being” at all, as any attempt to do so illegitimately implies some
number of not-beings.109 Moreover, as thus innumerable, what is not is not graspable in anyway:
not-being is “unthinkable and unsayable and unutterable and unaccountable.” 110
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The third impasse uses this last conclusion as a starting point, reflecting on the very
discussion at hand, given the unaccountability of not-being. For we cannot consistently say that
not-being is unsayable or think that it is unthinkable. Any purported refutation of not-being
presupposes the very thing it is refuting, and thus undermines itself. 111 This inconsistency does not
mean that not-being indeed is sayable or thinkable, but instead suggests that the unsayability of
not-being must be silently presumed, rather than demonstrated. This leads the interlocutors back
to the Parmenidean beginning, where the impossibility of not-being is necessary but
indemonstrable.

The Sophistic Challenge
After establishing the Eleatic ban on not-being, the Stranger plays the role of sophist. The Strangeras-sophist demands that, if we are to claim that sophistry is the art of the production of images or
inducing falsity, we must give a definition of image and falsehood.
Image: Theaetetus proposes that an image is “what was made such as a genuine thing,
another such as this,” 112 and explains that the image is not the genuine thing, only it resembles the
thing. The Stranger, linking the genuine (ἀληθινός) with what really is (ὄντως ὂν), supposes that
since an image is not genuine, it really is not. So even if an image is “really a likeness,” 113 it also
shares in not-being. As images thus seem to illegitimately mix being and not-being, they are
impossible, and we cannot truly say that the sophist is an image-maker.
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Falsity: the Stranger proposes that a belief is false if it believes what is not, or what is
“contrary to the things that are.” 114 Elaborating, the interlocutors establish that what really makes
a belief (or account) false is not merely that it is of not-being, but that it believes (or says) of what
is not that it is, or of what is that it is not. 115 Yet in both the simplified account (falsity is of notbeing) and the complex account (falsity confuses being for not-being or vice versa), falsity is
impossible, for not-being is unaccountable. 116
Thus the sophist finds refuge under the Eleatic ban on not-being: without an account of
not-being, we cannot account for sophistry as image-making or falsehood-inducing.

Hunting for Not-Being
The Eleatic Stranger is determined to fix this with a pursuit by account for not-being, establishing
both the being of not-being and the not-being of being. 117 Yet he is worried that, in such a pursuit,
he will be accused of parricide. 118 Indeed, not only does the Stranger seek to break the rule of papa
Parmenides about not-being,119 but he does so by calling into question being itself. Earlier thinkers,
including Parmenides, were too quick in deciding the quantity and quality (that is, the “how many”
and “of what sort”: πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά) of beings. 120 Is being one (as the Eleatics suppose), many,
or some mixture of one and many? 121 Are beings moving, sensible bodies, or unchanging, invisible

114

Plato Sophist 240d6, τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι.
Plato Sophist 240e1-241a2.
116
Plato Sophist 241a3-b3.
117
Plato Sophist 241d6-7.
118
Plato Sophist 241d1-3.
119
Plato Sophist 241d5.
120
Plato Sophist 242c4-6.
121
Plato Sophist 242c8-245e5.
115

43

forms, or is being some sort of mixture of motion and rest? 122 Every answer leads to an impasse,
and the interlocutors decide that being is just as complicated and perplexing as not-being.123
Still, the Stranger hopes that, insofar as they can illuminate either one of being or not-being,
they can better understand the other. 124 The Stranger proposes that they can gain some clarity by
examining some of the greatest forms or kinds, both by themselves and in communion with one
another, investigating how they mix together or fail to do so. 125 The interlocutors posit as greatest
the kinds being, motion, and rest, 126 apparently drawing from their discussion of whether being is
as (moving) body or (immobile) form. Because each of these kinds is the same as itself, and
different than the others, the interlocutors quickly add same and different as two more of the
greatest kinds. 127 Like the kind being, the same and different each hold of everything, for
everything that is has some share of being, is the same as itself, and different than other things.
In the course of considering how the mixtures and separations of these five kinds, the
interlocutors reflect on the relation between motion and the other kinds. Motion differs from rest,
and “therefore it is not-rest.” 128 Further, motion, which is presumed to be and thus to share in
being, nonetheless differs from being itself. 129 So, as motion differs from being while also
partaking in it, “it is really not-being and being.”130 The basis for this rediscovery of not-being is
difference, for it is as different that motion is not-rest, not-being, not-same, and so on. The
interlocutors quickly generalize this conclusion to all forms. Not-being is produced by the “nature
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of the different,” 131 insofar as everything differs from being. So, although all kinds share in being,
that is, they “both are and are beings,” 132 they are yet, also, not-being. Moreover, even the kind
being is not, for it differs from every form other than itself: “for, not-being those [others], it is
itself one.” 133 The interlocutors have found the not-being of the forms, and indeed the not-being
of being itself.
The Stranger contrasts not-being as difference-from-being with the utter-not-being, τὸ
μηδαμῶς ὂν, which was shown to be impossible by the earlier Eleatic refutations. In those
refutations, not-being was understood as contrary or opposite to being.134 However, just as
something can be not-big without being small, 135 something can be a not-being without being the
opposite of being.
Negation is grounded in difference, not contrariety. The Stranger explains: the particle
“not” (τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὔ) before a name indicates something different than the name (or, more
specifically, it indicates something different than the things that are indicated by the name). 136
Thus the earlier refutations still hold: the contrary of being, what in no way is, cannot be said,
thought, we might as well shut up about it, etc. 137 Nevertheless, they do not gainsay the being of
not-being, properly understood as what differs from being.
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Questions about Not-Being as Difference-From-Being
Two significant problems remain. (1) Even with the Stranger’s account of negation, it seems that
not-being is impossible: “being” names everything, so if “not-being” names something different
than everything, it must name nothing. (2) Even if being differs from all the other forms, it is not
different from itself; this suggests that one can say that being is not this or that form, but not that
it is not-being.
To resolve these problems, we must recall our earlier discussion of the completability of
“being” in ancient Greek. We noted above that, even when used without a complement, being, ὄν,
is understood as open to a complement in a way that our term “existence” is not. In fact, the same
instance of the verb “to be” can be used both existentially and attributively, without any suggestion
of amphiboly. This also holds for not-being, μὴ ὄν. While the interlocutors do not explicitly discuss
the completability or openness of (not-)being, it is certainly presupposed in this discussion. For
example, the Stranger claims that “regarding each of the forms, then, being is many, but not-being
is unending in multitude.”138 This conclusion makes no sense if not-being is understood as some
singular difference-from-being-itself; instead, not-being must include difference-from-beinggreen, difference-from-being-in-motion, and so on endlessly. Some given form thus has several
positive determinations: its “being is many” (it is, is the same as itself, etc.). And it has infinite
negative ones.
This gives us an answer for (1): not-being cannot be difference from being itself, for what
differs from being itself would be none of the things that are, and in truth would be identical to the
contrary of being. Instead, not-being is always difference from being-something: for example,
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“not-being-musical” names something other than everything named by “being-musical.” Although
not-being thus always requires at least an implicit complement, we will see below that these
various not-beings can be collected into one kind with a single nature.
Moreover, turning to (2), the argument for the not-being of being uses the syntax of 2-place
not-being: “not-being those [other forms], [being] itself is one.” 139 It is not the case that being is
not-being because it differs from itself as such – this would simply be a contradiction. Rather,
being shares in not-being because it differs from the various determinate ways of being: beingfeline, being-red, being-at-rest, and so on. We can speculate that perhaps the suggestion is that the
kind being as such differs from being-x or being-y in the same way that a class differs from its
parts or subclasses.

Negative Kinds
The Stranger builds on his account of negation with an investigation into negative kinds, kinds like
not-beautiful and not-just. As the negative particle indicated difference from the name that
followed it, negative kinds are parts or subclasses of the kind difference. To the kind difference
belongs, for example, everything that is different than the beautiful. The class of everything that
so differs is named the not-beautiful.140 The Stranger makes an analogy with the kind knowledge:
just as knowledge can be divided into a number of knowledges, each of which concerns a
something (knowledge of the just, knowledge of the living, etc.), the nature of difference can be
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divided into a number of differences, each of which is other than something (the not-just, notliving, etc.).141
These negative kinds literally are “not,” in that they are not-beautiful, not-just, etc. Yet the
nature of difference is, and therefore also the parts of this nature – the negative kinds – have
being.142 The negative particle opposes beings to beings, rather than indicating something outside
of being. So, beings belong to negative kinds just as they belong to their counterparts: 143 while
Matelda, Virgil, Lucy, and Florence, as cats, belong to the kind feline, they also belong to the
negative kinds not-canine and not-aquatic. The negative kind thus have just as much being as their
positive counterparts.
The nature of not-being, then, simply follows from the account of negative kinds. Like the
other negative kinds, not-being is a part of difference. Specifically, the being of not-being is “the
part of [the nature of difference] that is set against the being of each.” 144 Since “the being of each”
may here be understood as all the various ways of being-something (e.g. being-beautiful, beingfeline), the form of not-being as such includes all the different ways of not-being-something (notbeing-beautiful, not-being-feline). Hence the Stranger affirms: “not only did we show that notbeings are,” that is, that there are various determinate ways of not-being-something, “but also we
have declared what happens to be the form of not-being.” 145 Not-being has a single being (or form,
or nature), defined by the intersection of difference and being. 146
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In a sense, not-being is subordinated to both difference and being; nevertheless, it is just as
real and extensive as each. Not-being is, just as all the other kinds are: it “is an οὐσία no less than
being itself.” 147 Not-being is the same as itself, as the beautiful is beautiful and the good is good. 148
Further, because everything differs from some determinate way of being or other, everything
shares in not-being: what is not is “scattered across all beings.” 149 The Eleatic Stranger has
transgressed Parmenides’ prohibition, 150 having articulated and defended both the being of notbeing and the not-being of being.

Answering the Sophist
Since the interlocutors have bypassed the Eleatic impasses about not-being, what remains for them
is the overcoming of the sophist’s obfuscations. The sophist claimed that images and falsehoods
were impossible, for not-being was unspeakable. Because the interlocutors now have an account
of not-being, negation, and negative kinds, it is no longer enough for the sophist to link images
and falsehoods to what is not. For instance, images were described as what seems like something
while not being that thing; 151 but it is now clear that it is possible for an image to not be the thing
it depicts, without thus being nothing at all. 152
While this sophistical argument against images might be easy to refute, establishing the
being of falsity proves more difficult. The Stranger, playing the role of sophist, concedes that notbeing is, but he contends that neither speech (λόγος) nor belief (δόξα) share in not-being.153 But
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speech and belief are false only insofar as they concern not-being.154 So, by claiming that speech
and belief concern only what is, the sophist maintains that falsehoods are impossible. 155 To define
sophistry, Theaetetus and the Stranger must therefore give an account of falsity, carefully linking
it to not-being without returning to the rejected hypothesis that the false says the opposite of what
is.156
The interlocutors begin with a discussion of speech (or “propositions,” “accounts,” λόγοι):
speech weaves together nouns (or names, ὀνόματα) and verbs (ῥήματα), with the former signifying
agents and the latter signify actions. 157 Neither nouns alone nor verbs alone can produce speech,
for only their intermixture can “manifest the action or inaction or οὐσία of a being or a notbeing.” 158 Moreover, speech needs to be “of something” (τινὸς), that is, it must refer to some
being,159 and it says something “about” (περί) this being. 160 The distinction between what speech
is “of” and what it is “about” sets up two separate relations between speech and beings: speech is
“of” a being by referring to it or indicating it directly (with the noun in the subject position), and
it is “about” a being by attributing something to it (with the verb naming the action or state which
is “to be about” noun, or to be attributed to the noun).
The truth or falsity of speech arises in this second relation, between what speech says about
its referent and what really is about this thing.161 Speech is true when what it says about something
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really is about that thing. 162 Speech is false when what it says about something really is not about
that thing. That is, recalling the account of negation, false speech says about its referent something
that is different from what really is about this referent. 163 False speech thus involves what is not:
“therefore, [the false] says not-beings as beings.” 164 Yet the not-being of false speech is still
something,165 just something different from the truth. For false speech still must say something
about something, or else it would not be speech. 166 False speech, then, says what is, as both the
noun (what the speech is “of”) and the verb (what the speech says to be “about” the noun) indicate
beings.167 What is not, in a falsehood, is the belonging together of what is attributed and that to
which it is attributed: the false confuses the different with the same, not-being with being. 168 The
interlocutors have reached an agreement about false speech. With this account of falsity, the final
obstacles in the interlocutors’ hunt for the sophist seem to be overcome. Thought and belief are
modeled on speech, and the reality of false belief is quickly established. 169 Theaetetus and the
Stranger can return, finally, to the supposition that sophistry is a deceptive image-making art. 170

The Being of Not-Being
The being of not-being is articulated as a kind of difference, namely difference from being, while
difference itself is an irreducible and fundamental form. While not-being is thus defined and
defended, the possibility of something that is contrary or opposite to being is rejected along Eleatic
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lines: Parmenides’ prohibition on speaking of not-being is maintained, but only for the case of the
contrary of being, what completely is not. Moreover, as not-being is mixed among all things, the
interlocutors can account for both images and falsehoods. Images appear to be something, while
not-being that thing. Falsehoods confuse being and not-being: that is, they say something is, which
is different from what is. In the Sophist, not-being is, it has a specific nature, and it is revealed to
be an indispensable element of beings.

iii. Other Appearances of Not-Being in Plato
The Sophist must take priority when thinking about a Platonic theory of not-being. This dialogue
engages most thoroughly and directly with the problem of not-being, and it reaches substantive
conclusions about the form of not-being. But there are other Platonic texts where the problem of
not-being arises, and which are worthy of quick review.
An obvious case is Plato’s Euthydemus, where the sophist Dionysodorus invokes the
impossibility of not-being in order to deny that anything is false. In the last Chapter we saw the
Gorgian provenance of this argument. Further, this argument is clearly the target of the Stranger’s
refutations in the Sophist. We need not dwell longer on this dialogue, as it only exemplifies what
Plato takes to be the problematic and sophistical way of understanding not-being.
The other textual allusions to not-being in the Platonic corpus are generally more
productive. In this Section we shall touch briefly on how not-being comes up in certain discussions
of the Republic and the Parmenides, and is perhaps involved in the Timaeus and Plato’s unwritten
teachings.

Ignorance, Belief, and Appearance in the Republic
52

At the end of Book V of the Republic,171 Socrates discusses with Glaucon the difference between
philosophers, who desire wisdom and pursue all sorts of learning, and the lovers of sights and
sounds, who seek out beautiful appearances and speeches. Socrates clarifies this difference by
invoking a distinction between three mental states:
(1) knowledge,
(2) ignorance, and
(3) belief.
The first is associated with philosophers and the third with the lovers of appearances. This
distinction should remind us of Parmenides’ three paths:
(1) the way of truth,
(2) the incomprehensible way, and
(3) the way of belief.
And, as is the case with Parmenides’ three ways, for Socrates the distinction between mental states
is based on an ontological difference between
(1) being,
(2) not-being, and
(3) the mixture of being and not-being.
Like the Eleatic, the Socratic philosopher is one who pursues truth and being.
The interlocutors agree that someone who knows “knows something,” 172 and that this is
something that is, that is, a being. 173 Further, they establish that a not-being cannot be known:
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“what completely is, is completely knowable, and what is not in any way, is altogether
unknowable.” 174 Thus they establish a sort of rough analogy between a potency and its objects:
knowledge (γνῶσις) concerns being, and ignorance (ἀγνωσία) is “necessarily about not-being.” 175
This analogy is somewhat tenuous – as Socrates himself suggests176 – for ignorance is never
directly called a potency (δύναμις), and it is unclear how it can have not-being as an object. I will
return to ignorance shortly.
Moving onward, Socrates contends that we can distinguish potencies only if they relate to
different objects and accomplish different things. 177 Thus if there is some potency that differs from
knowledge and ignorance, it must attend to things which are somehow between (μεταξύ) being
and not-being.178
Belief is this different potency, for while knowledge is always unerring, belief frequently
ends up being wrong. 179 But since knowledge is directed at true beings, belief must be directed
toward something else. Further, since we cannot have a belief about what in no way is, and not being was already associated with ignorance, the objects of belief must somehow be.
What are these believed objects, which somehow are and somehow are not? They turn out
to be nothing other than the various things that appear to us, the objects to which the lovers of
sights and sounds attend. For any beautiful thing is also, in some respect, ugly; any large thing,
small; any pious thing, impious. 180 Here the interlocutors reason from “what is something is also
not that something” to “what is also is not.” And so Glaucon describes appearances as “neither
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being nor not-being, nor both nor neither; in no way is it possible to think these things firmly.” 181
Nothing that appears to us is completely what it is. Instead, such appearances “roll around between
not-being and pure being,” 182 partaking of being in certain respects and not-being in others.
While belief relates to unstable appearances, knowledge regards the unchanging beings
themselves, that is, the forms. Beauty itself, the form of the beautiful, unlike any given beautiful
thing, always remains exactly what it is. So it is, in the Republic, with all the forms: they do not
change and cannot be sensed. This division between the objects of belief and knowledge is most
famously represented in the image of the divided line of Book VI, with the intelligible unchanging
forms composing the larger portion of the line and appearances making up the shorter portion (the
lengths are postulated to be proportional to the clarity of the objects). 183 Ignoring Socrates’ further
subdivisions of this line, this image postulates a fundamental divide between the objects of
knowledge (the forms, the things themselves, the intelligible, beings – along with the derivative
mathematical objects) and those of belief (what partakes in the forms, appearances, the visible,
what is between being and not-being, that is, becoming, γένεσις – along with the derivative
images).184

The Form of Not-Being Tacit in Socrates’ Argument
The form of not-being, as established in the Sophist, is unsurprisingly absent from the conversation
of the Republic. Nowhere in this do the interlocutors define not-being as a kind of difference, nor
do they differentiate not-being from what completely is not. Still, if we think on Socrates and
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Glaucon’s discussion with this form and that distinction in mind, we find that they clarify some of
the difficulties of the argument.
The interlocutors agree that “utter-not-being is completely unknowable,” 185 a claim we are
familiar with from Parmenides and the Eleatic arguments in the Sophist. But if all we could say
about not-being is that we are wholly ignorant of it, the sophists will remind us that this renders
belief inoperative, as its objects go between being and not-being. Moreover, Socrates affirms that
“ignorance by necessity [is] about not-beings,” 186 but such an ignorance-about cannot follow from
the unknowability of not-being (even if “ignorance” and “unknowable,” that is, ἀγνωσία and
ἄγνωστος, are cognates). For nothing can be “about” (ἐπὶ) the unknowable utter-not-being, as if it
were the object of some power of ignorance.
The interlocutors do not acknowledge any tension between these various claims. The topic
of ignorance is incidental to their discussion of knowledge and belief. But we can see that there
are two different concepts of ignorance at play here.
(1) Our inexpressible ignorance of what in no way is; the unknowability of utter-notbeing posited by Parmenides.
(2) Our common, everyday ignorance of beings; this is about not-being as false speech
and beliefs are about not-being as explicated in the Sophist.
Socrates has no need to distinguish these kinds of ignorance in the Republic. But by doing so we
can resolve some tensions in the text.
Further, the Republic’s brief argument that appearances – what becomes, or the things that
participate in the forms – are somehow between being and not-being supposes something like the
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Sophist’s account of not-being. The interlocutors agree that a beautiful thing also appears ugly,
what is double is also half, the big thing small, and so on.187 Each of these appearances, then, is no
more what it is than not what it is. 188 However, to conclude from this assumption that appearances
are between being and not-being (or, as Socrates says, they “roll around between not-being and
pure being”) 189 the interlocutors have to accept the supposition that not-being-something is a sort
of not-being. That is, the form of not-being articulated in the Sophist.

Mental Gymnastics in the Parmenides
The bulk of Plato’s Parmenides is an investigation of the consequences of two opposing
propositions – the one is, the one is not. These examinations are not done in reference to visible
things, “but referring to those that most of all one might grasp by speech and hold to be forms.” 190
Each of these propositions is interpreted in two ways, giving us four different starting points. And
for each of these starting points, the interlocutors separately consider the consequences both for
“the one” itself and for “the others” of the one. Thus, the dialogue has eight hypotheses, as well as
a section supplemental to the second hypothesis, sometimes counted as a separate hypothesis. The
speaker who leads these examinations is none other than the titular poet-philosopher Parmenides,
who guides Aristotle (a future tyrant, who is unrelated to our Stagarite student of Plato, Aristotle,
scholarch of the Lyceum) in discussion with questions about the being and not-being of the one.
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These eight hypotheses are presented as a strange sort of intellectual gymnastics, 191 on display at
the request of the still youthful Socrates. 192
The ultimate meaning of these hypotheses, both separately and taken together, is
undeveloped. 193 Thankfully, we can focus on just the fifth and sixth hypotheses. These two suppose
that “the one is not,” and ask what this means for the one. What would it mean for the one to not
be? The pursuit of these questions turns on the sense of not-being.

Hypothesis Five: Not-Being that Shares in Οὐσία
The fifth hypothesis of the Parmenides is that “the one is not.” Parmenides begins his investigation
into this hypothesis by comparing it with the opposing statement “the not-one is not.” We
distinguish these statements insofar as we know that their subjects – the one, the not-one – differ
from one another. 194 Therefore the one that is not must have determinations beyond its not-being.
It must differ from other things (that is, from the not-one), and we must have some knowledge of
it (minimally, we know that it differs). Moreover, the one that is not must be identifiable in some
way, and have a number of other attributes: “it is necessary for it to share both in the ‘that’ and in
many others.” 195 We must be able to say things of the one, and relate things to it.196 If the one were
not determined in these ways, then we would not be referring to anything whenever we propose
that “the one is not,” and indeed we would fail to utter anything meaningful. 197
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Hence the one is still something, even if it also is (simply) not. In the proposition “the one
is not,” the predicate (not-being) is added to subject (the one), while the subject itself is already
determined.198
The interlocutors establish several further attributes of this one, arguing from its otherness
from other things, its intelligibility, and its identifiability or “thisness.” They contend: the one that
is not has to be like itself and unlike other things. 199 It is not equal to other things. 200 Thus it shares
in inequality.201 – and greatness, smallness, and even equality. 202
Not only does this one that is not have many attributes, Parmenides argues that it somehow
shares in οὐσία. Parmenides argues from the truth of the proposition to the being of its referents:
“yet since we claim to speak truths, it is necessary also for us to claim to speak of beings.” 203 The
one that is not must accordingly have some share of being, or else we could not truly say that it is
not, and we could not speak of it at all. “For if [the one] will not be a not-being, but will somehow
give up [its] being in order to not-be, right away it will be a being.” 204 This being is understood as
a bond or restraint, δεσμός, on the one’s not-being. If the one had absolutely no share in being, it
would mutely, indiscernibly, and simply not be.
Parmenides connects this conclusion about the being of the one that is not to a general
consideration of the being of not-being and the not-being of being. 205 For being to completely be,
it must share in not-being, insofar as it is not what is not. Likewise, for not-being to really not-be,
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it must share in being, insofar as it is what is not. This must be the case for anything that is:
something is what it is and is not what it is not. Thus “being has a claim to not-being, and notbeing to being.” 206 Against the poet Parmenides who forecloses all investigation into what is not,
Plato’s character Parmenides contends that not-being must be seen as somehow being, and being
as somehow not-being.
The final investigation of the fifth hypothesis concerns whether the one that is not changes
or moves. Parmenides suggests that, since the one both is and is not, it must change from one state
to the other, and furthermore must move. 207 Yet, because it is not, the one is nowhere, and thus
can neither move its place, nor rotate, nor change. 208 Somehow, then, the one that is not both
changes and does not change, it is at motion and in rest. Insofar as it shares in both being and notbeing, the one that is not both comes-to-be and passes-away; insofar as it is nowhere, it admits of
neither generation nor destruction. 209 With this paradox, the interlocutors end their first
investigation into the one that is not.

Hypothesis Six: Not-Being that Lacks Οὐσία
The sixth hypothesis of the Parmenides, like the fifth, is “the one is not.” This investigation differs
from the last by starting with the lack of οὐσία of the one that is not. The not-being of this sixth
hypothesis is not bound by any being: it is unrestrained not-being.
All of the various determinations attributed to the one of the fifth hypothesis are denied of
this one without any οὐσία. This one neither comes-to-be nor passes-away;210 it is neither in motion
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nor at rest; 211 it is not equal, unequal, great, or small; 212 it is not like or other than itself or other
things.213 In sum, the one without οὐσία bears no relation to anything at all. 214
This implies that it cannot be indicated with words like “something,” “this,” or “that.” 215
In fact, the interlocutors conclude that “neither knowledge, nor belief, nor perception, nor account,
nor name, nor anything else of beings” 216 can pertain to what is not. Instead, what is not has no
attribute whatsoever. It seems to stay in no state at all (οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν).217 This sixth hypothesis
resolves into complete paradox, insofar as it cannot even be named in the hypothesis itself.

Between Two Eleatics
In these hypotheses, Plato’s Parmenides establishes two alternative senses of not-being. Either, as
with the fifth, not-being is determined in some way or other, such that we can think and speak of
it, relate it to other beings, and even attribute being to it. Or, as with the sixth, not-being is simply
not, but in this case we cannot say anything at all of it – not even that it is not. It should be obvious
that these hypotheses from Parmenides are parallel to the distinctions made by the Eleatic Stranger
in the Sophist.
The fifth hypothesis of the Parmenides shows that something can share in not-being while
still being intelligible, differentiable, real, and somehow changeable. The Sophist shows what notbeing is, such that the forms (and speech) can share in it without being nothing at all. These are

211

Plato Parmenides 163d8-e26
Plato Parmenides 164a1-2.
213
Plato Parmenides 164a2-4.
214
Plato Parmenides 164a4-7.
215
Plato Parmenides 164a7-b2.
216
Plato Parmenides 164b1-2, ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων.
217
Plato Parmenides 164b3-4.
212

61

the same concept of not-being: form of not-being as difference from being is not-being as
restrained by οὐσία
So too we find a parallel in the Sophist with the sixth hypothesis of the Parmenides. The
Eleatic arguments of the former establish (or fail to establish) the same things as the latter. What
is utterly not, the contrary of being, not-being that has no share in οὐσία, cannot be said or thought.
Each of these discussions ultimately undermines itself, insofar as each has to say not-being to deny
not-being. But each speaks (or fails to speak), of the same (no-)thing.
Strange, then, that the Eleatic Stranger characterizes his arguments as a murder of
Parmenides. We will return to this apparently hollow internecine debate at the end of this Chapter.

Χώρα as the Instantiation of Not-Being in the Timaeus
The speech in the Timaeus about the creation and structure of the cosmos does not directly address
not-being, and so our remarks here will be brief and hypothetical. In the Republic, the divided line
partitioned the world into being and becoming. Timaeus adds a third kind, χώρα (“ space”). I
wonder whether this χώρα is a sort of infra-sensible instantiation of not-being – the “difference
from being” behind the world of becoming.
Χώρα is postulated as the “receptacle of all becoming,” 218 or that “in which” becoming
happens (while the being is that “from which” becoming happens, as its model). 219 As the
receptacle of the visible forms, χώρα must itself be invisible and shapeless. 220 Χώρα is outside of
all the forms, which are themselves outside of it. And since χώρα is a necessary condition of the
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cosmos, it persists for all time. 221 Timaeus posits that this formless, receptive χώρα is the mother
of everything, while being is the father and becoming is the offspring. 222
We might suppose this χώρα to be something like the atomists’ void, as both are invisible,
shapeless principles, both are distinct from the true beings (be they atoms or forms), both are a sort
of principle of locality, and both are necessary for the possibility of change. But, unlike the void,
χώρα is not empty: indeed, it is full of the becoming of the cosmos. While the atomists maintain a
strict separation between atoms and void, such that they only ever appear alongside one another,
Timaeus suggests that χώρα and the forms are mixed together in the world of becoming. In this
way, χώρα is more akin to matter than it is to void. Democritus would probably not claim that it is
the void which we speak of whenever we talk about “this” or “that” thing. Yet Timaeus makes
precisely this suggestion regarding χώρα: when we talk about “this” water or “that” fire, “this” and
“that” refer not to the quality of water or fire, which is subject to destruction, but to the underlying,
everlasting χώρα in which these qualities appear. 223
I would like to propose – speculatively – that χώρα is the instantiation of the kind not-being
in the cosmos (or maybe, rather, it is an instantiation of difference). Here are some reasons for this
claim:


Χώρα is third after being and becoming – the only ontological status that seems to remain
is not-being.



Becoming is, for Plato, a mixing of being and not-being; in the Timaeus we are told that
becoming is the offspring or mixture of the forms (beings) and χώρα.
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Χώρα is receptive of every form; likewise, everything that is and comes to be shares in the
kind not-being (or difference).



Χώρα is formless, not sensible, and not a thing at all.



Χώρα alone differs from everything.



Χώρα is a principle of sensible differentiation of things.

All of this does indeed make χώρα hard to grasp, as Timaeus contends. If χώρα indeed is a singular
cosmological principle of not-being, it is so because everything that comes into being shares in
not-being, what differentiates it from other beings.

An Unwritten Principle of Not-Being?
As we are already speculating, we might also mention the possibility that there is a major role for
not-being in what Aristotle names Plato’s “so-called unwritten teachings.” 224 The central unwritten
doctrine is best expressed by Aristotle’s account of Plato’s thought in Metaphysics A.6:
Because the forms are the causes of everything else, he thought that the elements
of these [the forms] are the elements of all things. As matter, then, the great and the
small are principles, and as οὐσία the one. 225
The basic supposition is that the Platonic forms themselves have their being on account of more
primary principles (which may or may not themselves be forms). There is a material principle that
is variously named the dyad, the unlimited, the great and the small, or the unequal. And there is a
formal principle which is the one, the limited, or the equal.
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Especially important for us to mention is Physics I.9 191b36-a3, where Aristotle suggests
that Plato (or one of his students) identifies the dyadic, material principle with not-being (191a3a16). Not-being is made into a principle of being in order to establish genuine becoming, given the
Eleatic assumption that becoming must come from what is not. 226 We see another connection
between a Platonic principle of not-being and Eleatic assumptions discussed in Metaphysics Ν.2
1088b26-1089a6, where not-being is assumed by Plato or some other academic in order to explain
the plurality of beings contra Parmenides. 227
We might also note Physics IV.2 209b11-16, where Aristotle reads Plato’s Timaeus as
identifying χώρα and matter. Given the Aristotelian evidence that Plato’s material principle is a
principle of not-being, this gives us further evidence for our reading of χώρα as some instantiation
or infra-sensible condition of not-being in the cosmos.
But what is really worth appreciating here, regarding these unwritten doctrines, is that all
of their substance – about not-being, at least – we already saw in the dialogues. We see the Platonic
protagonists grapple with Parmenides’ arguments, and feel compelled to introduce an idea of notbeing. Already in the Sophist and the Parmenides the form of not-being is characterized as a
principle not only of becoming and appearances – something we see in the Republic – but of being
and the forms. Every form participates in not-being, the Eleatic Stranger argues, even being itself.
This teaching is only “unwritten” for those without the patience to read.
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iv. A Synopsis of Plato’s Idea of Not-Being
Not-being appears across Plato’s dialogues, in various contexts with various speakers. There is a
degree of dramatic tension in these discussions; nevertheless, we can recognize a single Platonic
idea of not-being operative across the dialogues, one which plays a role at every ontological level.
Here I will briefly review the major characteristics of not-being in order to provide a single view
of this idea.

Utter-Not-Being
What is the contrary or opposite to being, what completely lacks οὐσία, utter-not-being, absolutely
is not. It is impossible to speak or think of it. Any talk about utter-not-being will be wholly selfrefuting. Even these sentences.

The Form of Not-Being
Yet there is an idea of not-being that does share in οὐσία, or is even an οὐσία itself. This is notbeing as difference-from-being. “Not” should be thought of as indicating a kind of difference, and
“being” must be understood as open to predicates (being-blue, being-in-motion, etc.), and not in
absolute, simple terms (or else we would return to utter-not-being). This form of not-being has
numerous attributes, sharing in many other forms, e.g. it is, it is the same as itself, it is different
from different forms, it is one, etc.

Not-Being as Constitutive of Falsity and Images
Images and falsehoods are constituted by not-being. An image looks like something, but it is not
this. False speech is of beings, but it says about these beings things that are not about them.
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Not-Being as Constitutive of Becoming and Appearance
Generally, images and falsehoods are just a class of the larger world of becoming and appearance.
But even generally, becoming mixes what is and what is not. A particular will partake in many
forms (being), but it will also partake in negative forms (not-being).
Further, we might think of χώρα, space, as a fundamental principle of not-being separate
from the forms and from becoming. Χώρα is itself not sensible and unformed, but it is also a
principle of sensible differentiation. It is a material receptacle for becoming.

Not-Being as Constitutive of Being
Even the forms themselves participate in not-being. Any given form is different from all other
forms. Even being must participate in not-being, insofar as being itself is different from beinghuman or being-at-rest. The kind not-being has a universal scope, and thus can be thought of as a
principle of being itself.

v. Plato and Eleaticism
We might wonder: if Plato’s Parmenides and his Eleatic Stranger ultimately share a theory of notbeing, then why does the Stranger claim to be breaking with Parmenides by speaking of what is
not?
Of course, in the surviving fragments of On Nature the real Parmenides does unequivocally
forbid discussing both not-being as such and not-being as mixed with being. In fact, the
impossibility of mixing being and not-being serves as a fundamental ground for his conclusions
about being. So, while the Stranger’s form of not-being fits with the arguments proposed by the
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Platonic character of Parmenides, it is certainly at odds with the poem that Parmenides the person
wrote. Thus the Stranger is acknowledging a true break, but it is Plato’s Parmenides himself who
is false.
I take it that by expressing this anti-Eleatic idea of not-being in the voices of the Eleatic
Stranger and Parmenides himself, Plato is hinting that traditional Eleaticism should be corrected
from within. The suggestion is that there is something fundamentally right and important in the
Eleatic project, but Parmenides and other Eleatics (e.g. Zeno) need to be revised or reinterpreted
by means of Eleatic principles themselves.
So, for example, On Nature’s prohibition of not-being must be restricted to what
completely is not, while there remains the possibility of an idea of not-being as difference. We
might also recall that the conclusions about not-being in the Republic – it is linked to ignorance,
becoming shares in it – have an Eleatic provenance, yet Socrates does not think that belief is
entirely false.
Thus, Plato takes himself to be establishing a new, more consistent and comprehensive
Eleaticism. The Parmenides and the Sophist each inaugurate this same neo-Eleatic philosophy by
different means. Of course, some difficulties remain: if the Platonic fiction is that Parmenides
himself (and Zeno, and Socrates) was aware of this proper, revised Eleaticism, why is it that the
Stranger, a fictional student of Parmenides, does not acknowledge any revised doctrine?
Regardless, both dialogues appear to articulate a single neo-Eleatic teaching on the form of notbeing.
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Chapter 4
Aristotle Against Eleatic Ontology

i. An Eleatic Debate
Parmenides of Elea undoubtedly committed one of the greatest conceptual blunders in the history
of philosophy: by explicitly denying any reality to not-being, and by prohibiting all theorizing
about what is not, he inadvertently establishes not-being as perhaps the pivotal concept of early
Greek ontology.
Each of the philosophers we have considered is, in some sense, an Eleatic. The atomists
like Democritus accept the Eleatic account of being, while pluralizing it into corporeal atoms and
supposing their motion by means of the void. The sophists, especially Gorgias, use Eleatic
suppositions to establish impossible conclusions and obfuscate the very possibility of falsity. Plato
also accepts an Eleatic sense of being, but as a separate formal principle. Further, he dramatizes a
revision of Eleatic doctrines from within its own school in the dialogues Parmenides and the
Sophist. Certainly, Democritus and Plato reject Parmenides’ immobilism and strict monism, and
so they confront and even overturn the ban on not-being. But the principles of not-being thus
developed – the void, the idea of difference from being – are constructed alongside an Eleatic
sense of what is.
In this Chapter, I will consider Aristotle’s criticisms of the predecessors on not-being by
focusing on this Eleatic dimension of the debate. In the remainder of this section I will give a quick
overview of how not-being comes up in the predecessors, grouping these problems into several
headings. In his writings Aristotle addresses each of these issues, but for later Sections of this
Chapter I will focus on the fundamental critique: there is no single sense of being, and thus we do
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not need a principle of not-being. Instead, Aristotle provides an alternative conception of being as
already determined in several ways – and not-being as subordinated to and determined by these
ways of being.

Not-Being in the Predecessors, Topically
Parmenides’ On Nature establishes the coordinates for the later discussions of what is not. He
analyses several concepts – e.g. difference, error, change – in terms of not-being, with the intention
of thus rejecting them from his ontology. For those who followed, these concepts become
irrevocably associated with the question of not-being.
Thus, while reflecting on the pre-Aristotelian debate on not-being, we can place the
problems of not-being into roughly four headings, each of which is related to a prohibition from
Parmenides’ poem. These topics are:
(1) the being of not-being – whether not-being is and what it is;
(2) not-being as a principle of difference or multiplicity;
(3) the possibility of speaking or thinking not-being;
(4) not-being and the possibility of change, becoming, and motion.
By considering these topics serially, we can review the overall shape of the predecessors’ debate
on not-being.

The Being of Not-Being
Parmenides denies that not-being can have any being at all, either on its own (the incomprehensible
path of what is not and must not be) or mixed with what is (the way of deceptive belief, where
mortals confuse what is and what is not). Gorgias accepts the impossibility of not-being in his
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eristic On Not-Being, but only to establish that nothing is. Yet both the atomists and Plato contend
that it is necessary to postulate some sort of not-being. For the atomists not-being is the void,
emptiness itself, which has a place and is in time, but otherwise lacks the various attributes of
being (full, limited, one, homogenous, etc.). Thus, for the atomists being and not-being, atoms and
void, are entirely separate components of what is. In contrast, for Plato not-being and being are
mixed together. Not-being names the part of being set up against being – not-being is the idea of
difference from being. As such, not-being plays a constitutive role both in the communion of forms
(or beings), and in the changing visible world (or becoming). Not-being as completely separate
from being, what lacks οὐσία, the utter-not-being or opposite of being, cannot in any way be for
Plato.

Not-Being, Difference, and Multiplicity
Parmenides argues that, because not-being is impossible and should not be mixed with being, being
is entirely one and homogenous. Yet this strict monism is belied by the multitudes of appearances.
The atomists account for this apparent multiplicity by means of the void: while each atomic being
is one and homogenous, there are many such beings, separated by the void. Likewise, the
differences between atoms – shape, position, and order – depend on the presence of the void. For
Plato, the kind not-being as difference from being is itself fundamental, and it is responsible for
negation and negative kinds. Without difference, everything would be the same, and all would
simply be one. Not-being is crucial insofar as it explicitly differentiates what is from what is. Thus
not-being is as extensive as being itself.
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Speaking and Thinking of Not-Being
For Parmenides, it is simply impossible to speak of or think about not-being as such (what is not
and must not be). Moreover, speech that mixes being and not-being leads to belief, which is
fundamentally deceptive and at odds with the truth. The atomists keep the Parmenidean distinction
between deceptive appearance and true reality, but they are discontent with the Eleatic
consequence that appearance and reality are inherently inconsistent with each other. So, while
thought teaches us that the reality is atoms and void, our senses show only their colorful
combination, never atoms or void as such. Thus, the atomists have no problem with thinking of
not-being; indeed, it must be thought of as real. Gorgias considers the Eleatic supposition that we
can only think being, but he finds it unacceptable, for it suggests the conclusion that everything
passing through thought, no matter how ridiculous, must be. Yet later sophists, such as
Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, and Antiphon, embrace this consequence: since we can only think
and speak of being, falsehood and contradiction are impossible, for they would be the thought and
speech of not-being. This dangerous conclusion incites Plato’s account of not-being in the Sophist.
There he not only shows that we can speak and think about not-being as such, as long as it is
properly understood as difference from being, but he also provides an account of false speech as
the saying of not-being. False speech does not say utter-not-being, but instead it says about
something what is not-being about it. Further, like the Eleatics and atomists before him, Plato
proposes that appearances are particularly deceptive, because they mix being and not-being in an
unstable way.
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Not-Being and Change
According to Parmenides, since being does not mix with not-being, being cannot come-into-being,
pass-away, move, or in any way change, for this change would have to come from what is not. The
Eleatic Melissus further argues that if there were motion, it would have to take place in the void;
but the void, as not-being, is not. The atomists Leucippus and Democritus adopt Melissus’
argument, but instead suppose that it demonstrates that not-being as void must be, given that
motion is. Atomic beings do not themselves alter in anyway, being ungenerated, indestructible,
and otherwise unchanging. Rather, the stable atoms move in the emptiness of the void. Thus notbeing is the condition of all locomotion, and locomotion underlies all other sorts of apparent
change, including alteration, coming-to-be, and passing-away. Plato also accepts that change
depends on not-being, but not on the not-being of emptiness or void. Coming-into-being is the
change from the not-being of something to the being of it, and passing-away is the change in the
reverse direction. The apparent world of becoming rolls around between what is and what is not.
Moreover, if we suppose that the χώρα instantiates not-being, then the cosmos itself depends on
this spatial not-being as the underlying principle from which and in which change happens.

Enter Aristotle
Aristotle, ever ambitious, addresses each of these predecessors, and on every one of these topics.
So, he engages with the sophists in the Topics and Sophistical Refutations, the atomist’s void in
Physics V.6-9, Platonic ideas across the Metaphysics, Parmenides in Physics I.2-3, etc. Much of
Aristotle’s writing works through the problems of his predecessors, and much of his own theories
come out of these engagements. Exploring all of this well exceeds the bounds for this project.
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Further, I want to prioritize the exploration Aristotle’s own, constructive ontology of not-being;
we cannot get lost in the point by point destruction of his predecessors.
Fortunately, we do not need to consider each of these topics to understand Aristotle’s
overall view of the predecessors’ debate over not-being. For Aristotle thinks the entire Eleatic
basis for the debate is faulty: Parmenides’ assumptions about being itself are wrong, and therefore
later arguments about not-being, built on these assumptions, should be rejected. In brief: being is
not singular, therefore not-being is not a basic principle. Instead, for Aristotle, ontology needs to
acknowledge that there are many ways for something to be.

ii. The Conclusions Do Not Follow: Against Parmenides
In Physics I.2-3 Aristotle criticizes the Eleatic position that beings are one and motionless. He tells
us that their “presuppositions are false and the arguments do not follow.” 228 It is perhaps
noteworthy, given what we saw of Parmenides’ poem, that Aristotle does not take the ban on notbeing to be among the assumptions of Parmenides. Instead, the pertinent presuppositions here are
immobilism and monism. We can, with Aristotle, 229 set aside the immobilism and focus on the
monism.
Aristotle quotes the monistic thesis of the Eleatics as the saying that “all are one,” εἶναι ἓν
τὰ πάντα,230 but he wonders what this is supposed to mean. For both “being” and “one” can mean
several things, and none of the candidates is plausible. 231 Ultimately the supposition Aristotle
attributes to Parmenides is that “being is said simply” and not “in many ways.” 232 Not content only
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to contradict Parmenides, Aristotle shows that he contradicts himself: given the simplicity,
univocity, or single sense of being, not-being is inevitabilitle.

Eleatic Monism Implies Not-Being
To argue that monism implies not-being, Aristotle relies on a distinction between subjects and
their attributes. He presupposes that being has some minimal structure of inherence or attribution,
which is reflected in predicative statements like “Florence is playing,” “the paint is white,” or
“being is indivisible.” In accordance with this structure, the argument is in two cases:
1. when being is an attribute of an underlying subject;
2. when being is an underlying subject that has attributes.
In each case, not-being follows.
Case 1: being is an attribute. In this case there is some underlying subject of which we
attribute being: e.g. Florence is a being. We can quickly note, with Aristotle, that already this case
allows for entity pluralism, for even if there is only one sense of being there might be many subjects
that have this being (as there can be many green objects even if greenness is simple). 233 But what
is the ontological status of the subject of attribution? It must differ somehow from its attribute, but
being is the attribute in question. Therefore, it must differ from being. This would be no problem
if there were several ways of being – one way to be a subject, another to be an attribute - but the
assumption is that being is said simply, that is, it only has a single sense. Thus we reach the
unacceptable conclusion that, while we attribute being of such a subject, we must also admit that,
as it is different from being, it must not be. 234
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Case 2: being is a subject. To move past Case 1, Aristotle allows the Eleatic another
presupposition: being is what just-is, τὸ ὅπερ ὄν. Aristotle explains that since being just-is, it is not
an attribute or accident of anything else, but other things are attributes of it. 235 But even if being is
what just-is, Aristotle argues, this same being must also not be. Say we attribute “identity” or
“indivisibility” to being: what would the ontological status of this attribute be? Again, since being
has only one sense and is the subject of attribution, the attribute itself must be other than being. As
so other, it is “wholly not-being” 236 Yet this not-being is itself attributed of what just-is. Hence
being is not.237
With these two cases, Aristotle establishes that the hypothesis that being has only a single
sense implies that not-being must be, whether being is taken to be an attribute or to be simply a
subject. The two parts of the arguments rely on the same strategy, in which being is identified with
one or another component of the inherence relation (either the attribute or the subject), and the
ontological status of the remaining component is found to necessarily be not-being. Curiously, notbeing itself plays a different role in each of these cases. In the first case, it is the subject that is notbeing, so that not-being here acts as a principle of plurality or diversity in the entities to which
univocal being is attributed. Yet in the second case, not-being is attributed to what just is, that is,
to being itself; here we find a precursor to the sort of apophatic arguments which suppose a being
so singular and exclusive that we must posit that it is not. 238

iii. Those Who Conceded to the Arguments
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Cf. Plato Parmenides 137c-142a, Pseudo-Dionysius The Mystical Theology 133-142.
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While Aristotle presents this argument from Physics I.3 as a sort of reductio ad absurdum against
Parmenides, he admits that the conclusion is not itself incoherent. The postulate of not-being is not
itself inconsistent, even if it is at odds with Parmenides’ own position. So, he says:
But indeed, obviously, it is not true that if being has one meaning, and is not such
that it also simultaneously means its contradictory, there will be no not-being; for,
while not simply being, nothing prevents not-being from being not-beingsomething.239
This is especially important for us, as we will explore the ways not-being can in fact be in the next
Part of this project!
Setting aside his own commitments, at the end of Physics I.3 Aristotle also informs us that:
“some conceded to both these arguments: to [the argument] that all are one if being means one
thing, [they conceded] that not-being is; to [the argument] from dichotomy, they posited indivisible
magnitudes.” 240 The first argument is clearly the one from earlier in Phys. I.3, reviewed in the last
section. The second argument, from dichotomy, is less clear and irrelevant to our project. 241 But
who is Aristotle talking about – who conceded on Eleatic grounds that not-being is?
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Phys. I.3 187a3-6, φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὡς, εἰ ἓν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐκ
ἔσται οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν.
240
Phys. I.3 187a1-3, ἔνιοι δ' ἐνέδοσαν τοῖς λόγοις ἀμφοτέροις, τῷ μὲν ὅτι πάντα ἕν, εἰ τὸ ὂν ἓν σημαίνει, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ
μὴ ὄν, τῷ δὲ ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας, ἄτομα ποιήσαντες μεγέθη.
241
Alexander (according to Simplicius 1.3-4 138.3-140.25), Themistius 11.36-12.5, Philoponus 83.29-85.1,
Simplicius 1.3-4 140.19-141.13, Ross Physics 479-481, and Charlton 63 all think Aristotle is referring to one of Zeno’s
arguments. Porphyry seems to attribute the argument to Parmenides, but Simplicius 1.3-4 139.24-141.13 argues
forcefully against this. Simplicius suggests two candidates for what the argument is, which Ross Physics 479-481
accepts: the argument could be that if the many is, it must be both limited and unlimited, or it could be that if being
has a magnitude it must be both infinitely large and infinitely small because of the infinite divisibility of magnitudes.
Charlton 63 thinks that Aristotle is talking about Zeno’s stadium paradox, but this paradox itself relies on the
dichotomy arguments that Simplicius provides.
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Ancient commentators were generally agreed that Plato is the person Aristotle is talking
about here242 (while they suppose his pupil, Xenocrates, brought in indivisible magnitudes –
although we can note that indivisible bodies are postulated in the Timaeus). Simplicius denies that
Plato is Aristotle’s target here because Platonic not-being is not merely nothing, but is difference
itself.243 Ross, following Simplicius’ argument, thinks that Aristotle is referring to the atomists,
and Charlton follows this suggestion. 244
Evidence used to support the claim that Aristotle is referring to Plato is Metaphysics Ν.2
where Aristotle says:
There are many causes for them [i.e. Plato and his students] digressing into these
causes, the greatest being that they were at an archaic impasse. For it seemed to
them that all beings would be one, being-itself, unless they resolved and went up
against the account of Parmenides – “for this may never be made manageable, that
not-being is” – but it was necessary to demonstrate that not-being is. 245
This should be familiar to us from our discussion in Chapter 3 Section ii of Plato’s Sophist, and it
makes the Platonists good candidates for those who “conceded” to the Eleatic argument.
Evidence used to support the claim that Aristotle is referring to the atomists is Generation
and Corruption I.8 where Aristotle says:
The best way, which covers everything with one account, is put forward by
Leucippus and Democritus, who by this produce a principle according to nature.

242

Those who held this position include Alexander (according to Simplicius 1.3-4 138.3-140.25), Themistius 11.3612.5, and Philoponus 83.29-84.13. Thomas Physics 27 also supposes that Aristotle here refers to Platonists.
243
Simplicius 137.1 – 138.1.
244
Ross Physics 480-481, Charlton 63.
245
Meta. Ν.2 1088a35-1089a5, πολλὰ μὲν οὖν τὰ αἴτια τῆς ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἐκτροπῆς, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀπορῆσαι
ἀρχαϊκῶς. ἔδοξε γὰρ αὐτοῖς πάντ' ἔσεσθαι ἓν τὰ ὄντα, αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν, εἰ μή τις λύσει καὶ ὁμόσε βαδιεῖται τῷ Παρμενίδου
λόγῳ “οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα,” ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὂν δεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστιν·
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For some of the archaic ones [i.e. the Eleatics] believed that being must of
necessity be one and unmoving; for the void is not, but being cannot be set in
motion without a separate void, nor can it be many without something to separate
it […]
[Leucippus,] agreeing on these things with appearances and with those who
endorse the one [i.e. the Eleatics] that there is no motion without a void, says the
void is not-being and nothing of being is not-being, for being is authoritatively
full.246
This will also be familiar to us, from our discussion in Chapter 2 Section ii of the atomists, and
indeed it makes the atomists good candidates for those who “conceded” to the Eleatic argument.
Given the strong evidence for both groups, why should we assume that Aristotle can only
be speaking about one at the end of Physics I.3? Commentators, while looking to help with
uncertainty, are perhaps too quick to ignore deliberate ambiguity. It might seem unusual to group
the Platonists and the atomists together, but their responses to the Eleatics are similar (even setting
aside the fact that they both posit indivisible bodies). Both endorse the Eleatic assumption that
being-itself has a single meaning (whether it is as bodily atoms or the form of being), and both
accept that to grant multiplicity, difference, and change they need to postulate a principle of notbeing. If Aristotle can paint both with the same brush – and obviate their conclusions by denying
their premise – so he should.
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GC I.8 325a25-29, 324b35-a6, Ὁδῷ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ πάντων ἑνὶ λόγῳ διωρίκασι Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος,
ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἥπερ ἐστίν. Ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔδοξε τὸ ὂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἓν εἶναι καὶ ἀκίνητον· τὸ
μὲν γὰρ κενὸν οὐκ ὄν, κινηθῆναι δ' οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι μὴ ὄντος κενοῦ κεχωρισμένου. Οὐδ' αὖ πολλὰ εἶναι μὴ ὄντος
τοῦ διείργοντος […] Ὁμολογήσας δὲ ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς φαινομένοις, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἓν κατασκευάζουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν κίνησιν
οὖσαν ἄνευ κενοῦ τό τε κενὸν μὴ ὄν, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν φησιν εἶναι. Τὸ γὰρ κυρίως ὂν παμπλῆρες ὄν·
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iv. The Aristotelian Alternative
Aristotle’s problem with Parmenides is that he assumes there is a single sense of being, and does
not appreciate that, so as to be consistent, this would require a postulate of not-being. His problem
with the atomists and Plato is that they accept Parmenides’ premise, even if they reach more
sensible conclusions. We need not concern ourselves with Aristotle’s precise objections to the void
or the theory of ideas, because we can recognize that he has a problem with the underlying Eleatic
ontology that singularizes being-itself and requires a fundamental principle of not-being.
There is no simple sense of being. Or, as Aristotle aptly puts it in the Metaphysics: “being,
said simply, is said in many ways.” 247 Aristotle never exactly attacks the Eleatic hypothesis that
being has a single meaning. He comes close when he argues that being is not a class or genus – for
a genus cannot be predicated of the differences that divide it into sub-classes, but being is
predicated of all things, including these differences – but this argument is effectively an aside, and
is made in a passage having apparently nothing to do with Parmenides. 248 Instead, Aristotle
typically counters the hypothesis that being is synonymous, usually just by articulating the various
ways things are said to be. 249 Thus he asks of the Eleatics in Physics I.2: “what do they mean when
they say all is one, do they mean οὐσία or quantities or qualities?” 250 For Aristotle, that there are
distinct ways of being is evident.
Determinateness, diversity, or difference are not spaces between or forms beyond some
being-itself. Therefore, not-being is not a first principle. Instead being is always determined and
ordered, and in several ways simultaneously. In Part II we will find that not-being, for Aristotle,
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Meta. E.2 1026a33-34, τὸ ὂν τὸ ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον λέγεται πολλαχῶς.
Meta. Β.3 998b17-28.
249
As in Phys. I.2.
250
Phys. I.2 185a22-23, πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἶναι ἓν τὰ πάντα, πότερον οὐσίαν τὰ πάντα ἢ ποσὰ ἢ ποιά.
248
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is according to and derivative of these more fundamental determinations of being: as there are
several ways of being, so there are several ways of not-being.
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PART II

SAY NO MORE:
ON THE SEVERAL SENSES OF NOT-BEING IN ARISTOTLE
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Chapter 5
The Basic Aristotelian Determinations of Not-Being

i. That Not-Being Somehow Is
For Aristotle not-being has some sort of being. In Metaphysics Θ.10 he says:
and since being and not-being are said according to the figures of predication, but
also according to the potency or actualization of these or their opposites, and still
further by being true or false in the most authoritative sense […].251
And in Meta. Γ.2: “Because of this we say that even what is not is not-being.252 And in Meta. N.2:
“For not-being is said in many ways, since being also is.” 253 In Physics I.8 he argues that privation
is one of the principles of change, and is “in-itself not-being.” 254 Likewise, in Phys. V.1 he asserts
that “change from simply not-being to οὐσία is simple generation.” 255
Granted, there are also texts in Aristotle’s corpus that cast the being of not-being into doubt.
For example, in the Topics he says “not-being is not the genus of coming-into-being, for there are
simply no forms of not-being.” 256 Further, as we saw in the last Chapter Aristotle generally
discards any conception of not-being based on the Eleatic assumption that being has a single sense.
He also rejects sophistic arguments that reach an unqualified conclusion about not-being from
qualified premises. These would be guilty of the fallacy of secundum quid et simpliciter: “but to
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Meta. Θ.10 1051a34-b2, Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὂν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ
δύναμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν τούτων ἢ τἀναντία, τὸ δὲ κυριώτατα ὂν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τοῦτο δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ.
252
Meta. Γ.2 1003b10, διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι μὴ ὄν φαμεν.
253
Meta. Ν.2 1089a16, πολλαχῶς γὰρ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ὄν.
254
Phys. I.8 191b15-16, καθ' αὑτὸ μὴ ὄν.
255
Phys. V.1 225a15-16, ἡ δ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἁπλῶς εἰς οὐσίαν γένεσις ἁπλῶς.
256
Top. IV.6 128b8-9, οὐκ ἔστι γένος τὸ μὴ ὂν τοῦ γινομένου· ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἴδη.
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say that not-being, because it is believed, is some being, is not true; for the belief is not that it is,
but that it is not.” 257 Finally, Aristotle dismisses any supposition that turns not-being into an οὐσία,
or οὐσία into something that is not: “for how could not-beings utter a sound or walk?” 258
Yet in each of these cases Aristotle opposes a specific conception of not-being, or a
particular argument for it. Nowhere in the corpus does he dismiss not-being as such. Although he
disagrees with the concessions that Plato and Democritus make to the Eleatics, and thus with their
conception of not-being, he agrees with them, contra Parmenides, that there is not-being:
But indeed, obviously, it is not true that if being has one meaning, and is not such
that it also simultaneously means its contradictory, there will be no not-being; for,
while not simply being, nothing prevents not-being from being not-beingsomething.259
Thus, Aristotle holds that not-being somehow is. Let us, then, consider the ways that not-being
can be.

ii. Not-Being and the Principles of Investigation
We find the first elements of an Aristotelian account of not-being in his discussion of the axioms
or principles of investigation in Metaphysics Γ. Aristotle calls these axioms “unhypothetical”:
knowledge is only possible insofar as they are true, one cannot be in error about them, and thus
they are the most durable and sure of all propositions. 260 Further, these axioms “hold of all beings,
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Int. 11 21a32-33, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ὅτι δοξαστόν, οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὄν τι· δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι
οὐκ ἔστιν. Cf. SE 5 166b37-a20, 25 180a23-b40.
258
Meta. Γ.4 1008a22-23, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα πῶς ἂν φθέγξαιτο ἢ βαδίσειεν;
259
Phys. I.3 187a3-6, φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὡς, εἰ ἓν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐκ
ἔσται οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν.
260
Meta. Γ.3 1005b11-17.
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but not to some peculiar kind apart from others.” 261 Of course, such indemonstrability and
universality suggests triviality, insofar as these principles are presupposed in every account
whatsoever. Yet Aristotle justifies examining them in the Metaphysics by arguing that, since they
hold of each thing insofar as it is, the philosopher who investigates being as such will necessarily
consider them. Likewise, as we are investigating not-being as such, these axioms are of special
interest for us, as they concern the distinction between what is and what is not.

The Principle of Non-Contradiction
The principle of non-contradiction is that “it is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to
belong and also not-belong to the same thing in the same respect.” 262 Aristotle defends various
interpretations of this same principle: logical (a proposition and its negation cannot be true at the
same time), epistemological (“for it is impossible for one to suppose the same thing to be and not
to be”),263 and ontological (“it is impossible for a being simultaneously to be and not be”). 264 We
are most interested in this axiom’s ontological dimension, although this cannot be neatly separated
from the logical dimension for Aristotle.
The principle of non-contradiction states that being and not-being are always mutually
exclusive. Insofar as something is, it cannot not-be; insofar as it is not, it cannot be. Things may
change from being to not-being or vice versa, but nothing is simultaneously both in the same
respect. This principle holds for both attributes and οὐσίαι, and Aristotle uses both as examples
(e.g. “white” and “not-white” at Meta. Γ.4 1008a7-11, “human” and “not-human” at 1006a28-
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Meta. Γ.3 1005a22-23, ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν ἀλλ' οὐ γένει τινὶ χωρὶς ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων.
Meta. Γ.3 1005b19-20, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό.
263
Meta. Γ.3 1005b23-24, ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὁντινοῦν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.
264
Meta. Γ.4 1006a3-4, ἀδυνάτου ὄντος ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.
262
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1007a20).265 Indeed, he supposes that the truth of this axiom is independent of any particular
ontology, whether his own, the Eleatic, or the Platonic. The principle of non-contradiction, then,
identifies a universal, insurmountable separation between what is and what is not.

The Principle of Excluded Middle
The principle of excluded middle is articulated as follows: “But truly, between contradictories
there is nothing at all admitted to be, yet it is necessary that one [contradictory] would be either
affirmed or denied with respect to one of them.” 266 Given any thing, and any possible predicate or
attribute, either that determination holds of the thing or it does not hold of the thing, there is no
“middle” option. Like non-contradiction, this is not merely a linguistic or logical rule, but holds
for being as such: if one denied this principle, they would have to admit that there “would be
something besides being and not-being.”267
The principle of excluded demands either being or not-being of everything. For each thing
and in every respect, it must either be or not-be. Where what is ends, that is where what is not
begins; where not-being is not, there is being. As with the earlier axiom, this latter principle holds
equally of attributes (Virgil the cat must either be striped or not-be-striped) and οὐσίαι (Matelda
the cat must either be or not-be). Thus, the principle of excluded middle identifies the total,
exhaustive application of what is and what is not.
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We also saw, above, that he articulates this principle both in terms of “being” and “not-being” simply (at Meta.
1006a3-4) and in terms of “belonging” and “not-belonging” (at Meta. 1005b19-20). I think these articulations should
each be interpreted as broadly as possible, so as to hold for all beings whatsoever. Still, “belonging” and “notbelonging” is more suggestive of the attributes, while “being” and “not-being” suggests οὐσίαι. By adopting both
expressions, Aristotle implies that this axiom holds generally, for every way that something can be or not-be.
266
Meta. Γ.7 1011b23-4, Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μεταξὺ ἀντιφάσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι οὐθέν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι
ἓν καθ' ἑνὸς ὁτιοῦν.
267
Meta. Γ.7 1012a7-8, καὶ παρὰ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται.
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These Principles as Determinative and Basic
Obviously these two principles complement each other. Together, they determine how being and
not-being are distributed among things. While non-contradiction separates being and not-being,
excluded middle demands either being or not-being. Something either is or is not: it cannot be both
and it cannot be neither. This pair of axioms establishes a basic, twofold determination of notbeing: not-being and being of the same thing and in the same respect are incompatible, and notbeing is necessarily present in the absence of being.
It is worth reflecting on the fact that these most certain principles concern being and notbeing. Aristotle argues that these axioms are so indubitable that even those who explicitly deny
them implicitly accept them even by speaking. 268 Speech loses its meaning, if what is spoken of
both is and is not. Even worse, nothing would have any determinations at all, or everything would
have every determination. All things would be one, and everything would also be nothing. 269
Earlier philosophers were foolish to suppose that they could even imagine a world wherein the
principles of investigation fail to hold: any image one might have ultimately relies on the
distinction between being and not-being. So, while most particular investigations are not
themselves ontological, the distinction between “is” and “is-not” is fundamental to both the world
and our knowledge of it.

The Possibility of Not-Being
While these principles provide the basic determinations of not-being, they also reveal an obstacle
to any Aristotelian theory of what is not. Yes, the principle of excluded middle tells us that
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269

Meta. Γ.4 1006a11-13
Meta. Γ.4 1007b18-26.
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everything either is or is not, but then how could not-being be? According to the principle of noncontradiction, insofar as something is, it is impossible for it to not-be. Being and not-being exclude
one another: we might worry that to say “not-being is” is to utter a contradiction.
Moreover, in our discussion of these axioms we have been treating being and not-being as
interchangeable, as if there were some things that are and some things that are not. But Aristotle
does not accept any sort of Stoic or Meinongian class of “something” which can, indifferently,
either be or not-be.270 Aristotle instead holds that “being is common to everything.” 271 So:
everything is, and, according to the principle of non-contradiction, insofar as each thing is, it
cannot not-be. We might then suspect that nothing is not, and that our inquiry into not-being in
Aristotle should end here.
Still, Aristotle does suppose that not-being is, and he has a solution to this problem. While
the principle of non-contradiction keeps being and not-being separate, it does so always relative to
some particular determination. The same thing cannot be and not-be in the same respect: but the
same thing can be in some respects and not-be in others. Lucy is, is a cat, is annoying, and is
hungry; she is not a monkey and she is not striped. Insofar as we can call the former ways of being,
so too we can call the latter ways of not-being. These ways of not-being are also ways of being,
because it is truly the case that Lucy is not striped, and hence “not-being-striped” is a real attribute
of a being. No being is everything, and so there are plenty of ways to not-be.272
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For the Stoics cf. Long and Sedley 162-166; for Meinong cf. Marek.
Meta. Γ.2 1004b20, κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσι τὸ ὄν ἐστιν.
272
Recall Plato’s Sophist 256e5-6: “regarding each of the forms, then, being is many, but not-being is unending in
multitude,” Περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν. Cf. 259b1-6. I discuss this
in Chapter 3 Section ii above.
271
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This answers the question, but it also reveals two further determinations of not-being. There
is no not-being as such; instead, there are ways that beings can not-be. Not-being (1) is said of
some being, (2) and is said in a certain respect.
(1) In-itself (καθ’ αὑτό), not-being is not. Not-being is only insofar as it holds of or
pertains to something that is. Not-being does not subsist, exist, or persist in-itself.
It has only dependent, not independent, reality. It is something that is by belonging,
rather than something that simply is. It is thus on pain of contradiction.
(2) Aristotle here agrees with the Eleatic Stranger: for not-being to be, it must not-besomething. A being can only not-be in some qualified way. To ignore this
qualification is to fall into contradiction. It is true that Lucy is not striped, but that
does not mean that Lucy is not. Lucy, as a living οὐσία, simply is; she has being
καθ’ αὑτό, and thus cannot simply not-be.
Non-contradiction does not eliminate not-being, but it does circumscribe it as being of something
and in a certain respect.

iii. What Is Not, Simply
We have been asking about the being of not-being, but we also might wonder about what simply
is not, without any qualification. Aristotle shows no anxiety over saying that something is not.
Homer, Achilles, the void, the goatstag: each of these is not. Further, Aristotle acknowledges that
these can be an object of our speech or beliefs. 273
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Int. 1 16a16-18, 11 21a25-33.
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Insofar as we can say anything concrete of such not-beings, anything more beyond an
endless litany of negations, we must attribute some sort of being to them. “Homer is a poet,”
“Achilles is wrathful,” “the void is posited by the atomists”: without affirmations like these, one
could never distinguish one not-being from another. According to Aristotle, in these cases being
is only said accidentally and in a qualified way. Of course, these must remain in accordance with
the principle of non-contradiction. Therefore, something like the goatstag is still ontologically
dependent on some underlying being (perhaps our imagination and speech), and it is still not-being
in some specifiable respect (by not being in any place, at least). Inasmuch as something simply
and wholly is not, there is nothing more to say (if goatstags are interesting, it is because they
accidentally are, not because they are not). Further, inasmuch as we can say something or other of
not-being it is conditioned in some particular way.

iv. Not-Being and Οὐσία
While these basic determinations are important, they do not constitute a novel Aristotelian theory
of not-being. In fact, they are fairly familiar features by this point. The Eleatic Stranger introduces
the same sort of conditions: not-being is ontologically dependent and it is qualified as not-beingsomething. Moreover, both Aristotle and the Stranger would agree that everything is the same as
itself and is not other than itself. Of course, Aristotle does not endorse the Eleatic Stranger’s
formalistic conclusions about being and not-being. Also, Aristotle is more explicit about (and
perhaps more committed to) the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle than Plato
is. Nevertheless, so far we have not found anything substantially original in the Aristotelian
account. For this, we must move past the superficial outlines, and consider the ground of Aristotle’s
theory. Not-being is of something and is in a certain respect: but of what, and in what respects, is
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not-being? To begin to answer these questions, let us consider the relation between what is not and
what is most of all, οὐσία.

The Primacy of Οὐσία
For the Platonist, all things, including not-being, are insofar as they share in the idea or form of
being. Aristotle contends that there is no idea of being, and indeed “being” cannot signify a proper
class. Instead, there are several distinct ways in which things are said to be. Still, being is not
simply equivocal. Aristotle argues:
Thus, also, being is said in many ways, but everything refers to one principle; for
some are called beings because they are οὐσίαι, others because they are affections
of οὐσία, others because they are a way to οὐσία, or destructions, or privations, or
qualities, or productive, or generative of οὐσία, or of what are said to be relative to
οὐσία, or negations of some of these or of οὐσία. Because of this we say that even
what is not is not-being.274
All beings are so-called because they each somehow refer to a single principle (πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν),
namely, οὐσία. This holds for the being of not-being. For Aristotle supposes that even to ascribe
self-identity to what is not (that is, to say that not-being is not-being), not-being must have some
relation to οὐσία.
This discussion about what is called being (τὸ ὂν λεγόμενον) relies on a fundamental
presupposition of Aristotle’s ontology. Οὐσίαι simply are – they have their being in virtue of
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Meta. Γ.2, 1003b5-10, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν ἀλλ' ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι,
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themselves, καθ’ αὑτό – while all other things depend on οὐσία for their being. 275 For Aristotle,
οὐσία, a substantive term derived from the feminine participle of εἶναι, 276 indicates what something
is, the underlying subject that is neither said of nor said in another subject, or what is a “this” and
separable.277 His typical examples of οὐσίαι are independent, sensible things, like individual
animals, and their forms. 278 Οὐσία is the first of all the categories, and is per se prior to all of the
others.
Like every other way of being, not-being depends on οὐσία. Contra Plato, there is no form
of οὐσία for not-being to share in. But only οὐσία has independent being, and so not-being has its
being as some sort of determination of οὐσία. Ultimately, everything is because of οὐσία. If there
were no οὐσία, there would be simply nothing, neither being nor not-being.

Οὐσία Cannot Not-Be
Because οὐσία is what is simply and in virtue of itself, there is no οὐσία that simply is not. As we
said above, what is καθ’ αὑτό cannot not be. If something is an οὐσία, then it is. If something is
not, then it cannot be an οὐσία. As we consider the ways of not-being, we must immediately discard
any notion of not-being as οὐσία. We just discussed terms like void, goatstag, and Achilles: these
seem to indicate οὐσίαι that are not. But really, insofar as they have any meaning, what they
indicate is something that is precisely not an οὐσία at all, but only has being accidentally.

Οὐσία and Being Itself
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Categories 5 2a34-b7, Ζ.1 1028a10-b2.
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Both Parmenides and Plato would endorse Aristotle’s claim that things depend on οὐσία for their
being, and that οὐσία is most of all. Yet, for both, οὐσία is nothing other than being itself. For
Parmenides, there is only one way for οὐσίαι to be, and probably there is simply only one οὐσία.
For Plato, each of the various forms is an οὐσία, although each is such only insofar as it shares in
the kind being or unity (with the diversity of forms requiring another principle). Thus, the
conception of οὐσία as identical being itself leads to both Eleatic monism and Platonic dualism. 279
For Aristotle, there is no single sense of being-itself. Instead, οὐσία names the most primary
way of being. 280 In this way, he replaces monism or dualism with an ontological pluralism.
Certainly it is significant that Aristotle rejects the theory of separate forms or ideas and applies the
term οὐσία to sensible things. But perhaps what is even more crucial is the supposition that there
are several distinct ways for something to be. Each of these ways of being depends on οὐσία, which
is thus primary, but none of them is reducible to οὐσία. With this, Aristotle inaugurates an
ontological tradition that accepts not only the diversity of beings, but also the diversity of ways for
something to be. And, with the distinction in ways of being, comes a corresponding diversity in
ways for something to not-be.

v. Not-Being Is Threefold
Above we said that not-being, for Aristotle, is the not-being of something and in a certain respect.
But “being, said simply, is said in many ways.” 281 Insofar as not-being is, it is relative to some way

279
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of being or other, and consequently there are a several ways of not-being. Accordingly, in
Metaphysics Ν.2 Aristotle asks of the Platonists:
Then from what sort of not-being and being are beings? For not-being is said in
many ways, since being also is; not human means not-being-this, but not straight
means not-being-such, and not three cubits long means not-being-so-much.282
Not-being here is determined in relation to the various figures of predication, such that not-being
an οὐσία differs from not-being a quality, both of which are distinct from not-being a quantity.
Presumably this homonymy of not-being holds with respect to each of these categories of being.
Yet the categories do not exhaust the senses of being. In the Metaphysics, the figures of
predication are just one of the several ways that being is said. The others are what is accidental,
what is true, and what is potentially or as actualized. 283 This fourfold distinction structures Books
Ε-Θ of the Metaphysics, wherein Aristotle investigates the causes of each way of being. So, too,
will these four senses of being serve as an architectonic for our investigation into the various ways
of not-being.
This conceit – to understand not-being in terms of the several senses of being – is not my
invention, but Aristotle’s own. We saw it in the Metaphysics Θ.10 passage at the start of this
Chapter. In this text Aristotle identifies three ways of not-being that follow from the determinations
of being. Later, in Meta. Λ.2, Aristotle asserts that “not-being is threefold,”284 evidently following
the three senses established in Θ.10. As we will show, these ways of not-being are the privative,
falsity, and potentiality.
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Meta. Ν.2 1089a15-19, ἔπειτα ἐκ ποίου μὴ ὄντος καὶ ὄντος τὰ ὄντα; πολλαχῶς γὰρ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ὄν·
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In each of the final three Chapters of this project I will examine one of these three ways of
not-being. This task is not a matter of reading off the ways of not-being and adding a “not-” in
each case. The passage from N.2, quoted above, might have suggested something like this: “not”
can be added to a predicate of any category, and so we simply have as many ways of not-being
(not-being-this, not-being-such, etc.) as we have figures of predication (οὐσία, quality, etc.). Yet
this way of talking about what is not, as if it were a minor qualification of what is, ignores the
fundamental asymmetry between not-being and being. For every way of not-being must somehow
also be. Hence in every case we will need to ask how this is a way of being, and how it is
nevertheless also a way of not-being.
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Chapter 6
Privation: Categorical Not-Being

i. Not-Being and Being In-Itself
In Metaphysics Δ.7 and Ε.2 Aristotle identifies four ways of being; in Θ.10 and Λ.2 there are only
three ways of not-being. One of the ways of being cannot be said of what is not, namely, what is
said to be in-itself (καθ’ αὑτό).
When Aristotle first distinguishes the several ways of being in Metaphysics Δ.7, he says
that “Being is said to be, on the one hand, accidentally, and on the other hand, in-itself.”285 In the
last Chapter we noted that not-being cannot be in-itself, or καθ’ αὑτό, because of the principle of
non-contradiction. We also explained that οὐσία, because it is καθ’ αὑτό, cannot not-be.

The Categories as Being In-Itself
In Posterior Analytics I.4 Aristotle claims that only οὐσίαι are καθ’ αὑτό, but in the Metaphysics
he extends what is καθ’ αὑτό: “being in-itself is said of as many things as the figures of predication
signify; for in however many ways these are said, in this many ways they signify being.” 286 Thus
being καθ’ αὑτό refers to categorical being, and in Meta. Ε.2 he refers to this sense of being simply
as “the figures of predication.” 287
Not-being cannot be found even within this expanded notion of being in-itself as
categorical being. The figures of predication name the positive, most general determinations or

285

Meta. Δ.7 1017a7-8, Τὸ ὂν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ καθ' αὑτό.
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classes of beings. Negative predicates do not fit neatly into these categories, and instead hold of
things across the categories. So, it is true to say “is not white” of both the quality black, but also
the quantity five-meters, and indeed of some items in every category. Further, even if we turn to
the broader discussion of the expression καθ’ αὑτό in Metaphysics Δ.18, we find no place for notbeing. Here Aristotle says that the in-itself can be:
1. What it is for something to be;
2. Everything present in what something is;
3. What arises directly as a primary attribute of something;
4. What has no cause except for itself;
5. Everything that belongs to some single thing as such.
These would each indicate that something is in-itself. Not-being meets none of these conditions:
therefore we recognize that not-being never holds καθ’ αὑτό of any of the categories.

Not-Being Does Not Have Being In-Itself
A difficulty might be found in the axioms of investigation. Non-contradiction and excluded middle
both concern being and not-being, and each holds καθ’ αὑτό of every being whatsoever. It is a
καθ’ αὑτό attribute of every being, as such, that it is not other than itself (or not-not-itself). So, at
least in an attenuated sense, not-being holds καθ’ αὑτό of all beings. 288 Yet to hold καθ’ αὑτό of
all beings is not the same as to have being καθ’ αὑτό (i.e. to be categorically). These most general
principles of investigation hold for every category and indeed every way of being, and thus do not
indicate, define, or demarcate what has its being καθ’ αὑτό. Yes, it holds of every positive,
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categorical determination that it is not what it is not (e.g. that being-green is not not-being-green,
for example, not-being-white or even not-being-justice); but this does not make not-being into a
kind of being in-itself. Really, the principle of non-contradiction establishes the opposite: insofar
as something has its being καθ’ αὑτό, just so it is precisely not not-being. Let us not belabor the
point any further: what is not cannot be καθ’ αὑτό.
Beings are said to be in four ways. But one of these, what is καθ’ αὑτό, does not admit of
not-being. Recall that Aristotle begins Meta. Θ.10 by saying that “being and not-being are said
according to the figures of predication.” 289 It should be clear, though, that being and not-being are
not said according to the figures of predication in the same way. Being is said of the categories
καθ’ αὑτό, while not-being is said of them only accidentally, κατὰ συμβεβηκός. For it is
accidentally that “also the not-white is said to be, because that of which it is an accident is.” 290

ii. Not-Being and Being Accidentally
Negative Predicates
Aristotle does not use any generic term for not-being as said according to the figures of predication,
i.e. negative attributes like not-(being)-white or not-(being)-here.291 According to Aristotle, to be
deprived, or to lack (ἐστερῆσθαι), is for a being to not have what it is natural to have when it is
natural to have it. Thus, in its most authoritative sense, a privation (στέρησις) is the not-beingsomething of a subject that should naturally be that same thing (e.g. not-sighted said of an adult
human).292
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Meta. Δ.7 1017a18-19, οὕτω δὲ λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι, ὅτι ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, ἐκεῖνο ἔστιν.
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Aristotle occasionally speaks of privation more broadly, to refer to any not-beingsomething of a subject that could be that same thing, whether naturally or not.293 In this sense, notbeing-outside and not-being-grey would be privations of Lucy the indoor, tortie cat. Yet he almost
never uses “privation” to refer to the not-being of an attribute or predicate that could not possibly
hold of the subject, e.g. Lucy’s not-being-a-dog or a tone’s not-being-red.294 Occasionally he uses
“negation,” ἀπόφασις, for the simple absence of a predicate, 295 but strictly speaking “negation”
refers to either propositions or things structured like propositions (not negative predicates). 296
Likewise, Aristotle generally reserves “contradictories,” ἀντιφάσεις for propositions, and applies
it indifferently to either affirmations or negations. None of these terms generically refers to notbeing as said of categorical being.
Still, I will use the word “privation” to refer to negative attributes, or not-being as said of
the figures of predication. “Privation” is chosen here because it does generally refer to predicates
or attributes, rather than to propositions. Further, Aristotle says of privation that it “is in-itself notbeing,” ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ μὴ ὄν. 297
Moreover, while privation is homonymous, this homonymy turns out to have a larger
import. We can distinguish between (1) privations of attributes that would naturally hold of their
subjects (e.g. not-clawed as said of a cat), (2) privations of attributes that can hold of their subjects
(e.g. not-outside as said of a cat), and (3) privations of attributes that never hold of their subjects
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(e.g. not-feathered as said of a cat). The first of these is the primary sense of privation, although
Aristotle occasionally uses the term in the second sense, and rarely in the third. Yet these distinct
senses not only indicate stronger and weaker meanings of privation, they also reflect different ways
of being κατὰ συμβεβηκός. For this reason, what seemed like a drawback of the term “privation”
ends up being an advantage. We will begin with the status of privations in general, and afterwards
consider the more determinate ways of being a privation.

Privations as Being Accidentally
Privations are the lack, in a subject, of a predicate or categorical determination. Thus, a privation
is not-being in-itself: to be a privation is to not-be-something. Still, Aristotle tells us that privations
have being accidentally, κατὰ συμβεβηκός. 298 Literally, this means “according to what happened,”
from the perfect participle of συμβαίνειν; in Posterior Analytics I.4, he says that accidents are
anything said of an underlying subject other than its definition. 299 When Aristotle discusses
accidents, he is typically concerned with positive predicates of something, like a doctor being a
housebuilder, or a human being educated. These accidental attributes are insofar as that to which
they happen, or belong, is. But this holds, too, for privations: the negative attribute “not-outside”
has being because Lucy is, and is not-outside.300 Simply put, a privation is not-being as an accident
of some being, and it is not-being with respect to some categorical determination.
Granting that privations are accidentally, we might still wonder why there are privations.
Aristotle explains why there are accidents in Metaphysics Ε.2, but this explanation (that not
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everything is either always or for the most part) will not wholly account for privation. We can
posit our own Aristotelian explanation of privatives by means of the principle of non-contradiction.
To any given subject belongs a number of positive attributes or determinations, some of which are
essential and some accidental. Insofar as a subject has each of these attributes, it cannot have the
contradictory attributes, that is, attributes that differ from these but are said in the same respect.
So, Matelda, being-grey, is not-orange and not any other color. It is for this reason that there are,
necessarily, some privations. Some privations will always hold of their subject – if Matelda is καθ’
αὑτό a cat, then she will always not-be a dog. Others only hold occasionally – Lucy is not-upstairs
when she is anywhere else, because “upstairs” is itself said accidentally of Lucy. In every case,
the privation belongs to its subject only as a consequence of the subject’s affirmative attributes,
insofar as these exclude other incompatible attributes. Thus, privations are accidental not only
because they are attributes of a subject, but also because their being is determined by the various
positive attributes of this subject.
Yet, as discussed in De Interpertatione 14 and Prior Analytics I.46, the contradiction of an
affirmation is a negation, not a privation. For example, the contradictory of “Lucy is outside” is
not “Lucy is not-outside” but “Lucy is-not outside.” This is because a privation is an attribute or
predicate that is said of a subject that has being, while a negation does not attribute anything of a
subject. This becomes clear when Aristotle makes the subject explicit:
Further, is not-white wood and is-not white wood do not simultaneously belong [to
the same thing]. For, if something is wood that is not-white, it will be a wood; but
what is-not white wood need not necessarily be wood. 301
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A negation simply says that the predicate does not belong to the subject, no matter whether the
subject or the predicate has being. 302 So, Aristotle says “to be not-equal and not-to-be equal are
also not [the same]. For the former is of some underlying subject, what is not-equal, and this is the
unequal, but the latter is of nothing.” 303 If a privation holds of a subject, then the negation of the
corresponding attribute is true; but the negation can be true without there being a privation which
holds of a subject. 304 For instance, because there is no void, it is false to say that the void is notfinite, but true to say that the void is-not finite. To predicate a privation of a subject is to utter an
affirmation, albeit an affirmation of a negative attribute.

The Several Senses of Accident and Privation
Aristotle has several different definitions of what it is to be an accident. The broadest, already
mentioned, is that an accident is whatever belongs to a subject without being part of its
definition.305 Close to this, also, is what Aristotle says in Topics I.5: an accident is what belongs
to a thing but is not a definition, a property, or a class. 306 Immediately after this, he says that an
accident is “what can belong and not-belong to one and the same thing.” 307 Aristotle prefers this
latter definition, because it indicates what an accident is in-itself, and it does not presuppose a
knowledge of what definitions, properties, and classes are. 308 Still, we should notice that this
second account is narrower than the first, for the first holds also of attributes that necessarily belong
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to their subjects without being a property or definition of them. A privation like not-feathered is
said necessarily of Lucy the cat, but it is not part of the definition of cat, and it is not a property of
cats (for this privation necessarily holds of nearly everything other than birds, while a property is
what belongs necessarily and exclusively to its subject, and is thus convertible with the subject). 309
Indeed, the first definition of accident pertains to all not-being according to the figures of
predication, while the second holds only for privations of attributes that can belong to their subjects
(e.g. not-inside or not-outside as said of Matelda). But we already noted that Aristotle tends not to
use the term “privation” to refer to what cannot belong to a subject, and this tendency is manifest
in his preference for the second, more determinate and restrictive definition of accident.
Likewise, Aristotle’s favored sense of “privation” accords with his most determinate
definition of “accident.” In Metaphysics Δ.30, Aristotle says that an accident is what happens
neither from necessity nor for the most part. 310 This is the narrowest definition of accident, for it
excludes predicates like “four-footed” and privations like “not-three-footed” as said of cats (which,
for the most part, are four-footed and are not-three-footed). Yet it does hold of “privation” sensu
stricto, as the not-being of some predicate that is natural for the subject to have (e.g. not-sighted
as said of cats). For if the subject naturally has this predicate, then it does not have the privation
for the most part.
Building on this definition of accident, in Meta. Ε.2 Aristotle argues that accidental being
only has accidental causes, and thus one cannot have a science of accidents. He also contends that
there must be accidents, for not everything happens either always or for the most part. These
conclusions also pertain to privations of natural predicates. Moreover, here we again recognize
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Aristotle’s preference for stricter, more determinate definitions, even at the expense of a more
universal account of accident and privation. 311
It is worth noting that every sense of “accident” can include what is καθ’ αὑτό (i.e.
affirmative categorical being). Indeed, although Metaphysics Δ has the most restrictive definition
of accident, Aristotle’s second example of what is κατὰ συμβεβηκός in Δ.7 is “the man is
musical,” 312 while “musical” is in the category of quality. Therefore, being καθ’ αὑτό and being
κατὰ συμβεβηκός are not mutually exclusive. Still, there are some things that are only καθ’ αὑτό
(e.g. οὐσίαι) and others that are only κατὰ συμβεβηκός (e.g. privations).
We have seen that, generally, privations are accidents. “Privation” and “accident” are both
homonymous, and the different ways of being a privation follow the different ways of being an
accident. Strictly, an accident is what is neither always nor for the most part; strictly, a privation
is a lack of an attribute which naturally occurs. More generally, an accident is anything that can
belong or not belong to the same subject, while a privation is a lack of something that could belong
to its subject. In the loosest sense, an accident is whatever belongs to something other than what
is equivalent to that thing, and a privation is any lack or not-being of an attribute in a thing. These
are not simply terminological distinctions, but instead reflect causal differences.
Because first philosophy is an investigation into the causes of being, in the Metaphysics
Aristotle favors the narrow sense of privation and accident, as what is unnatural or what is neither
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always nor the most part. What it is to be a privation is the same no matter whether a privation
belongs to its subject necessarily, contingently, or unnaturally. Instead, these indicate a distinction
in why a privation belongs to its subject. Something is a privation sensu stricto when it happens to
a subject despite the nature of the subject. These unnatural privations need a different sort of
account than the more indifferently contingent privations like not-outside or not-standing. Further,
necessary privations come about just because of what the subject in-itself is. We proposed that all
privations have their being because of the principle of non-contradiction. Nevertheless, in any
specific inquiry into causes it makes a difference whether some particular privation (or accident)
has its being because of, indifferently to, or in spite of, the nature of its subject.
It is still valuable to have a broad, causally-neutral account of accidents and privations.
Aristotle does not have such a general discussion of privation as not-being according to the figures
of predication. 313. But we also saw that the Topics, which concerns dialectic rather than causal
inquiry, does include just this sort of general definition of an accident.
Aristotle’s preference for a restricted, more determinate sense of privation also marks a
departure from the Eleatic Stranger’s account of negation. For the Stranger, “not” indicates the
different (ἕτερον), and not-being is what differs from being. Difference is not restricted to some
specified respect, and thus it is true to say that Matelda, a grey cat, is not-grey because she is not
the same as the color grey. What is decisive, in this case, are identity claims: everything is the
same as itself and differs from other things. In the Aristotelian account, by contrast, it is an issue
of non-contradiction: mutually exclusive attributes cannot be said of the same thing in the same
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One might expect such an account in the dialectical text of the Categories (on which, cf. Menn “Dialectic”), but in
the Categories Aristotle discusses privation in its strictest sense. I take this to indicate that, even apart from causal
concerns, Aristotle thinks that στέρησις is primarily said in reference to attributes that are otherwise natural. This
diverges from our own decision to use “privation” generically, but this generic use is also reflected in Phys. I and
Meta. Ι.
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respect. Thus Matelda, who is grey, is thereby not-orange. Predication, rather than identity, is
decisive. Aristotle acknowledges that “everything in relation to everything is either the same or
other.” 314 In this way a subject is other or different than its accidents (and everything else). But
this alterity is not the basis for predicating privative attributes of a subject. 315 Instead, there are
privations because of the opposition of contradictories. Aristotelian privations do not depend on a
broad idea of difference (ἕτερον) or otherness (ἄλλο), but instead on the different (διαφέρον) as
what is said in a certain respect. 316 We may also note that, although Aristotle does not have a
general account of privation, he does take care to distinguish the various senses of sameness,
difference, and otherness in Metaphysics Ι, a text which challenges several Platonic concepts.

The Being and Not-Being of Privations
We have the first of three ways of not-being: not-being according to the figures of predication.
Such privative not-being has its being κατὰ συμβεβηκός, and on account of the principle of noncontradiction. This is confirmed in Physics I, where Aristotle says that privation (στέρησις), which
has its being κατὰ συμβεβηκός, 317 “is in-itself not-being,” ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ μὴ ὄν.318
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Meta. Ι.3 1054b15-16, ἅπαν πρὸς ἅπαν ἢ ταὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο.
Further, difference is not in contradiction with a being’s self-identity. Therefore, Aristotle claims, difference is said
of beings, not not-beings. Cf. Meta. Ι.3 1054b18-22. We can imagine that this is said against any Eleatics who might
suppose that beings cannot be said to be different from anything, for then they would not-be.
316
See Meta. Ι.3 1055a2-8.
317
Phys I.7 190b27.
318
Phys. I.8 191b15-16.
315
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Chapter 7
The False: Veridical Not-Being

i. Being Beyond the Categorical
In the review of the several senses of being in Meta. Δ.7, after discussing being accidentally and
being in-itself, Aristotle says:
Further, to be and is mean that [something is] true, while not to be means that
[something is] not true but false, alike in affirmation and negation, for example,
that Socrates is musical because this is true, or that Socrates is not white because
that is true; while the diagonal is not commensurable because this is false. 319
This is his terse introduction of a new sense of being as the true. It is striking that Aristotle
introduces a third, major determination of being. Between what is in-itself and what is accidentally,
we can find every οὐσία, attribute, and privation, as well as the accidental combinations of these.
What is missing from this ontology?
By connecting the true and false to propositions – affirmations and negations – Aristotle
suggests that this new determination of being arises out of the facts of speech. It is plausible that
Aristotle identifies this distinct way of being as being true in response to certain sophistic and
Platonic arguments320 that argue from a proposition’s being true to being simply. By separating
categorical and accidental being from veridical being, Aristotle complicates – if not undermines –
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Meta. Δ.7 1017a31-35, ἔτι τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὅτι ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος,
ὁμοίως ἐπὶ καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως, οἷον ὅτι ἔστι Σωκράτης μουσικός, ὅτι ἀληθὲς τοῦτο, ἢ ὅτι ἔστι Σωκράτης οὐ
λευκός, ὅτι ἀληθές· τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ διάμετρος σύμμετρος, ὅτι ψεῦδος.
320
Parmenides 161e3-162a4; Sophist 257e9-258c4. Cf. Menn Aim and Argument 326.
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seemingly easy inferences from truth to reality. Thus, we need a separate consideration of what it
means for something to be true or false.
True and false are largely said by Aristotle with reference to beliefs and propositions; so
he probably introduces this third, veridical sense of being to account for these.321 Affirming (or
believing) that “Lucy is asleep” is not the same as her really being so, and the being said in the
affirmation (or held in the belief) is not the same as the being of οὐσία-attribute composite, even
if they are related. The determinations “true” and “false,” then, somehow pertain to the being and
not-being believed in our mind and expressed in our speech.
As an aside, this is not true in the case of simple essences, where the true thought of an
essence is a sort of contact with the form itself. But there is no falsity with these simples, only
truth or ignorance – contact or the lack of contact. This case is analogous to our earlier discussion
of οὐσία:322 there is no οὐσία that is not, and there is no simple that is false. I will not be focusing
on such simples in this project.
That Aristotle posits veridical being alongside categorical and accidental being does not
belie the ontology of the categories. The same instance of the term “being” or “is” can
simultaneously indicate the categorical, the accidental, and the true: if I say “Lucy is not-grey,”
here “is” indicates not only the being of an underlying subject, Lucy, and her accident, not-grey,
but it also indicates that these are truly combined, that is, the veridical being involved in this
affirmation. Further, truth and falsity themselves fit into the categorical framework, and in the
Sophistical Refutations Aristotle places them into the category of quality: “the being false or true

321
322

See Metaphysics Δ.7, Ε.4
See Chapter 5 Section iv, above.
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of a proposition or a belief does not indicate a this, but a such.”323 Still this postulate of another
way of being does suggest that the human situation – that we think and speak of things – institutes
an ontological register separate from, even if dependent on, the categories of οὐσία and its
attributes. Perhaps, in some way, this veridical register even pertains to non-human life: even if
neither cats nor gods hold beliefs or speak, each has some access – through perception, or thinking
– to what is true.

ii. How Truth and Falsity Are
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle is explicit and insistent that the false is a way of not-being:


“Further, to be and is mean that [something is] true, while not to be means that
[something is] not true but false.” 324



“Things, therefore, are said to be false in this way, either because they are not or
because their appearance is of something that is not-being.” 325



“A false proposition, as false, is of not-beings […]” 326



“But since being, said simply, is said in several ways, one of which is
accidentally, another is as the true, and not-being as the false, and besides these
there are the figures of predication […]” 327

323

SE 22 178b27-28, τὸ γὰρ ψευδῆ ἢ ἀληθῆ λόγον ἢ δόξαν εἶναι οὐ τόδε ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε σημαίνει. Cf. Crivelli Aristotle
189 n20.
324
Meta. Δ.7 1017a31-32, ἔτι τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὅτι ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος.
Cf. Meta. Δ.29 1024b24-27, Ε.2 1026a35.
325
Meta. Δ.29 1024b24-26, πράγματα μὲν οὖν ψευδῆ οὕτω λέγεται, ἢ τῷ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὰ ἢ τῷ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν φαντασίαν
μὴ ὄντος εἶναι.
326
Meta. Δ.29 1024b26-27, λόγος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ᾗ ψευδής.
327
Meta. Ε.2 1026a33-36, Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ὧν ἓν μὲν ἦν τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ὡς ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, παρὰ ταῦτα δ'ἐστὶ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας.
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This insistence on the not-being of the false leads to two questions. (1) Given that the false is a
way of not-being, what is the not-being of falsity? Or: how is the false not? (2) Further, given that
every way of not-being must also somehow be something, what sort of being does the false have?

Truth and Falsity are Qualities of Declarative Propositions
We already have an answer to this second question, and this will serve as a first step for our
consideration of the false: “the being false or true of a proposition or a belief does not indicate a
this, but a such.”328 In other words, falsity is a quality of certain objects. More precisely, it seems
to be the contrary (with no intermediate) of truth in certain objects. 329 What kinds of objects are
false? In the above passage, Aristotle gave us two: propositions and beliefs. So, to address how
the false is a way of not-being, we should consider what it is for these items to have the quality of
falsity. Given that propositions and beliefs, at least with respect to truth and falsity, are structured
analogously,330 we can focus on propositions and take the account to hold similarly for beliefs. 331
Not all propositions (nor all beliefs) admit of truth and falsity: “for instance a prayer is a
proposition, but is neither true nor false.” 332 A true or false proposition must be ἀποφαντικός,
declarative,333 and simple declarative propositions are either affirmations or negations. 334 For
Aristotle, “an affirmation is a declaration of something about something, while a negation is a
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SE 22 178b27-28, τὸ γὰρ ψευδῆ ἢ ἀληθῆ λόγον ἢ δόξαν εἶναι οὐ τόδε ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε σημαίνει.
As described in Cat. 10 12b26-32. Note that while affirmations and denials, according to Cat. 10, are not opposed
as contraries are, this text does not disqualify truth and falsity from being so opposed.
330
Int. 1 16a4-9. Cf. Crivelli Aristotle 8.
331
Moreover, we need not be concerned with whether Aristotle prioritizes temporally-brief utterances (“expressiontokens”) or temporally-enduring statements (“expression-types”), because with respect to truth and falsity the cases
are near enough for our purpose. Still, Crivelli Aristotle 72-76 is probably correct that for Aristotle propositions are
primarily understood as short-term tokens, rather than indefinite expressions.
332
Int. 4 17a3-4, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μέν, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής.
333
Int. 4 17a2-3.
334
Int. 5.
329
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declaration of something apart from something.” 335 In other words, affirmations attribute a
predicate to a subject, while negations deny the attribution of a predicate to a subject. 336
Affirmations indicate the combinations and negations the separations of οὐσίαι and their attributes
across the categories. They achieve this by themselves being a combination or separation –
Aristotle sometimes uses the generic word συμπλοκή, “interweaving” – of a subject-term and a
predicate-term. The truth or falsity of a declarative proposition (or of a belief) thus depends in part
on the interweaving of its terms (or its thoughts):


“For both the false and the true concern combination and separation.” 337



“For what is true or false is an interweaving of thoughts.” 338



“Generally, what is said without any interweaving is neither true nor false.” 339

Yet the combination of terms does not per se grant truth or falsity: “for it is not because we truly
suppose you to be pale that you are pale, but because you are pale that we are true when saying
this.” 340 Thus the truth or falsity of propositions lies in whether the combinations or separations
they indicate are indeed the combinations or separations of things. As Aristotle says in De
Interpretatione: “propositions are true in the same way as the things.” 341

335

Int. 6 17a25-26, κατάφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσις τινὸς κατὰ τινός, ἀπόφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσις τινὸς ἀπὸ τινός.
There is a question, with both affirmations and negations, of whether they indicate the real being of the subject, or
merely the combination or separation of a possible subject and the predicate. Bäck compellingly argues that
affirmations indeed indicate both that the subject is combined with the predicate and that the subject is, while negations
indicate either that the subject is not or that the predicate is not combined with a real subject. See also Chapter 5
section ii, above.
337
Int. 1 16a12-13, περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσίν ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές.
338
De An. III.3 342a11-12, συμπλοκὴ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος.
339
Cat. 11 13b10-11, ὅλως δὲ τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν. See
also Cat. 4 2a8-10, Meta. Κ.8 1065a21-23.
340
Meta. Θ.10 1051b6-9, οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἴεσθαι ἀληθῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἶ σὺ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι
λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν.
341
Int. 9 19a33, ὁμοίως οἱ λόγοι ἀληθεῖς ὥσπερ τὰ πράγματα.
336
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A Question: To What Do Propositions Refer?
The truth or falsity of propositions depends on what the propositions indicate. Yet what is it that
propositions indicate, what are they about? In the Categories Aristotle claims that
What affirmation and negation are about is not an affirmation or a negation. For an
affirmation is an affirmative proposition and a negation a negative proposition, but
none of what affirmation and negation refer to is a proposition. These [referents]
are, however, said to be opposed to one another as affirmation and negation; for
also in these things the way of opposition is the same: for just how an affirmation
is opposed to a negation, for example ‘he sits’ / ‘he does not sit,’ in this way also
each of the things indicated are opposed, to sit / not to sit. 342
Propositions must ultimately be about non-propositional things (even if some propositions – like
this one – are about other propositions). These non-propositional things are opposed as
affirmations and negations – that is, as being combined or separated. But what are they?
Paolo Crivelli argues that propositions, for Aristotle, refer to mind-independent states of
affairs which are themselves the primary bearers of truth and falsehood.343 According to Crivelli,
Aristotle’s “most unequivocal testimony” of this is in Δ.29, which he translates as:
One way in which what is false is spoken of is by being a false object. This can
happen, on the one hand, because it is not combined or it is impossible for it to be
composed (the diagonal’s being commensurable and your being seated are spoken
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Cat. 10 12b5-15, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ
κατάφασις λόγος ἐστὶ καταφατικὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις λόγος ἀποφατικός, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν
ἐστι λόγος. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς
ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός· ὡς γάρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀντίκειται, οἷον τὸ κάθηται – οὐ κάθηται, οὕτω καὶ
τὸ ὑφ' ἑκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ καθῆσθαι – μὴ καθῆσθαι.
343
Crivelli Aristotle 3, 6, 46-62. Cf. Kirwan 178-179.
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of in this way, for one of these is false always and the other sometimes, for it is in
this sense [sc. in the sense of being false] that these are non-beings) […] 344
If Crivelli were correct, falsity should be primarily understood in terms of false states of affairs,
extra-linguistic items that are also different from composite things. 345 These immediately seem
paradoxical, being both things (πράγματα) and not-beings. With reference to this passage, Kirwan
complains:
Aristotle says that your sitting down is false when it is ‘not compounded,’ i.e. when
you and sitting down do not combine. If they do not, there is no such state of affairs:
a false state of affairs is one that does not exist. 346
Crivelli is undisturbed by this tension, allowing that somehow states of affairs both are (at least
insofar as they are the target of beliefs and propositions) but are not (insofar as they are false, and
do not correspond to any real combination of things). 347 So he claims:
Aristotle is probably committing himself to the claim that a state of affairs is false
just in case it is not combined or it is impossible for it to be combined. But now, if
for a state of affairs it is impossible to be combined, then that state of affairs is not
combined. Hence Aristotle is probably committing himself to the claim that a state
of affairs is false just in case it is not combined.
This is an interesting idea, as the not-being of the false would pertain to (or even consist in) the
not-being of these mind-independent states of affairs. Following Crivelli’s lead, we could then

344

Meta. Δ.29, 1024b17-21, as translated in Crivelli Aristotle 46.
Crivelli Aristotle 48-49.
346
Kirwan 178.
347
Crivelli Aristotle 49-50 also contends that all states of affairs are affirmative (or indicate combinations) and that
none are negative (or indicate separations).
345
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connect the not-being of falsity with the status of negations, so that what a negation expresses is
that some positive state of affairs is false. 348

There Are No Mind-Independent Bearers of Truth and Falsity
Crivelli cannot be right about the existence of mind-independent Aristotelian states of affairs, if
these are meant to be different from the regular categorical things. (Unless otherwise noted, I use
the expression “state of affair” strictly to refer to non-mental, non-linguistic, non-categorical
entities that are structured like propositions.)
There is immediately a problem with their ontologically uncertain status. On the one hand,
they are things but are not mental, linguistic, material compounds, or incidental compounds. On
the other hand, recall one of Aristotle’s complaints against any theory of ideas:
But as for those who posited the ideas as causes, first, while seeking to grasp the
causes of the beings around us, they imported other things, equal to them in number,
just as if someone who wished to count a smaller number of beings thought it
impossible unless he were to make them greater […] For alongside each particular
thing there is also some οὐσία with the same name […] 349
To endorse the existence of states of affairs is to multiply entities as excessively as these
doctrinaires of the ideas did. Crivelli would have to say: alongside each particular combination of
οὐσία and attribute there is some separate state of affairs with the same name. But while these
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Crivelli Aristotle 77-98.
Meta. A.9 990a34-b4 an b6-7, οἱ δὲ τὰς ἰδέας αἰτίας τιθέμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ζητοῦντες τωνδὶ τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς
αἰτίας ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἴοιτο μὴ
δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη […] καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ὁμώνυμόν τι ἔστι καὶ παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας.
349
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ontological problems make the existence of Aristotelian states of affairs unpalatable, Aristotle’s
larger discussion of truth and falsity makes it untenable.
Whenever the question arises of whether there are some mind-independent bearers of truth
or falsity, Aristotle’s answer is simply negative. In Metaphysics Ε.4 he says:
for the false and the true are not in things, as if the good was true while the bad was
directly false, but in thought […] and since the interweaving and separation
[appropriate to the true and false] are in thinking but not in things, and being of this
sort differs from being in the authoritative sense (for thinking adds or subtracts the
what it is, or the quality, or quantity, or whatever else), being as incidental as well
as being as true or false must be dismissed [from the project of first philosophy] –
for the cause of the former is indeterminate and of the latter is some attribute of
thought.350
Further, Meta. K.9 reiterates this point: “So of being as true and as incidental, the first is in
something interwoven by thought and is an attribute of this […].” 351 So while Meta. Δ.29 speaks
of “false things,” these subsequent texts clarify that there are no false or true things that are not in
thought, either as propositions or beliefs.
Crivelli, to maintain his postulate of states of affairs, introduces an implausible distinction
between the true or false “in the ordinary sense,” which is discussed in Meta. E.4 and is supposed
to be restricted to mental and linguistic items, and “being in the strictest sense true” or “being in

350

Meta. E.4 1027b25-27, b29-a1 οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθὲς
τὸ δὲ κακὸν εὐθὺς ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' ἐν διανοίᾳ […] ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ συμπλοκή ἐστιν καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν διανοίᾳ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς
πράγμασι, τὸ δ' οὕτως ὂν ἕτερον ὂν τῶν κυρίως (ἢ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ποιὸν ἢ ὅτι ποσὸν ἤ τι ἄλλο συνάπτει ἢ ἀφαιρεῖ
ἡ διάνοια), τὸ μὲν ὡς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν ἀφετέον – τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μὲν ἀόριστον τοῦ δὲ τῆς διανοίας
τι πάθος.
351
Meta. K.8 1065a21-23, τὸ δ' ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἐν συμπλοκῇ διανοίας καὶ πάθος ἐν
ταύτῃ.
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the strictest sense false,” which is discussed in Θ.10 (and presumably the beginning of Δ.29) and
holds specifically of states of affairs. 352 There is nearly no textual support for this distinction, and
it complicates the obvious point made in E.4: truth and falsity are attributes of thought –
propositions and beliefs.

The Causes of Truth and Falsity: Metaphysics Θ.10
Of course, Metaphysics Θ.10 does follow through on the promise in E.4 that “whatever must be
considered about this sort of being and not-being [i.e. being as true and not-being as false] should
be examined later.” 353 This is not a move from an “ordinary sense” to a “strict sense” of truth and
falsity, but instead an examination of the causes of truth and falsity, truth across time, and the truth
of non-composite beings. For us, the important passage is toward the beginning of the chapter:
Since being and not-being are said […] by being true or false in the most
authoritative sense, and this, in the case of things is to be combined or to be
separated, such that one who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined
to be combined thinks truly, but one who holds these things in an opposite way
thinks falsely, when is it that what is called truth or falsity is or is not? 354
Let us try to make sense of Aristotle’s claims in this passage.
(1) Crivelli is probably right that τὸ κυριώτατα ὂν (“being in the most authoritative sense”
or “being in the strictest sense”) must be read with ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος – “being in the most
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Crivelli Aristotle 65-66.
Meta. E.4 1027b28-29, ὅσα μὲν οὖν δεῖ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὸ οὕτως ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.
354
Meta. Θ.10 1051a34, b1-6, Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὂν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν […] τὸ δὲ κυριώτατα ὂν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τοῦτο δ'
ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τὸ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διῃρῆσθαι, ὥστε ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ
συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα, πότ' ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀληθὲς λεγόμενον ἢ
ψεῦδος;
353
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authoritative sense true or false” – rather than signaling a “most authoritative” way of being. There
is no other support for the idea that what is true or false is the most authoritative way of being. 355
(2) Still, the use of the expression τὸ κυριώτατα ὂν in this text gives no prima facie reason
to suppose this sense of the true and false differs from the one discussed in E.4. Indeed, Meta. Δ.29
introduces several distinct senses of the false that do not indicate an ontologically distinct way of
being and thus have no bearing on the discussion of either E.4 or Θ.10 (e.g. the falseness of
humans). These other senses of false are presumably meant to be excluded by Aristotle’s
expression τὸ κυριώτατα ὂν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. But there is no clear reason to exclude the truth and
falsity of propositions and beliefs.
(3) In Θ.10 (as in Δ.29) Aristotle discusses truth and falsity “in the case of things,” ἐπὶ τῶν
πραγμάτων, while in E.4 he was clear that truth and falsity are “in thinking but not in things,” ἐν
διανοίᾳ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι. But πρᾶγμα is very generic and not a technical Aristotelian
term: much like the English “thing,” the word πρᾶγμα is flexible enough both to contrast with
mental items and to include mental items, depending on the context. The use of πρᾶγμα gives us
no reason to assume that Aristotle is either contradicting what he said in E.4 or changing the topic
from E.4.
(4) There is some editorial uncertainty over whether the text should read ἐστὶ τὸ συγκεῖσθαι
ἢ διῃρῆσθαι or ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διῃρῆσθαι, that is, whether Aristotle is saying that the
authoritative sense of being true or false is to be combined or separated, or whether it is by
combination and separation. 356 But it does not really matter which of these is meant, because both
are right. The truth and falsity of propositions or beliefs consists in the combination or separation

355
356

See Crivelli Aristotle App.1 234-236.
See Crivelli Aristotle App.2 238.
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of the terms of the belief (“for what is true or false is an interweaving of thoughts”), 357 but it also
depends on the combination or separation of things (“for both the false and the true concern
combination and separation”). 358
(5) Moreover, whether Aristotle is claiming that the authoritative sense of truth is
combination/separation or is by them, the added “such that” or ὥστε-clause makes it clear that
truth and falsity require a twofold combination (or separation): thinking truly is thinking the
combined as combined, the separated as separated. Truth depends on an interweaving of thought
that reflects an interweaving of reality, and falsity arises when the weaves do not match.
(6) Let us also note that this ὥστε-clause discusses the being-true and being-false of
thoughts, not of states of affairs. It is the one who thinks, οἰόμενος, that either thinks-truly or
thinks-falsely. These clunky expressions translate forms of ἀληθεύειν and ψεύδεσθαι, common
Greek verbs for being-true (or speaking-truly) and being-false (or speaking-falsely), which have
no perfect translation in English. That Aristotle begins Θ.10, his longest and apparently most
definitive surviving discussion on truth and falsity, by using these verbal forms and referring them
to a thinker, οἰόμενος, again indicates that for Aristotle truth and falsity belong to thinkers, with
their beliefs and words, most of all.
(7) Finally, the passage at hand ends with a question: “when is it that what is called truth
or falsity is or is not?” Aristotle is asking what is responsible for truth and falsity, and we have
already seen his answer: “for it is not because we truly suppose you to be pale that you are pale,
but because you are pale that we are true when saying this.” 359 The truth or falsity of some speech
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De An. III.3 342a11-12, συμπλοκὴ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος.
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or belief is not causally responsible for – and has no priority over – the combination and separation
of things. Things make the true and false what they are, not vice versa.
For the remainder of Θ.10 Aristotle considers how truth can change over time, and the truth
of non-composite beings. The only other passage perhaps relevant for us is when he says:
To be as the true, and to not-be as the false, in one way is: if it is combined, [it is] true, but
if it is not combined, [it is] false; but in another way is: if it really is [as true], it is in this
way, and if it is not in this way, it is not. 360
This passage returns to the truth and falsity of composites to contrast this way of being with the
way of being of non-composite truths. But its articulation of the truth and falsity of composites is
too terse to establish a clear sense of Aristotle’s theory: the “it” which is combined or uncombined
could be any sort of object. Nothing in Θ.10 supports the theory that there are non-mental nonlinguistic objects which are true or false. Instead, the text bolsters the idea that what is primarily
false are propositions or beliefs, and that their falsity is because they fail to correspond to things.

Ways of Being False: Metaphysics Δ.29
Let us also consider the discussion of the false in Metaphysics Δ.29, what Crivelli calls the “most
unequivocal testimony of Aristotle’s commitment of states of affairs as bearers of truth and
falsehood.” 361 This is an important text for our goal of articulating how the false both is and is not.
But its place in Δ belies its status as a wholly comprehensive account. 362 I do not suppose that the
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Meta. Θ.10 1051b33-a1, ὸ δὲ εἶναι ὡς τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, ἓν μέν ἐστιν, εἰ σύγκειται,
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361
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later discussions of truth and falsity in the Metaphysics, the above discussed E.4 and Θ.10, are
inconsistent with Δ.29. But there is also no reason to understand Δ.29 to be exhaustive, as if its
silences were absolute and its ambiguities absent – as if it indicated the limits of Aristotle’s theory.
This is Crivelli’s fundamental misreading of this text.
There are five major senses of the false discussed in Δ.29: (1) false things as uncombined
things, (2) false things as things that seem to be what they are not, (3) false λόγοι both in general
and (4) as definitional, and (5) false humans. Only the first and third concern us here, and it is
plausible that these are what is meant by “being false in the most authoritative sense.” 363 Earlier I
gave Crivelli’s translation of the discussion of false things as uncombined things, but here is my
own:
The false is said in one way as a false thing, and of this sense, one way is by not
being combined or it being impossible to be combined (just as it is said that the
diagonal is commensurable or that you are sitting; for, of these, the one is always
false and the other sometimes; for it is thus [i.e. always or sometimes] that these
are not-beings) […] Things, therefore, are said to be false in this way, either by
them not-being, or […] 364
Again, we have several points to make about this passage.
(1) Here Aristotle speaks about the false “as a false thing,” ὡς πρᾶγμα ψεῦδος. We
discussed above that πρᾶγμα, “thing,” is a non-technical generic term, which can both include or
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As in Θ.10. It is also plausible that Crivelli is right that only the first of these, the “false things,” is really meant by
“being false in the most authoritative sense.” But as I will discuss, we need not think that these “things” are states of
affairs.
364
Meta. Δ.29 1024b17-21 24-25, Τὸ ψεῦδος λέγεται ἄλλον μὲν τρόπον ὡς πρᾶγμα ψεῦδος, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν τῷ μὴ
συγκεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι συντεθῆναι (ὥσπερ λέγεται τὸ τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι σύμμετρον ἢ τὸ σὲ καθῆσθαι· τούτων
γὰρ ψεῦδος τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ δὲ ποτέ· οὕτω γὰρ οὐκ ὄντα ταῦτα) […] πράγματα μὲν οὖν ψευδῆ οὕτω λέγεται, ἢ τῷ μὴ
εἶναι αὐτὰ.
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exclude mental and linguistic things. Therefore, there is an uncertainty here about what sort of
thing is under discussion. There are four candidates.
(a) The false things could be states of affairs – if there were not good reasons already
discussed for excluding such things from Aristotle’s ontology.
(b) Given that Aristotle does not in Δ.29 explicitly speak about false belief or thought,
it is possible that beliefs are the false things he is implicitly indicating here. In this
reading, we might suppose that he is being deliberately vague so that he can
decisively dismiss being as truth / not-being as false from the project of first
philosophy in E.4.
(c) There is also a suggestion, given the parenthetical remark ὥσπερ λέγεται, “just as
it is said,” that these false things are linguistic expressions. This is made difficult
by the fact that Aristotle talks about false propositions later in Δ.29. Minimally, we
should note that Aristotle’s examples of “false things” are all “things said,” rather
than wholly non-linguistic items.
(d) Finally, it is possible that the “false things” under discussion are the οὐσίαι and the
attributes that they do not have, which are the target of false (affirmative) beliefs
and propositions. 365 These would be non-mental, non-linguistic items, but in the
already familiar categorical determinations that populate Aristotle’s ontology. This
candidate fits comfortably with the word πρᾶγμα, as well as with the attribution of
not-being to false things. For what is not and is not combined, understood
categorically, are the οὐσίαι and the attributes they lack. But in this case, Aristotle
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A view held by Alexander 431.5-432.10.
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would indeed contradict this passage later in Meta. E.4 when he asserts that the true
and false are in thought, not in (non-mental) things. Further, given that in Δ.7
Aristotle postulates the false as a separate way of not-being, we need not read “notbeing” in this passage categorically.
Each of the readings (b), (c), and (d) have their advantages and disadvantages. Ultimately, the text
is underdetermined, and we need not decide which one of these is meant and which others
excluded. In any case, we should recognize in this passage the often underappreciated Aristotelian
rhetorical strategy of writing vaguely enough that various potential rivals – perhaps the Platonists
who would want to understand the false as a principle of being366 – would agree with his
articulation.
Anyone who holds (a), that in Δ.29 Aristotle is introducing states of affairs as a new kind
of thing, has a serious problem. Aristotle is clear in this passage that these “false things” are not,
insofar as they are not combined. So: what is the ultimate ontological status of false states of
affairs? Here, at the spot that would be their conceptual introduction, Aristotle appears to deny
them being. Either this denial is categorical, or it is a denial of veridical being. The first is untenable
– the same thing would both be and not-be. The second is possible, but then we have postulated a
set of entities whose only discernable feature is to lack veridical being – what will their categorical
status even be? This is not an impasse for the other candidates. If the “false things” are false
οὐσία/attribute composites, then there is no special problem with denying them categorical being.
And if the “false things” are false beliefs or false propositions, then they can clearly lack veridical
being while still having their familiar categorical status as human beliefs, utterances, or writings.
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(2) Aristotle only discusses these false things as not combined. Crivelli takes this to suggest
that states of affairs are only positive or combinatory. Given that Aristotle frequently links falsity
to both combination and separation (or to both affirmation and negation), 367 it seems more likely
that Aristotle is either being terse or taking συγκεῖσθαι, “to be combined,” in a generic sense that
holds for both combinations and separations, akin to συμπλοκή, “interweaving.” Either way, there
is insufficient textual support to suppose that Aristotle is excluding any sort of negative or
separated falsehoods (like the belief that “the square is not a rectangle,” where these are separated
in the proposition but combined in things). Further, we have seen (for example in Meta. Θ.10) that
falsehoods require a twofold combination/separation – what is combined (in thought) must be
separated (in things), or vice versa. Aristotle does not address this correspondence at all here,
undermining the presumption that this passage is meant to be a definitive or comprehensive
account of falsity.
(3) Aristotle adds a remark, made parenthetical in most versions of the text, to elaborate
the distinction he makes between (a) not being combined and (b) being impossible to be combined.
That this is the purpose of the remark is made clear by the two uses of γὰρ, “for,” showing that
these clauses are meant to explain what comes before. The diagonal’s being commensurate is (b)
impossible to be combined, and is thus always false, while your being seated is (a) not combined
in some circumstances, and so only sometimes false. Aristotle ends this parenthetical remark by
saying “for it is thus [οὕτω] that these are not-beings”; Crivelli takes οὕτω to indicate “in the sense
of being false,”368 but given that this is explaining the distinction between what is sometimes false
and what is always false, οὕτω probably indicates “[b] always or [a] sometimes.”
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Cat. 10 12b6-15, Int. 1 16a12-13, Meta. Δ.7 1017a31-35.
Crivelli Aristotle 46.
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(4) Nor does the passage as a whole “explain what it is for a state of affairs to be false,” as
Crivelli would have it. 369 Instead, it introduces a vague, unfinished – but mostly uncontentious –
description of what it is to be false (whatever things happen to be so). It uses the idea of a failure
of combination to link the false to not-being. Thus, he concludes the discussion of false things by
saying “things, therefore, are said to be false in this way, either by them not-being […].” He also
includes a brief modal consideration, because this not-being can be either sometimes or always,
and he adds some examples on this point.
Later in Δ.29, Aristotle connects false λόγοι, “propositions” or “accounts,” to not-being:
A false λόγος, as false, is of not-beings; hence every false λόγος is of something
other than that of which it is true, as what is [true] of the circle is false of the triangle.
And of each thing there is a way in which a λόγος is one (of the what it is for it to
be), but in another way there are many [λόγοι], since the thing itself and the affected
thing are somehow the same, e.g. Socrates and musical Socrates (but the false λόγος
is a λόγος about nothing simply). 370
Λόγος in this text is ambiguous, 371 and thus we left it untranslated. Aristotle seems to equivocate
between full propositions (“Florence is our cat”) and predicates (“is our cat”). For it is a full
proposition that really indicates something and is really true or false, 372 but it is a predicate that
can be false of one thing and true of another (“is our cat” being true of Florence but false of
Aristotle). Further, he distinguishes between the λόγος that properly belongs to a thing – the
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Crivelli Aristotle 47.
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definition of what it is – and all the other things that can be truly or falsely said of something. But
no matter how we take λόγος, a false λόγος is of not-beings: it speaks about things that are not.

An Answer: What Propositions Refer To
With this we have returned to an earlier, still unresolved question: what are propositions, especially
false propositions, about? If we think they are about beliefs or some other mental states, we can
then ask to what these, in turn, refer. We have argued that they cannot be about states of affairs.
Instead, propositions (and beliefs) must be about the categorical things that populate the world:
οὐσίαι and their attributes. We do not need – and Aristotle does not posit – some object in-between
thoughts and things; thoughts are about things.
Truth or falsity is a quality of a proposition (or a belief) that depends on the correspondence
or matching between the combination or separation articulated in the proposition and the
combination or separation in things. It is not itself a relation or relative, but instead is a quality that
involves a relation between terms and things. 373 Perhaps Aristotle’s best formulations of truth and
falsity is one of his most succinct:
This is clear foremost to those who define the true and false. For, to say that being
is not to be, or that not-being is to be, is false; to say that being is to be, and that
not-being is not to be, is true. 374
By affirming (or negating) a predicate-term of subject-term a proposition indicates a combination
(or separation) of a subject-entity and predicate-entity. Among things, that subject-entity either has
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or fails to have the predicate as an attribute. When the combination or separation of terms matches
the combination or separation of things, the proposition has the quality of truth; when they fail to
match, it is false. A false proposition, or false belief, is thus about not-beings. That is, it articulates
combinations or separations which categorically are not: Lucy’s being a dog, Aristotle’s being
alive, red’s not being a color. These complex entities, taken in this way, do not have categorical
being – even if, as with Plato’s Sophist, the simple items being combined and separated are real
beings.

iii. How the False Is Not
In what way is falsity not? There are two answers, which ultimately coincide.
(1) Falsity is a way of not-being because it is about not-being. Insofar as it concerns
anything, as speech and belief do, false speech and belief concern things that are
not. It does not matter whether the falsehood is about a combination which is really
separated or a separation that is really combined: the true and false are “alike in the
case of affirmation and negation.” 375 Either way, it refers to complex categorical
beings that are not.
(2) Falsity is a way of not-being because it is not true. For Aristotle, outside of the
categorical (comprising both the in-itself and the accidental), there is a veridical
sense of being: something can “be” insofar as it is the case, it is true, it says or
thinks things as they are. We have argued that this veridical way of being is only
properly found “in thought,” ἐν διανοίᾳ, but it nevertheless establishes a separate
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ontological register. In this way, to be true is to be, and to fail to be true, to be false,
is not to be.
Answer (2) ultimately coincides with answer (1) because to fail to be true is precisely to be about
not-being – these are different ways of saying the same thing.
Truth and falsity “do not reveal any being beyond of the nature of [in-itself] being.” 376
Indeed, properly understood, they fit neatly within, and are wholly dependent on, categorical ways
of being. Truth and falsity are qualities of propositions and beliefs. These qualities are relational
without being relatives, that is, they depend on the relation of correspondence between the
combinations or separations of terms in the proposition (or belief) and the combinations and
separations of things. Finally, the objects they concern – what propositions and beliefs are about,
that make them true or false – are normal things, combinations and separations of οὐσίαι and their
attributes.
Thus, not only do truth and falsity fit into the categorical register of beings, but they are a
somewhat minor determination therein. They are not οὐσίαι, and they are not even particularly
robust qualities, being so relational. This becomes important in the Categories, where Aristotle
argues that propositions and beliefs are not οὐσίαι, despite being capable of having contrary
determinations over time (something that seems to be a characteristic property of οὐσίαι). Here he
argues:
For it is not because sentences and beliefs receive anything that they are said to be
capable of receiving contraries [i.e. the qualities of truth and falsity], but because
the affection has come to be about something different. For it is by the thing’s being
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or not-being that the proposition also is said to be true or false, not because [the
proposition] is capable of receiving contraries [as οὐσία is]. For simply not at all
by anything is the sentence or the belief changed, so that these would not be capable
of receiving contraries because no affection comes to be in them. Οὐσία, by
contrast, itself receives contraries, and thus is said to be capable of receiving
contraries.377
In this passage truth and falsity do not even reach the status of a πάθος, an affection or attribute,
because they are not inherent qualities of any given speech or belief. This seems to be because of
its relational character, for “a sign that a relative is least of all an οὐσία and a being is that of this
alone there is neither coming to be nor passing away nor motion.” 378 A difference of relatives over
time, for Aristotle, is not a becoming, a change, or a motion; and so too with the qualities of truth
and falsity.379
Yet, this minor, tenuous determination of categorical being itself determines its own
veridical way of being. For us, and for other discriminative or cognitive beings, the status of truth
and falsity is vital. We are animals that speak and think, and speech and thought cannot remain
indifferent to truth. Further, while the veridical register does not determine the categorical one, it
does reflect it: we can go from a proposition’s being true to the world holding in the way articulated
by the proposition. Likewise with the false – the falsity of a belief implies the reality of the things
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not being so. Trusting truthful people therefore gives one a path to generally accurate beliefs
outside of our own ken, while false persons mislead and confuse. For the philosopher, true,
speculative thinking is perhaps the primary goal. In these and countless other ways, truth and
falsity are fundamental for our lives.
Here, then, is the second of three ways of not-being: not-being as the false. Falsity is a
quality of a proposition (or belief) that is determined by the failure of correspondence between the
terms of the proposition (or belief) and the categorical things of the world. For something to be
false is for it to not-be because it is not true; for something to be false is for it to be about notbeings.
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Chapter 8
Potentiality: Not-Being Actualized

i. A New Distinction
In this Chapter we turn to the final way of not-being Aristotle establishes in the Metaphysics. We
can find it in the Meta. Θ.10 passage that began Chapter 5: “and since being and not-being are said
according to the figures of predication, but also according to the potency or actualization of these
or their opposites, and still further by being true or false in the most authoritative sense […].” 380
In Chapter 6 and 7 we considered not-being according to the figures of predication and not-being
as the false. What remains is what is or is not following the determinations of potency and
actualization.
These ways of being also follow the fourfold distinction Aristotle first articulates in
Metaphysics Δ.7. After speaking of what is accidentally, what is in-itself, and what is true or false,
he continues: “besides, to be and being signify, for the abovementioned cases, in one way
something specified by a potency, and in another way by an actualization.” 381 The distinction
between potency and actualization plausibly has its roots in Plato’s Euthydemus, where Socrates
emphasizes the difference between having goods and using them well, and in Plato’s Theaetetus,
where Socrates distinguishes having knowledge and using knowledge. 382 But the ontological
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distinction of being-potentially (what is according to a potency, τὸ ὂν δυνάμει) and beingactualized (what is according to an actualization, τὸ ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ), along with the development of
a complex terminology to articulate this distinction, all seems to be Aristotle’s own invention.

Potentiality and Actualization as Transcategorical
We should first notice that, although Aristotle’s examples of potencies and actualizations are
usually those of motions, οὐσίαι, and activities (πράξεις), he clearly asserts that the distinction
between what is potentially and what is actualized is transcategorical. So in Metaphysics Δ.7 he
says this distinction holds “for the abovementioned cases,” 383 that is, the cases of being in-itself,
accidental being, and being as true. Further, in Meta. Θ.10 Aristotle reaffirms that this distinction
holds across the figures of predication. Aristotle seems most of all interested in understanding
potency and actualization in terms of motions, οὐσίαι, and activities: actualization is integral to his
definition of motion, it resolves some of the problems of the unity of form and matter in sensible
οὐσίαι, and it gives us a way to understand both human and divine activities. Yet we should not
lose sight of the fact that something as unspectacular as the quality cold can be determined either
as τὸ ὂν δυνάμει or τὸ ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ, that is, as being-potentially or being-actualized. This fact can
serve as an important antidote to any view that identifies ἐνέργεια with “activity” in general,
whatever we mean by this English word. So, for example, the ἐνέργεια of being alive should
plausibly be called an activity, but we have no reason to suppose that τὸ ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ, said of e.g.
being red or being six feet tall, indicates any activities.

383

Meta. Δ.7 1017b2, τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων.

131

In Meta. Δ.7, Aristotle elaborates the distinction between what is potentially and what is
actualized with several examples:
for we say that one is seeing both when one potentially sees and actually does,
likewise that one knows both when one is able to use knowledge and when one
does use it, and also that something is at rest both when rest already belongs to it
and when it is able to rest. Similarly in the case of οὐσίαι: for we say that Hermes
is in the stone, that the half is of the line, and that what is not yet ripe is grain. 384
Aristotle repeats the Platonists’ distinction between having and using knowledge, and analogically
extends this distinction to vision (having sight and seeing). The example of rest is notable, as
motion would perhaps be a more intuitive case. Perhaps Aristotle opts for rest here to make it clear
that something can actually-be (or be-actualized) while not necessarily actively-being. Actually
being in motion would indeed be identical to actively being in motion, but actually being at rest
should not be thought of as somehow “actively” being at rest. Aristotle’s three examples of οὐσίαι
seem to be chosen to be comprehensive, as they include an artificial object (the statue and the
stone), a mathematical object (the half and the line), and a natural object (the seed and the plant).
(We can note that the half is not really an οὐσία, as some overly eager Platonists might have it, but
a relative.) 385 These examples make it clear: with sensation, intellection, or motion, but also with
things, whether artificial, mathematical, or natural, we recognize a difference between what is
present, existent, realized, developed, or operational, and what is implicit, pre-existent, latent,
germinal, or in reserve – a distinction between being-potentially and being-actualized.
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Meta. Δ.7 1017b2-8, ὁρῶν τε γὰρ εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ, καὶ [τὸ] ἐπίστασθαι ὡσαύτως
καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ χρώμενον, καὶ ἠρεμοῦν καὶ ᾧ ἤδη ὑπάρχει ἠρεμία καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον
ἠρεμεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν· καὶ γὰρ Ἑρμῆν ἐν τῷ λίθῳ φαμὲν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς γραμμῆς, καὶ σῖτον
τὸν μήπω ἁδρόν.
385
Cat. 4 1b25-2a4.
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Being-Potentially is a Way of Not-Being
While Metaphysics Δ.7 distinguishes between being-potentially and being-actualized as two ways
of being, of special interest for us is how being-potentially is yet another way of not-being. In Θ.3
Aristotle is clear about this point: “for of not-beings, some are potentially: but they are not, because
they are not actualized.” 386 Further, in On Generation and Corruption I.3, while discussing the
sources of coming-to-be Aristotle says “in one way things come to be from not-being simply, but
in another way from what always is. For being-potentially but not being-actualized must precede,
and this is said in both these ways [i.e. as being and not-being].” 387 Indeed, of the several ways of
not-being, what is potentially, or what is by means of a potency, is perhaps the most important for
Aristotle. So, in this Chapter, like those on privation and falsity above, I shall pursue two questions:
(1) how is being-potentially a way of not-being, and (2) how is it a way of being?

Some Issues Moving Forward
To pursue these questions, we must first review some methodological and terminological issues.
Methodologically, our focus is to get to an understanding of being δυνάμει as a way of not-being.
We will not consider any historical or developmental dimensions of these concepts in Aristotle. 388
Nor will we make much of the difference between the two terms ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια, insofar
as these are nearly elided in the text most relevant for our purposes – Aristotle’s discussion in
Meta. Θ on being ἐνεργείᾳ and being δυνάμει. Nor will we consider all the applications of potency
and actualization. Nor, finally, will we appeal to the distinction between “first” and “second”
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Meta. Θ.3 1047b1-2, τῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων ἔνια δυνάμει ἐστίν· οὐκ ἔστι δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστίν.
GC I.3 317b15-18, ὅτι τρόπον μέν τινα ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἁπλῶς γίνεται, τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον ἐξ ὄντος ἀεί· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει
ὂν ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ μὴ ὂν ἀνάγκη προυπάρχειν λεγόμενον ἀμφοτέρως.
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ἐνέργεια, which, although (occasionally) important for the applying these concepts, is nevertheless
inessential (and, within Aristotle’s Metaphysics, unused) for articulating the basic ontology. And
indeed, this is our strict concern: the ontology of what potentially is.
Terminologically, a fair amount of clarification will be necessary. As noted above, the
words ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια seem to be Aristotelian inventions, as do some of the important
uses of otherwise more familiar terms (e.g. using δυνάμει as an adverb). We already mentioned
that much of this new vocabulary is transcategorical – potency and actualization can hold for
οὐσίαι, or qualities, or relations, or actions, etc. – and thus necessarily equivocal. But even within
a given category, Aristotle suggests that there is some equivocation with these terms: a sleeping
cat and an awake cat are both potentially asleep, but not in the same way. 389 Moreover, according
to Aristotle the terms δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, “potency” and “actualization” have primary, more
familiar senses associated with motion and change, separate from their general ontological
meaning.
Aristotle is cognizant of these semantic problems. Hence in Metaphysics Θ, the major
discussion of these concepts, he begins with the more familiar term δύναμις, in its more familiar
sense as a principle of motion, and from there develops an understanding of the less familiar
concepts and senses of being δυνάμει, ἐνέργεια, and ἐντελέχεια. But as heirs to a long and
somewhat sedimented Aristotelian tradition, interested as we are here in Aristotle’s finished
ontology, in my own review of the terms I will begin with the concept of “actualization,” which I
propose as an unorthodox but more faithful translation of the term ἐντελέχεια and the related
ἐνέργεια. From a consideration of actualization, we will move on to the expressions δύναμις,
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δύνατον, κατὰ δύναμιν, and δυνάμει. With this accomplished, we should be able to pursue being
δυνάμει as a way of not-being.

ii. Actualization in Aristotle
The Sense and Provenance of Ἐντελέχεια and Ἐνέργεια
I am generally translating ἐντελέχεια as “actualization.” This word is ambiguous in English, as it
might indicate either an end of actualization (e.g. being a cat) or a process of actualization (e.g.
becoming a cat). 390 But, given the scholarly disagreement about the meaning of ἐντελέχεια and
ἐνέργεια, these ambiguities of “actualization” perhaps serve as an advantage. Certainly it is better
than the ad hoc translation of these terms variously with “activity” or “actuality” according to
some translator’s reading of a given passage. Still, I will generally be using “actualization” to refer
to the actualized-result, what is actualized, rather than the actualizing-process – a conception of
ἐντελέχεια and the overlapping sense of ἐνέργεια that I will defend below. I should also note: that
while I am looking to consistently translate ἐντελέχεια, ἐνέργεια, δύναμις and their cognates
according to a regimen, I frequently discuss these concepts with a host of terms that I take to be
rough synonyms, helpful for better understanding the underlying concept (e.g. “fulfillment,”
“completion,” “being-at-an-end” for ἐντελέχεια, and “capacity,” “power” for δύναμις).
The word ἐντελέχεια appears to originate with Aristotle, although he does not discuss
inventing it. There is some disagreement concerning the exact etymology of the word. 391 Joe Sachs
rehearses some major accounts of the word’s origins:
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[Ἐντελέχεια is] a fusion of the idea of completeness with that of continuity or
persistence. Aristotle invents the word by combining ἐντελές enteles (complete,
full-grown) with ἔχειν echein (=ἔξις hexis, to be in a certain way by the continuing
effort of holding on in that condition), while at the same time punning on
ἐνδελέχεια endelecheia (persistence) by inserting τέλος telos (completion).392
Others have proposed that the term derives from the phrase ἐν (ἑαυτῷ) τέλος ἔχειν, “to have an
end in itself,”393 or from τὸ ἔχειν τὸ τέλος, “having the end” with ἐν- added to τελέχεια to suggest
“containing the end in itself.” 394 Whatever the source of the term, all of these origin stories show
the basic semantic resonances of ἐντελέχεια – what has its own completion, being at an end.
Indeed, the ancient commentators Alexander and Simplicius identify ἐντελέχεια with τελειότης,
“completion.” 395 Thus ἐντελέχεια is opposed to δύναμις, potency, not by excluding potency in
general – for something that is by means of ἐντελέχεια can still have potencies – but by being the
actualization, production, accomplishment, or completion of some prior potency. 396
Aristotle also seems to invent the term ἐνέργεια, which might in some case be understood
as “activity” or “operation,” but sometimes also as “actualization” more generally. The word is
connected to the verb ἐνεργεῖν, “to be in action,” “to operate,” “to be actualized,” or “to effect,”
and the adjective ἐνεργής, “active” or “effective.”
Insofar as we are concerned with being-potentially, τὸ ὂν δυνάμει, and this is said in
contrast with being-actualized, we are mostly interested in ἐνέργεια just insofar as its meaning
overlaps with ἐντελέχεια – ἐνέργεια as “actualization” – rather than ἐνέργεια as distinguished from
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ἐντελέχεια. Fortunately, as he discusses what is ἐντελεχείᾳ and ἐνεργείᾳ as ways of being, Aristotle
gives some clear indications on this convergence. So, in Metaphysics Θ.3, he says: “the word
ἐνέργεια, which is put together with ἐντελέχεια, has been extended from motions most of all, to
other things also; for ἐνέργεια seems to most of all be motion.” 397 Here Aristotle indicates that
ἐνέργεια is first of all thought of as the activity of motion 398 – an activity which is identical to the
ἐντελέχεια of the motion. But here Aristotle is asserting that one can use ἐνέργεια in an extended
sense, overlapping with ἐντελέχεια, and holding of items that are not moving or changing. As
George Blair puts it: “there is no functional difference, one might say, between energeia and
entelecheia, though the different etymologies indicate a difference in what we might call
connotation or ‘flavor’ of the two words.” 399
Aristotle shares several reasons for connecting ἐνέργεια to ἐντελέχεια. One reason is that
ἐνέργεια carries some of the term ἐντελέχεια’s sense of accomplishment or being at an end. In
Meta Θ.8 he explains: “for the work [ἔργον] is an end [τέλος], and the ἐνέργεια is the work [ἔργον];
therefore the word ἐνέργεια is said according to the work and is directed to the actualization
[ἐντελέχειαν].” 400 So, given the analogous status of ἔργον and τέλος as the work, end, or fulfillment
of a power, so too will ἐνέργεια indicate, along with ἐντελέχεια, the status of achieving this end,
or in other words, the accomplishment or actualization of such a power.
Another reason is that, while being ἐνεργείᾳ pertains to more than κίνησις, being capable
of motion, change, or activity seems at least to be a sufficient condition for being-actualized. On
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Meta. Θ.3 1047a30-32, ἐλήλυθε δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τοὔνομα, ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ
τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα·δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι.
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Meta. Θ.8 1050a21-23, τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον, διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ
ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν.
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this point, in Metaphysics Θ.3 Aristotle argues: “and so people do not allow not-beings to be
moving […] and this because while these are not-beings ἐνεργείᾳ [or actualized not-beings], they
would be ἐνεργείᾳ.” 401 In other words, nothing is going to be ἐνεργείᾳ in the sense of in-activity
if it is not, minimally, an actualized being, that is, if it is not ἐνεργείᾳ in the sense that converges
with what is ἐντελεχείᾳ. Every ἐνέργεια is also an ἐντελέχεια, and so Aristotle will extend the
sense of ἐνέργεια from something like “activity” to something closer to ἐντελέχεια,
“actualization.” Going forward, unless otherwise noted, I will generally use the terms as synonyms,
although I am guided here more by the sense of the term ἐντελέχεια.
When thinking about these terms ἐνέργεια/ἐντελέχεια there is a danger of both
understatement and overstatement. Understatement: with the common translation of ἐντελέχεια as
“actuality,” the word loses some of the sense of “production” or “completion,” and might even
suggest synonymy with “reality” or a coextensiveness with what is in general. But this is wrong,
because there are real beings which are potentially, δυνάμει, not actualized, ἐντελεχείᾳ.
Ἐντελέχεια must be understood not as actuality, but as a fulfilled actualization of a latent power
or process. Overstatement: we saw in the Metaphysics Δ.7 passage that being according to
ἐντελέχεια can equally hold of substantial items (ripe grain) or trivial ones (rest in a movable
body). Menn’s discussion on this is helpful:
Aristotle does not conceive actuality, ἐντελέχεια, simply as ‘full, complete reality’
(LSJ’s translation) by opposition to some diminished sense of being, nor as
‘perfection’ understood without reference to the process of perfecting: ἐντελέχεια

401

Meta. Θ.3 1047a32-b1, διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν οὐκ ἀποδιδόασι τὸ κινεῖσθαι, […] τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ
ἔσονται ἐνεργείᾳ.
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has reference to the process of production, and indicates that the process has
reached its term. 402
Also, Gonzalez’s:
what is essential to energeia strictly speaking is completeness or being-an-end, as
a result of which we can designate non-motions like substantial forms as energeiai
because they are ends. The form of Hermes statues is an energeia not because it is
an action, but because it is an end like a (complete) action is.403
So, a complete ἐντελέχεια, and the overlapping sense of ἐνέργεια, is anything that is actualized, as
opposed to what is not yet actualized, or is on its way to actualization. This might be thought of as
loosely modal, as indicating an important way of being for Aristotle. But it is certainly not modal
in the stricter sense of distinguishing between possibility, actuality, and necessity.

Against Understanding Actualization as Actuality or Activity
It is worth staying with Gonzalez for a moment, because his 2019 essay is a compelling
reconsideration of Aristotle’s account of motion, actions, and the concept of ἐνέργεια/ἐντελέχεια.
He criticizes Frede, 404 among others, for the choice of “actuality” as a translation for ἐνέργεια,
contending that this is based on an anachronistic distinction between the actual and the potential,
one which makes being ἐνεργείᾳ equivalent to simply being real, and that it is generally
unmotivated by Aristotle’s own texts. 405 Further, he finds inadequate any translation for ἐνέργεια
that switches between “activity” and “actuality”:
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A translation must of course strive for clarity, but must also never allow this
otherwise commendable goal to prejudice the interpretation of the philosophical
argument, by, for example, introducing at the outset distinctions that are not found
in the language of the original and that are therefore justified only as the conclusion
of an interpretation. 406
These are compelling points: “actuality” does not seem to meaningfully convey the sense of
ἐνέργεια, and it is no improvement to switch between “actuality” and “activity” ad hoc. Gonzalez
then opts for “activity” as a translation of ἐνέργεια (and, it seems, tacitly also of ἐντελέχεια):
To say that action in the sense of the Passage [Meta. Θ.6 1048b18-35] is the strictest
sense of energeia is not to say that all energeiai are actions. As already noted above,
if we should stick to translating energeia as ‘activity’ and the dative energeiai as
‘in activity’ or ‘actively’, rather than switching to ‘actuality’ and ‘actually’, then
‘activity’ must be understood broadly enough to encompass more than actions. 407
He follows the lead here of Kosman, whose work is committed to an interpretation of Aristotle’s
ontology “as an ontology that portrays being as activity,” against those who see this as “an
ontology of things, of inert static entites.”408 So Kosman will claim:
At the heart of the cosmos is that which is full act, total shining forth of being.
Substance, that is, οὐσία or be-ing, is an activity, an entity’s manifesting what it is;
to be a man is to shine forth with humanity, to act one’s manhood out in the
world.409
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And: “Thomas is right to see at the heart of Aristotle’s ontology the claim that actuality is activity,
and that being therefore is act.” 410 (p. 121, n1). We also find a version of this interpretation in Joe
Sachs, who uses the expression “being-at-work” to translate ἐνέργεια, “being-at-work-stayingitself” for ἐντελέχεια, and contends of Aristotle that the “central thought is that all being is beingat-work, and that anything inert would cease to be.” 411
The problem here is that the term “activity” (or “being-at-work”) simply does not have a
broad enough sense to encompass all the important applications of ἐνέργεια insofar as it overlaps
with ἐντελέχεια, and thus it is as question-begging a translation of ἐνέργεια as “actuality” would
be of ἐντελέχεια. We should not be tempted by the poetic image of a world somehow constantly
buzzing with some silent manifesting activity. Set aside the fact that, contra Kosman, nobody
should be acting out their “manhood” in the world. A statue, a mathematical circle, the greyness
of Matelda the cat, or a ball at rest: each of these can be thought of as an actualization of some
potency, but there is no serious reason that any of them should be thought of as activities or
“beings-at-work,” no matter how broad and attenuated a sense of “activity” you might stipulate.
At least, Aristotle gives us no motivation for this thought. Certainly, Aristotle’s ontology is not
only of “inert and static entities” – the actualization of living beings, for instance, seem to require
a “more active and dynamic view of being.” But he nevertheless leaves room for thinking about
the inert and static as such. Aristotle’s ontology is an ontology of activities and things, where some
things indeed are on account of their activities (e.g. living things), some activities are not thinglike
at all (e.g. vision), and some things are inactive (e.g. mathematical triangles, the color grey).
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Returning to Gonzalez’ paper, it is not especially clear what motivates his choice of
“activity” for the translation. Perhaps it comes from his overall focus on the well-loved
Metaphysics Θ.6 1048b18-35 – a passage he convincingly establishes, contra Burnyeat,412 as
correctly placed in the Metaphysics. This passage is focused on classifying actions (or activities,
πράξεις) into those that are complete (having their end in themselves, ἐνέργειαι or actualizations)
and those that are incomplete (having an end outside themselves, κινήσεις or motions). But this
passage is using the concepts of ἐνέργεια and κινήσις to distinguish kinds of action, not using
action (or motion) to establish a concept of ἐνέργεια.413 As we saw above, Gonzalez contends –
and here we agree – that the primary sense of ἐνέργεια is “being-an-end.”414 But the English word
“activity” does not suggest any sort of fulfillment, completion, being-at-an-end, or actualization.
You can only get this sense by stipulating it, with Gonzalez and others, as the best translation of
ἐνέργεια, and working backwards from this stipulation to the claim that “an essential characteristic
of activity [is] its possession of an end within itself.” 415 Choosing “activity” as the translation is
hardly better supported than choosing “actuality,” and for this reason runs afoul of Gonzalez own
principles of translation, quoted above.
Of course, we can admit that “actualization” as a translation of ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια is
far from perfect – it is awkward, and not very traditional. Menn claims – without giving any
reasons – that “[actualization] is always wrong” as a translation; 416 I would not presume to know
what he thinks “actualization” means. For our own purposes, we must keep in mind that
“actualization” does not primarily indicate the process of actualization, even if there are cases
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where a process is its own result. Yet, as we already noted, given this apparent scholarly
disagreement about where exactly the senses of ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια lie between these two
quasi-alternatives of actuality and activity, and given that there nevertheless is some scholarly
consensus that each of these concepts is meant to connote a sense of being-at-an-end or completion,
“actualization” to me seems to be the best translation here, ambiguities and all.
I should acknowledge one important caveat to this argument for “actualization” as
translation. Because I am interested here in the ontology Aristotle is developing, the key concept
for us is ἐντελέχεια, and only ἐνέργεια insofar as it corresponds with ἐντελέχεια. If I were in the
unfortunate position of needing to distinguish ἐνέργεια from ἐντελέχεια, I would obviously be in
a bind. In that case “activity” (or “operation”) might be more compelling for ἐνέργεια, as it does
seem to get at how Aristotle uses ἐνέργεια in some important parts of his corpus (including some
parts of the Meta. Θ discussion of ἐνέργεια, as I reviewed above). But this still may burden
Aristotle with an unnecessarily active world view. Perhaps one could render the distinction
between ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια by “full-actualization” and “actualization” simply.

The Concept of Actualization and Motion
An actualization need not itself be active or in the process of actualization, 417 but it is something
that can be understood as the accomplishment, outcome, or fulfillment of a potency (granting that
there are several very important activities that are themselves their own ends – e.g. thinking, living,
seeing). Here is the true importance of ἐντελέχεια for Aristotle’s philosophy: a concept of
actualization as indicating what is in-itself an end. It is not that there is an ontological premium on
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activity over quiescence or on reality over possibility. Instead, the concept of ἐντελέχεια is used to
articulate the things in the world – actions or passions, motions or rest, mathematical, artificial, or
natural οὐσίαι and their attributes – as the ends and products of latent processes and powers (and,
ultimately, to prioritize these outcomes and ends over the processes and powers). The Aristotelian
world should be understood in terms of powers and their actualizations.
This gives us a way to think about Aristotle’s famously troublesome claim that “the
actualization of what is potentially, as such, is motion.” 418 In contrast to actualizations, what is in
potency does not have its end in-itself. Thus, the actualization or being-at-an-end of what is in
potency as such is not a simple or complete actualization or being-at-an-end, and in Metaphysics
Θ.6 1048b18-35 Aristotle asserts that motions are not simple or complete ἐνέργειαι. Instead,
insofar as a potency can be said to have an end “in-itself,” this end is in becoming something else.
Kosman gets this right when he says “becoming […] is for Aristotle the fully manifest being of an
entity’s capacity to be otherwise,” 419 and:
Motion, in other words, is not the actuality of a potentiality in the sense of an actuality that
results from a potentiality, but rather in the sense of an actuality which is a potentiality in
its full manifestation. 420
As the actualization of what is potentially, as potential, motion is not the fulfilled final product or
operation of a potency, that is, it is not the complete (or simple) actualization of a potency. Lucy
the cat, sitting downstairs, has the power to be upstairs – and insofar as that power is actualized as
a power, she is going up stairs. The complete actualization of this power would simply be her being

418

Physics III.1 201a10-11, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν.
Kosman “Substance” 129.
420
Kosman “Definition” 50
419

144

upstairs, but at this point she only equivocally has the power to be upstairs (since she is already
there).421 The actualization of the power as a power, though, where the power persists as
actualized, is the motion, or the incomplete actualization. 422
The distinction between actualizations (either ἐνέργειαι or ἐντελέχειαι) and motions is,
therefore, a consequence of the distinction between actualizations and potencies. Given that the
world, according to this ontology, is a world of powers and their fulfillments, and that these powers
and fulfillments admit of degrees of completion, motion falls out necessarily as the incomplete
fulfillment of the power, or the actualization of what is potentially as such.

Being-Actualized
Before moving on to potencies and being-potentially, we must acknowledge another
terminological distinction, which up to this point we have been mostly taking for granted: between
ἐνέργεια/ἐντελέχεια on the one hand, and what is ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐντελεχείᾳ, κατὰ ἐνέργειαν, or κατὰ
ἐντελέχειαν, on the other. These latter expressions – the datives, ἐνεργείᾳ/ἐντελεχείᾳ, and the
accusative prepositional phrases κατὰ ἐνέργειαν/κατὰ ἐντελέχειαν – act adverbially, typically
modifying a verb. Often, and most relevantly for us, they modify a form of the verb “to be.” We
see this adverbial use in the important programmatic remarks, discussed above, in Metaphysics
Δ.7 (“besides, to be and being signify, for the abovementioned cases, in one way something
specified by a potency [δυνάμει], and in another way by an actualization [ἐντελεχείᾳ]”) 423 and in
Θ.10 (“and since being and not-being are said according to the figures of predication, but also
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according to the potency or actualization [κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν] of these”).424 Here we see
that this adverbial use establishes a properly ontological dimension of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια –
taking up actualization not as a substantive, but as marking a way of being. Further, Aristotle is
committed to thinking of this way of being as transcategorical and ontologically fundamental.
We will occasionally translate these adverbial expressions with the phrases “by an
actualization,” “according to an actualization,” or “in actualization.” But I also translate τὸ ὂν
ἐνεργείᾳ/ἐντελεχείᾳ as “what is actualized” or “being-actualized.” With this I am trying to capture
a way of being in terms of actualization, as opposed to one grounded in potencies and powers. In
some cases, we must take recourse to the adverb “actually” to translate these adverbial phrases;
this is perhaps the least awkward translation, but also furthest from our commitment to
understanding ἐντελέχεια as actualization. We should not confuse “actually” with “really,” or as
referring to a domain of “actualities” or “existences” somehow different from that of
“actualizations.”
There is a question of whether what is in actualization, ἐντελεχείᾳ, is so on account of its
own actualization or because of the actualization of something else. For example, if we say that
Lucy is according to an actualization, ἐντελεχείᾳ, does “actualization” here refer to her life as an
activity of a certain ensouled body, or to her parent’s capacity for producing offspring? 425 Another
way of asking this would be: when we say that something is ἐνεργείᾳ/ἐντελεχείᾳ, does this
qualification refer to the thing’s formal or efficient causes?
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I do not find Aristotle especially clear on this point. The first cause, god, which is
ἐντελεχείᾳ,426 cannot be on account of the ἐντελέχεια of any other thing. Further, in several key
passages – Metaphysics Δ.7, Θ.6 – Aristotle does not emphasize any major distinction between the
concept of ἐνέργεια and something’s being ἐνεργείᾳ, which you might expect if the dative
construction was meant to indicate something’s efficient cause (while the nominative ἐνέργεια
would indicate its formal cause). But below I will argue that, for the parallel construction of “what
is in potency,” the potency in question does not belong to what is δυνάμει, but rather is a potency
belonging to some actualized, capable thing (which would be an efficient cause of the τὸ ὂν
δυνάμει, if it came into being). Fortunately, I do not need to resolve this issue when it comes to
ἐνεργείᾳ/ἐντελεχείᾳ (plus, formal and efficient causes are often homonymous anyhow!). Whatever
these terms refer to, Aristotle clearly uses these to say that what is, or happens, is or does so in a
fully actualized way.
The words ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια in the nominative simply refer to some actualization
itself. This might be an οὐσία, or a certain quality, or an action, but it is not clear whether Aristotle
thinks that any item in any category can be an actualization. On this point, it is notable that he
never uses the plural ἐντελέχειαι in his extant writings. By contrast, their dative/adverbial forms
ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια indicate that what they modify happens by means of, or according to, an
actualization. Aristotle has no problem claiming that (almost) everything across the categories can
be according to an actualization, or as actualized (the infinite, which is only potentially, would be
an important exception here). 427 Every actualization will actually be, that is, every ἐντελέχεια is
ἐντελεχείᾳ. But potencies can also actually be – vision, for example, is a potency for sight, but it
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is actualized in a suitable ensouled body. Or take something as meagre as a relation: it is doubtful
that this would be an actualization, but certainly we can call it actualized as opposed to merely
potentially. The concept of ἐντελέχεια is a significant invention of Aristotelian philosophy. But it
is the sense of τὸ ὂν ἐντελεχείᾳ, what is actualized, that holds of beings broadly, and thus serves
as a more generic, ontological determination than ἐντελέχεια as such.

iii. The Language of Δύναμις
While this discussion about actualization has been somewhat digressive, it is important to
articulate the correct sense of ἐντελέχεια in order to understand δύναμις, which is said both in
reference to and by contrast with ἐντελέχεια. So too we needed to understand the in-itself and the
true to make sense of the accidental and the false. As we recognize that, in its ontological,
transcategorical sense τὸ ὂν ἐντελεχείᾳ indicates what is actualized, what is complete and has its
end in-itself, we can recognize that the contrast with τὸ ὂν δυνάμει is not the contrast between
actuality and possibility, or the narrow contrast between activities and the capacities thereof, but
instead should be understood as the contrast between an end, fulfillment, or completion, and it s
sources or principle. And indeed, for Aristotle δύναμις indicates a kind of principle or source, an
ἀρχή.
Let us review some of Aristotle’s terminology of the “dynamic.” The four especially
relevant expressions are (1) the noun δύναμις, (2) the verb δύνασθαι, (3) the adjective (often used
substantively) δυνατόν, and (4) the phrase τὸ ὂν δυνάμει. There are also several negative terms
derived from these – e.g. ἀδυναμία, ἀδύνατος – that we do not need to dwell on.
(1) The word δύναμις means something like power, strength, capacity, might, or force. As
we will see, it comes to have a more specific meaning for Aristotle, and for this reason I will
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standardly translate it as “potency.” The English “potency” has the connotations of power,
strength, or capacity, while also being cognate with the important adverb “potentially,” and thus it
connects to later ideas of potentiality that develop out of the Aristotelian concept of δύναμις.
Although I will avoid using words like “power” or “capacity” to translate δύναμις, I will (and
have) used them to discuss, characterize, and exemplify the concept of δύναμις.
(2) The cognate verb δύνασθαι relates to this concept of power or strength by indicating
that the subject is capable of doing something, that it has the power to do something, and generally
that it can or is able to do something. It often complements another verb, in the infinitive. We do
not need an especially regimented way of translating this term.
(3) The adjective/substantive δυνατόν is hard to precisely translate into English and is
ultimately equivocal for Aristotle. As an adjective, it means powerful, strong, capable, mighty, or
forceful. This adjective can also go with a verb in the infinitive, indicating that the modified noun
can accomplish something. “Potential” is an often used but misleading translation, because usually
for Aristotle to say that something is δυνατόν means not that it is potentially, but that it has a
potency.428 Some translators thus opt for “capable” for δυνατόν, a translation that is much better
than “potential” but unfortunately loses the important direct connection with “potency.” Often
translators will go between these two options depending on context – a decision which ultimately
makes Aristotle’s arguments more, rather than less, opaque. 429 Beere tries to resolve all these
difficulties by opting for “capable” for δυνατόν, “capacity” for δύναμις, and “in-capacity” for
δυνάμει.430 Beere thus gets the sense correct, but by being burdened with some strange expessions
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(“in-capacity”), and at the expense of some felicity of connecting these concepts to the later
conceptions of potentiality growing out of an Aristotelian tradition.
Our difficulties with δυνατόν are compounded by the fact that it has an important,
philosophically relevant, secondary sense for Aristotle. After establishing, in Metaphysics Δ.12
1019a32-b3 that the δυνατόν is what has a potency, Aristotle then says that δυνατόν also indicates
“what is not necessarily false” or even “what admits of being true.” 431 He goes on to clarify that
this sense of δυνατόν is not said primarily in reference to a potency. 432 Here δυνατόν is clearly
“possible.” It seems to come into play when it modifies things which can be true or false, like
propositions. Further, when Aristotle considers modal propositions and their negations in De
Interpretatione 12, he is primarily talking about δυνατὸν εἶναι, what is possible to be.
Across Metaphysics Θ and elsewhere Aristotle often quickly goes from talking about
δύναμις, potency, to talking about the δυνατόν, what has a potency. These terms do not get elided,
but they are convertible: everything δυνατόν will have its corresponding δύναμις, and everything
δύναμις will belong to some δυνατόν. We cannot understand the ontological status of δύναμις, or,
all the more, the ontological determination of what is potentially, τὸ ὂν δυνάμει, without
recognizing the underlying δυνατά. Generally, the importance of this term is underappreciated by
scholars. Going forward, we will generally leave δυνατόν untranslated, although we will speak
about it as “capable,” “possible,” “able,” etc. when appropriate.
(4) Δυνάμει is the dative of δύναμις, “potency,” but it comes to have a somewhat technical
sense for Aristotle’s philosophy, paralleling the adverbial uses of the datives ἐνεργείᾳ and
ἐντελεχείᾳ. Thus, this adverbial δυνάμει means that something is accomplished or happens by
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means of a potency. There is also the accusative prepositional phrase, κατὰ δύναμιν, which means
something like “according to (a) potency.” The expression τὸ ὂν δυνάμει would then mean
something like “what is by a potency,” “what is in potency,” or “being in potency.” We will use
these translations, but we will also translate δυνάμει as “potentially,” so we can say that τὸ ὂν
δυνάμει is what is potentially or being-potentially.
Note: I do not use “potentiality” to translate any δύναμις terms or their cognates. But I
have and will use the word “potentiality” as a way of capturing being-potentially, τὸ ὂν δυνάμει,
as a way of being which Aristotle is the first to develop. As with τὸ ὂν ἐντελεχείᾳ, τὸ ὂν δυνάμει
is an ontological determination that can hold for nearly every item in every category, with a few
important exceptions (e.g. god). The remainder of this Section will focus on τὸ ὂν δυνάμει, how it
is a way of being, how it is a way of not-being, and what this means for Aristotle’s philosophy.
Yet to understand being in potency, we must clarify the being of potency.

iv. Potency
In the last Chapter we saw that, even though the categories exhaust what is, Aristotle still posits
and discusses other ways of being (e.g. the true) to account for how we approach being, and to
resolve all sorts of philosophical problems. So too with being-actualized and being-potentially:
these determinations do not add to the categories, but instead distinguish ways of talking and
thinking about items in any of the categories. Thus being “according to potency,” “potentially,” or
“in potency,” is a primary, transcategorical way of being for Aristotle which is coordinated with
all the other ways of being (being in-itself, being accidentally, being true). Aristotle is perhaps the
first to accept potentiality as a fundamental way of being.
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Yet there is no independently subsistent potentiality (let alone possibility) in Aristotle’s
ontology. Being-potentially is coupled to, contrasted with, and ultimately subordinate to being
“according to actualization,” “actualized,” or “in actualization.” We will discuss this subordination
when we consider why being-potentially is a way of not-being, in Section vi below. But, aside
from the general subordination of potentiality to actualization, what is potentially, or is in potency,
is also concretely dependent on potencies and δυνατά. There is no potentiality of, say, a dissertation
(or a “potential-dissertation”) separate from the power to write a thesis, belonging to one who has
this power, and the power of some object has to preserve this writing. Or, for a more morbid
example, as Virgil the cat has passed in the long course of writing this dissertation, there is no
potential-Virgil upstairs, as there is no Virgil. What is potentially does not have any potency to be
in-itself. We should not be misled by the simplicity of “potentially” as a translation of δυνάμει. To
be potentially is to be due to the potency of something: potencies themselves, along with the δυνατά
to which potencies belong, prop up this virtual way of being. 433 So there is no way of understanding
how things are said to be in potency without an appreciation of what potencies themselves are.

Potency in Plato
Potency, δύναμις, is already significant term for Plato. We saw in Chapter 3 that Socrates, in Book
V of the Republic, distinguishes knowledge and belief as kinds of potencies, adding an
epistemological component to this Eleatic ontological distinction. But potency itself becomes a
significant ontological concept for Plato. In the Sophist the Eleatic Stranger claims that whatever
has any potency, however slight, to do (ποιεῖν) or be affected by (παθεῖν) something will “really
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be,” ὄντως εἶναι.434 Not only is potency a sufficient criterion for something’s being, but the
Stranger goes as far as positing, as a definition (ὅρος), that “beings are nothing other than
potency.” 435 This is proposed while the Stranger discusses the so-called gigantomachia over οὐσία.
In this battle of giants and gods over being, the “giants” are those physicalists who hold that only
sensible bodies are, while the “gods” are those formalists who insist that the real beings are
insensible, incorporeal, intelligible forms. This account of being is put forward in order to
articulate a shared ontological commitment between these two positions, and indeed a commitment
that anyone would have. Thus this is one of Plato’s most programmatic claims about being, perhaps
rivalled only by Socrates saying in Republic VI that “the good is not being, but is beyond being in
seniority and in potency.” 436 Yet even in this latter claim we see the centrality of potency to Plato:
although the good is not being, it is nevertheless superlatively potent. Taking these two claims
together, we see that potency is perhaps the most general and a supreme determination for Plato –
holding of being in general (a claim, for the Stranger, that would be endorsed no matter what one’s
ontology is) and of the good that transcends being. Aristotle, at least, seems to endorse this
understanding of Platonic philosophy, as he asserts that the separate ideas are potencies. 437
The first cause of beings, for Aristotle, contra Plato’s idea of the good, will not be
superlatively potent, but even impotent, given that it is fully actualized at all time, and incapable
of any cessation or change. Generally, in contrast to Plato, as well as his physicalist giants and
formalist gods, for Aristotle potency and being-potentially will turn out to be much narrower
concepts, subordinate to the concepts of actualization. But with narrowness comes
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determinateness, and the concepts of potency and being-potentially are carefully articulated in the
Metaphysics.

Aristotle’s Concept of Potency
In Metaphysics Θ.1, Aristotle says that he will begin by discussing the “most authoritative,”
μάλιστα κυρίως, sense of potency, and from there move on to the sense that is “most useful,”
χρησιμωτάτη, for the project of first philosophy. 438 The most authoritative sense of potency,
already established in Meta. Δ.12, is the concept of potency as a principle (ἀρχή) of motion
(κίνησις) 439 or, more generally, change (μεταβολή). 440
Potency is further specified as the principle of change in something else (or, of a change in
itself as if it were something else – where it is accidental that the change is only in itself accidentally
– as a doctor can heal themselves insofar as they are a patient). 441 The fact that potency is directed
outward, toward the change of another, distinguishes potencies from natures, which are instead
inner principles of motion or change. 442 More than that, it means that this primary sense of potency,
the active (ποιητική) potency to change, necessitates a secondary concept of potency, that is, the
passive (παθητική) potency to be changed by another (along with a tertiary concept, which we will
not dwell on, of the impassive (ἀπαθής) potency to resist change). This distinction between the
potency to produce (ποιεῖν) change and the potency to suffer (παθεῖν) change is already present,
although undeveloped, in Plato’s Sophist. For Aristotle any change that occurs from the
interactions between things will be on account of determinate active and passive potencies of these
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things. So: fire has an active potency to burn (that is, to ignite), and wood the passive potency to
burn (that is, to be burned); Florence has the power to strike, and the cat toy has the capacity to
roll across the floor. Further, a thing will be δυνατόν in either case, whether it has an active or a
passive potency. 443
Moving on from this “authoritative” sense of potency, there is some scholarly disagreement
about what exactly the “useful” sense of potency is. Many readers take the “useful” sense to be
that of potentiality, the adverbial δυνάμει. 444 This is plausible insofar as the supposition that
something can be characterized as potentially-being is interesting, this way of speaking appears to
originate in Aristotle, and it is the topic of Metaphysics Θ.7. Against this, Anagnostopoulos has
compellingly argued that the more useful sense of potency is the potency for οὐσία.445 This does
seem to fit the programmatic statements in Meta. Θ.1 and 6, and it also fits the larger firstphilosophic project of knowing the causes and principles of οὐσία. Ultimately, what the “useful”
sense of potency is does not much matter for our purposes: I am interested in τὸ ὂν δυνάμει as a
way of not-being, but we cannot understand this without appreciating the broader sense of potency,
beyond the potency for change.
In Metaphysics Θ.6 Aristotle moves from his discussion of potency to introduce the
concept of actualization, but in so doing he also establishes a more expansive concept of potency.
Potency should be understood not only in reference to motion or change, but indeed to actualization
across the categories. Aristotle establishes this by means of examples:


the person building / the person who can build;
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the awake / the asleep;



the seeing person / the sighted person whose eyes are shut;



what is separated from the matter / the matter;



the complete / the incomplete. 446

In each case, the former is an actualization and the latter is δυνατόν, that is, what has a potency.
These examples include both active (the builder) and passive (the matter) potencies, but they also
include items in several categories: actions (building), qualities (completion), and οὐσίαι (what
comes from matter). For the category of relation, we can note that earlier in Θ.6 Aristotle mentions
that the half is potentially in the whole. 447 For Aristotle it is important to recognize that what it
means to be actualized will differ – although be analogous – for different ways of being. 448 So too,
on the other side of this analogy, for potency: potencies can be for items in any category of being.
The potency for motion and change thus becomes just one sort of the generic potency for being.
The expansion of the concept of potency from change to all sorts of beings does not seem
to entail any major conceptual revisions. Potencies are still understood as principles, ἀρχαί, and
we can still distinguish active and passive potencies. So “scratched” is a quality of furniture; Lucy
has the active potency to scratch, and the couch has the passive potency to be scratched. “Cat” is
an οὐσία; cats, according to Aristotle, come about through the active and passive potencies of the
appropriate matter of their parents. “Upstairs” is a location; I have an active capacity to throw
small items upstairs and the cat-toy has a passive capacity to be (thrown) upstairs.
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Natures and Potencies
Yet, as we review Aristotle’s more expansive list of δυνατά, we see that not all of the relevant
potencies are oriented outward. So a sleeper has a potency to be awake, and a sighted person with
closed eyes has the potency to open their eyes and see – but these are natural, inner principles,
where the power to act and to be acted on are the same power, in the same entity. Moreover, as we
are working toward an ontological determination of potentiality, our discussion must include the
many sorts of things that are both potentially and natural. Indeed, despite the narrow sense of
potency under consideration in Metaphysics Δ.12 and the first portion of Θ, Aristotle often does
not follow this restriction, using the adverbial δυνάμει, the adjective/substantive δυνατόν, and even
the nominative δύναμις in his discussions of natural capacities and ends. To incorporate the
concept of nature into our examination, we need to understand (1) how natures stand with regard
to the potency/actualization distinction, and (2) how natures stand with regard to the active/passive
distinction.
(1) Natures, for Aristotle, are inner principles of change. At the beginning of Metaphysics
Θ.8 he tells us that nature and potency are in the same genus, as both are principles. 449 Yet, insofar
as this is an inner principle, the fulfillment or result of a natural principle will be in the same natural
being that has that principle. A nature thus acts as both a principle and an end – indeed, it is its
own end in-itself. But this is how we understood actualization. So, as an inner principle of change,
a nature is both a potency (speaking generically) and an actualization. This should be expected by
those familiar with Aristotle’s psychology: the soul (the nature of a living being) is the
actualization of a certain body, but is also the power for further actualizations – living, growing,
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sensing, moving, thinking, etc. Potencies and actualizations are not mutually exclusive, and natures
(especially souls) are perhaps the best example of this.
(2) Because a nature is an inner principle, a natural being is both the agent and patient of
any natural change. Aristotle understands this achievement of natural οὐσίαι by distinguishing
their formal and material components. The form of a natural οὐσία is most properly called its
nature, and this is also the active component. The matter of a natural οὐσίαι is only equivocally a
nature, and it is passive to the actions of the form. This distinction is important for Aristotle, as it
undermines the supposition of self-moving beings. Still, Aristotle contends that it is appropriate to
think of the composite natural being as active. 450 This latter preference fits with the priority he
gives to the active generally – even though passive potencies are as necessary as active potencies,
we saw that Aristotle makes active potencies primary.
Given (1), we should think of natural principles as included in our discussion of potencies
and being-potentially, even if they are also actualizations. Florence, the cat who is sleeping, is
potentially awake; yes, this is on account of her nature, but it can also be described as a potency
for being awake or waking (thus she is δυνατόν of waking). Given (2), we should think of natural
principles as active, although the matter of these principles is passive. We should take care not to
lose the active/passive determinations when thinking about potentiality, even for natures. It is an
important distinction, that follows from (and, I would hold, partially motivates) Aristotle’s narrow
definition of potency from the beginning of Metaphysics Θ. In Section v we will see that this
distinction is operative in the ontology of what potentially is.
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The Relations of Potency to Actualization
Potencies, taken either narrowly in reference to motion or broadly in reference to being generally,
and natures, are principles or sources. They are contrasted with actualizations, things that are at an
end, but they are also directed to these ends. We still must better understand the relation between
these two determinations. There are three important points here: (1) there are unactualized
potencies; (2) potencies must be genuinely actualizable; (3) potencies depend on δυνατόν and
ultimately on actualized οὐσίαι.
(1) As explicated in Meta. Θ.3, the Megarian philosophical position is that a being is
capable of doing something only when it is actually doing it. 451 This position would elide the power
to do something with the actualization of doing it. 452 Aristotle argues that this position is
incoherent. He makes this point in several ways, but the guiding idea seems to be that if one did
not have potencies, capacities, or powers, separate from the actualizations they brought into being,
one would be unable to explain how change comes about. If opium lacked a dormitive virtue, it
would not put anybody to sleep (of course, if we cannot further explicate what it is “to have a
dormitive virtue” then we are not saying all that much!). 453
The upshot for Aristotle’s argument against the Megarians is that potency and actualization
do differ from one another even in reference to the same end. The power to sleep is different from
the fulfillment of sleep. In other words, potencies can be (and indeed often are) latent. Aristotle
concludes from this difference between potency and actualization that “thus it is possible
[ἐνδέχεται δυνατόν] for something to be and yet to not be, and it is possible [καὶ δυνατόν] for
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something to not be and yet to be, and similarly with the other categories.” 454 This apparent failure
of the principle is tied to the distinction between potency and actualization, and, as I consider
below, to being-potentially as a way of not-being.
(2) Although potencies have a separate being from their actualizations, in Meta. Θ.4
Aristotle denies that there are potencies incapable of being actualized. In other words, something’s
potency to X excludes the incapacity to X.455
We should clarify here what it means that something is incapable (ἀδύνατον) or has an
incapacity (ἀδυναμία). Just because something does not happen, does not mean that it was
ἀδύνατον or impossible for it to happen: if this were the case, everything would happen by
necessity.456 At the same time, Aristotle does not restrict ἀδύνατον to things that are “logically” or
“mathematically” incapable of being. Things that are presently happening or have already
happened are ἀδύνατον of happening or having happened otherwise (I am currently incapable of
having finished this project in 2016, although I might have been capable of doing so at that time).
Further, if something never comes about – cats never have grown wings – even if it is logically
possible for it to happen, this would be ἀδύνατον according to Aristotle.
So to say that something is δύνατον to X or has a potency to X is to say that it really can
come about that it happens to X. Generally, ἀδύνατον and δύνατον are contradictory predicates,
and something cannot both have the potency to X and lack the potency to X. 457 If this were not
true, everything would be possible, even impossible things – a position Aristotle finds evidently
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untenable. Δύνατον cannot be indifferently held of any meaningful phrase whether it refers to
something real or not: some things are ἀδύνατον, incapable of being, and whatever is so simply is
not.
(3) Perhaps the most important determination of potencies, relative to actualizations, is that
potencies always ultimately belong to actualized οὐσίαι. To fully understand this, we need to
appreciate that οὐσίαι themselves are actualizations – we will discuss this further point in Section
iv. But given that οὐσίαι are indeed actualized, we can see that potencies depend on actualization
in order to be. This is clearest in the argument that actualization is prior to potency in account:
For it is by admitting of being in actualization that δυνατόν is the primary sort of
δυνατόν, e.g. I mean by the house-builder what is capable of house-building, and
by the one with sight what is [capable of] seeing, and by the visible what is δυνατόν
of being-seen; and the same account holds for the other cases, so that it is necessary
for the account and cognition [of the δυνατόν] precedes the cognition [of the
potency].458
In every case, a potency is by belonging to some δυνατόν. A δυνατόν is an actualized being that
has a potency. There are no potencies independent from δυνατά, and there are no δυνατά without
potencies. Further, while the arguments of Metaphysics Θ focus on potency, δύναμις, itself, here
Aristotle acknowledges that epistemically the actualized δυνατά are prior.
Another illustration of the dependence of potency on the δυνατά or οὐσίαι to which they
belong can be found in Meta. Θ.5. This chapter mostly concerns when and how potencies get
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Meta. Θ.8 1049b13-17, τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρώτως δυνατόν, οἷον λέγω οἰκοδομικὸν τὸ
δυνάμενον οἰκοδομεῖν, καὶ ὁρατικὸν τὸ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ὁρατὸν τὸ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸν λόγον προϋπάρχειν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς γνώσεως
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actualized. Here we can recognize the ontological dependence of potencies on actualized οὐσίαι
by considering what Aristotle says about the actualization of potency. Generally, non-rational
potencies come to become actualized when there is some proximity between the agent and
patient.459 In contrast, rational potencies, like the technical arts, are actualized according to the
desire or choice of the agent. 460 In every case, the actualization of a potency happens through some
determination(s) of the underlying οὐσίαι. There are no “free-floating,” independently real
potencies for Aristotle: potencies are, and become actualized, through the actualized beings to
which they belong.

v. Potentiality as a Way of Being
Potentiality Depends on Potencies
Potencies are principles or sources of change, but also generally of being, distinguishable into
active and passive kinds. They differ from actualizations, they exclude their corresponding
impotencies, and they are by belonging to some actualized being (δύνατον). What is in potency,
what is potentially, being-potentially, τὸ ὂν δυνάμει, has its being on account of some determinate
potency. Note: the pertinent potency of what is in potency is not some power or capacity it has.
Thus being-potentially, or potentiality, has a highly attenuated ontological status: it is a way of
being that is grounded in potencies, which are themselves dependent on and subordinate to
actualized beings.
It is important to appreciate that, when we say that being-potentially depends on some
potency, we are not saying that being-potentially has any independent power or potency of its own.

459
460

Meta. Θ.5 1048a5-8.
Meta. Θ.5 1048a10-15.
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What is in potency is in the potency of some actualized thing. Lucy is potentially asleep on account
of her own waking potency, not the potency of Lucy-asleep. Or, for another example, there is
potentially a dissertation on not-being in Aristotle and his predecessors only insofar as I have the
capacity to produce it. It certainly has no power to write itself.
We saw a similar case of ontological-importance-cum-dependence with the true and false:
these are a way of being and not-being which have no independent being, but rather depend on
other beings. The true and false are grounded in speaking and thinking beings; potentiality
depends, a bit more broadly, on the potencies of things. By contrast, being-actualized directly holds
of being in-itself, that is, οὐσίαι and the other categories: it is not as much dependent on being initself as it is a way of characterizing being in-itself, as an end of a process and in contrast to beingpotentially.

What Is-Potentially Can Be Said to Be Without Qualification
One of the reasons that Aristotle introduces potentiality into his ontology is that people in fact will
simply say that X is, or that Y is Z, when they mean that it is so because of some potency. Consider
again Aristotle’s examples in Metaphysics Δ.7:
for we say that one is seeing both when one potentially sees and actually does,
likewise that one knows both when one is able to use knowledge and when one
does use it, and also that something is at rest both when rest already belongs to it
and when it is able to rest. Similarly in the case of οὐσίαι: for we say that Hermes
is in the stone, that the half is of the line, and that what is not yet ripe is grain. 461
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Meta. Δ.7 1017b2-8, ὁρῶν τε γὰρ εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ, καὶ [τὸ] ἐπίστασθαι ὡσαύτως
καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ χρώμενον, καὶ ἠρεμοῦν καὶ ᾧ ἤδη ὑπάρχει ἠρεμία καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον
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By developing the ontology of being-potentially, Aristotle is showing how these simple or
categorical propositions can make sense, or even be true, when not holding of actualized beings.
So “Florence terrorizes Lucy” is true even when Florence and Lucy are both peacefully sleeping,
on account of the potencies of Florence and Lucy (often actualized when Florence sees Lucy
sleeping in the cat-tree). Further, we want to be able to distinguish this from the same sentence
understood as holding-actually, while Florence chases Lucy up and down the cat-tree. We have
the same things, perhaps articulated with the same words, but clearly two differing ways of being.

Potentiality is Wholly Determined by Potencies
The ontology of potentiality is not some further thing above or beyond the potencies themselves.
To say that Matelda is potentially on the table, or that there is potentially dinner, is to say no more
than that Matelda has the potency to be on the table, or that someone has the power to make dinner
(respectively). There are δυνατά, and thus potencies, and thus things that potentially are – these
are, when properly understood, equivalent.
We can see this in Aristotle’s discussions of being-potentially in Meta. Η.5, 1044b29-a6.
This text is concerned with some impasses about form-matter composites and potentiality. The
first is whether matter is potentially opposite predicates – a question we will address in the next
Section. The second impasse, more pertinent here, is about “why wine is neither the matter of
vinegar nor potentially vinegar (even though vinegar comes to be from it), and why the living is
not potentially dead.” 462 Aristotle’s answer is that the wine and living being do not, in themselves,

ἠρεμεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν· καὶ γὰρ Ἑρμῆν ἐν τῷ λίθῳ φαμὲν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς γραμμῆς, καὶ σῖτον
τὸν μήπω ἁδρόν. Aristotle also uses similar examples in Meta. Θ.6 1048a32-35.
462
Meta. Η.5 1044b34-36, καὶ διὰ τί ὁ οἶνος οὐχ ὕλη τοῦ ὄξους οὐδὲ δυνάμει ὄξος (καίτοι γίγνεται ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄξος) καὶ
ὁ ζῶν δυνάμει νεκρός.
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have the potency to be destroyed. The problem is that the forms of these composites are directed
toward being-wine or living, not decaying or dying. And as go the forms, so go the composites:
the wine and the living being do not have, in themselves, the potency to be destroyed. A composite
changes its form by means of its matter – thus it is this material component that has the potency
for the destruction of a form. This potency only accidentally belongs to the composite. Thus, it is
not the wine that is potentially-vinegar or the living being that is potentially-dead, but the matter
of each that has this status. The ontology of potentiality does not extend beyond the reality of
potencies.
An easy consequence of this is that, as potencies can be of all sorts of being, beingpotentially is a transcategorical determination. This is just like the complementary determination
of being-actualized. Οὐσίαι, qualities, quantities, relations, can all be-potentially.

Aristotelian Potentiality Differs from a Modal Ontology of Possibilities
Above we contrasted Aristotle’s concept of actualization as the fulfillment or result of some
process with a generic modal notion of actuality as what happens to be the case. Likewise we can
see that there is some distance between Aristotle’s ontology of potentiality from a generic modal
notion of potentiality as the domain of possibilities, or things that might be the case. There is no
separate genus of possibilia alongside actualities. There are no unactualized essences or possible
worlds. Unsupported possibilities may be linguistically meaningful, but this does not mean they
have any important ontological status for Aristotle. It cannot be taken for granted that something
is-potentially because it is loosely possible (maybe we think Aristotle goes wrong here, but loose
possibility is not a way of being in his corpus).

165

When Something Is- Potentially: Metaphysics Θ.7
This rather narrow concept of potentiality is perhaps clearest in Metaphysics Θ.7, where Aristotle
says that “when each thing is potentially and when not must be distinguished, for [it is] not just at
any time.”463 This question is less about time, and more about being, that is, what conditions must
be met in order to establish something’s being-potentially. Aristotle thinks through this question
by considering several cases, which are mixed up in the text, but which would be helpful to review
separately.


Case 1: What becomes actualized from thinking out of being-potentially.464
Curiously, in this example, Aristotle asks about when this hypothetical being-inpotency of human thought becomes actualized. Since this discussion is supposed to
address the question of when something is-potentially, we should take the former
question as near to the latter. Thus we recognize that Aristotle is looking to hew
being-potentially as close as possible to actualization while still differentiating
them. His answer to the former: something from thinking becomes actualized when
(a) it is desired and (b) nothing external prevents it. From this answer, we can take
(b) and leave (a): something from thinking is-potentially when nothing external
prevents it (if it is also desired, then it will become actualized).



Case 2: What is potentially healthy. 465 For Aristotle, not just everything can be
healed, even by the best medicine. A body must itself be in the right condition, or
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Meta. Θ.7 1048b37-a1, Πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἔστιν ἕκαστον καὶ πότε οὔ, διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ὁποτεοῦν.
Meta. Θ.7 1049a5-7.
465
Meta. Θ.7 1049a3-5, 7-8.
464
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else it will be incapable of being healed. So this will be potentially healthy
whenever nothing internal prevents it from being healed.


Case 3: What is potentially a house. 466 What is potentially a house is only
genuinely so if “there is nothing necessary to add or subtract or change.” 467
Analogously to the potentially healthy, the housing materials are only potentially a
house when nothing internal prevents them from being a house.



Case 4: The earth and the seed as not-yet potentially human. 468 While case 2
and 3 are examples of passive potencies, and Case 1 is an active potency, in this
case the earth, seed, and human are exemplary of natural οὐσίαι. The question then
is at what point are such natural οὐσίαι like earth or seed potentially a living οὐσία,
specifically, a human. Aristotle is confident that earth is not potentially human, as
it is not yet even a seed, let alone the fully developed seed. But it is perhaps
surprising that Aristotle asserts that even the seed or sperm is still not yet potentially
human. The “seed” under discussion here must be unfertilized, as Aristotle says
that it would “need to be in another thing, and to change” 469 for it to be potentiallyhuman. The seed has its potency for being in-itself, like case 1, and like that case it
must have no external impediments in order to support a being-potentially. Once
these impediments are gone, and the seed is in the required place with the necessary
changes, it will be potentially-human.

466

Meta. Θ.7 1049a8-11.
Meta. Θ.7 1049a10-11.
468
Meta. Θ.7 1049a1-3, 14-17.
469
Meta. Θ.7 1049a14-15, δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ μεταβάλλειν.
467
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Note: for Aristotle seed exemplifies something that an internal principle of
change, and thus he connects it to external impediments – fair enough. But above
we recognized in natural beings active and passive components. Thus, following
cases 2 and 3, we might expect that the seed has internal impediments to being
actualized. And it is clear, in this text, that seed does indeed have internal
impediments, as Aristotle says it needs to change to be potentially-human.


Case 5: The earth as not-yet potentially a statue. 470 This last example is minor
and meant to clarify the situation of the seed. The earth is not potentially a statue
because it is not the appropriate material for a statue. The earth might potentially
be bronze, which could potentially be a statue, but it is not itself potentially a statue.

It is immediately clear from each of these cases that something is potentially only when there are
no relevant obstacles or impediments. A few bricks are not potentially a house, Venus Williams is
not potentially playing tennis if she cannot access any rackets, a court, and tennis balls, I am not
potentially a PhD without a dissertation, and these pages are not potentially a dissertation if I do
not finish them. In each case there are serious obstacles to actualization, and hence obstacles to
being in potency.
This narrowly determined character of potentiality, and the closeness of being-potentially
to being-actualized, further establishes that potentiality is far from possibility. But it is also more
compatible with Aristotle’s elision of being-potentially and simple categorical expressions of
being in the Metaphysics Δ.7 passage quoted above. It would be wrong to say that “earth is a
human” because “earth is potentially unfertilized-seed which is potentially fertilized-seed which

470

Meta. Θ.7 1049a17-18.
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is potentially a human” – but Aristotle seems fine with saying that “fertilized seed is a human”
even if it is not an actualized human, but only one in potency.
We should also recognize that the cases in Metaphysics Θ.7 can be divided into two classes,
with a different criterion for being in potency in each.
1. In every case where the principle of change is external to the thing changed, for it
to be potentially X is for it to have no internal impediments to actually being or
becoming X. This would be whenever something is a patient, or has a passive
potency (cases 2, 3, 4, and 5).
2. In every case where the principle of change is internal to the thing changed, for it
to be potentially X is for it to have no external impediments to actually being or
producing X. This would be whenever something is an agent, or has an active
potency (cases 1 and 4).
With these criteria, we see how the distinction between active and passive potencies determines
what is in potency. Agents are potentially doing, producing, or being something when there are no
obstacles outside the agent; patients are potentially being something when there are no obstacles
within the patient. Seed – case 4 – needs to meet both criteria to be potentially-human, because it
is a natural being whose change will have both active/formal and passive/material components.
Speculatively, we might wonder whether being an impediment is something that admits of
degrees. It certainly seems like there is less of impediment for seed being human than there is for
earth being human, or of these many pages being a dissertation than just my prospectus. If being
an impediment does admit of degrees, perhaps so too would being-potentially. Maybe, but
Aristotle does not develop any support for this hypothesis.
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Being-Potentially as Being
With this we see how potentiality is a way of being for Aristotle. To be potentially is to be on
account of a determinate potency of a δύνατον thing, without there being any pertinent external or
internal obstacles. Potentiality has no separate power or being from the power and being of the
potencies that support it. Hence this way of being is informed by the characteristics of potencies,
and their relations to actualizations: potentiality is separate from actualized being, yet is articulated
in reference to it, and is ontologically dependent on it. Being-potentially can be expressed with
simple categorical statements, even though these do not refer to actualized situations, if the relevant
potencies are present and obstacles absent. This way of being, narrowly determined as it is, ends
up being quite useful for Aristotle’s philosophy, involved in topics as abstruse as the unity of form
and matter, the status of motion, and the need for a first mover, but also as concrete as our ethical
character and psychological life. Yet this potentiality also, somehow, is not.

vi. Being-Potentially as Not-Being
Being-Potentially is Not-Being-Actualized
How is being-potentially a way of not-being? Well, Aristotle gives us an easy answer: “for of notbeings, some are potentially: but they are not, because they are not actualized.” 471 Actualization is
prior to potency. Because being-potentially is not being-actualized, it must be a way of not-being.
I think this is Aristotle’s reason for why potentiality is not-being. But this is less obvious than we
may first suppose.

471

Meta. Θ.3 1047b1-2, τῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων ἔνια δυνάμει ἐστίν· οὐκ ἔστι δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστίν.
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We must recall that actualization – a concept apparently invented by Aristotle – is not
actuality. Aristotle is not saying that being-potentially is not actual: there is no concept of the
actual in Aristotle’s corpus, and being-potentially certainly is a real, determinate, “actual” way of
being. The distinction between potency and actualization is less modal, and more concerns the
difference between origins and ends. But why should the power for being be ontologically
subordinate to the fulfillment of being? We can recall that for Plato it is potency that has
ontological pride of place (a commitment he suggests would be shared by both physicalists and
formalists).472 Further, Aristotle himself gives some arguments for why one might think that
potency might be more fundamental than actualization. Potentiality seems more encompassing
than actualization: everything that is actualized is capable of this actualization, while not
everything capable is actualized. 473 Plus, it seems like every actualized thing comes about from
some temporally prior potency, 474 so we might expect this temporal priority to translate to an
ontological priority.

The Priority of Actualization to Potency: Metaphysics Θ.8
Hence Aristotle needs to argue that it is in fact actualization that has priority over potency, which
he does in Meta. Θ.8. In this text, Aristotle considers actualization and potency broadly, including
potencies for being and natural potencies. He claims that actualization is prior to potency in (1)
account, (2) time, and (3) οὐσία.

472

Plato Sophist 247d8-e4.
Meta. Λ.6, 1071b22-24.
474
Meta. Θ.8 1049b19-23.
473
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(1) We noted above Aristotle’s reason for why actualization is prior to potency in account:
because potencies are potencies of actualized δυνατά. For him, this is evidence enough of the
epistemic priority of actualization over potency. 475
(2) When discussing time, Aristotle accepts that actualization is not absolutely prior to
potency. As I just said, potencies temporally precede their actualizations. But, as Aristotle points
out, these potencies are themselves preceded by actualizations that are formally (although not
numerically) the same as the later actualizations. 476 So, Lucy the cat comes from some potency,
but this potency belongs to her parents that were also cats. Aristotle points out that this temporal
priority is very important in all sorts of human capacities: one cannot be a harpist (that is, have the
capacity to play harp well) without actually playing harp. 477 So there is an important way that
actualizations have temporal priority to potencies, even if in another way they are not.
(3) Neither epistemological nor temporal priority are sufficient for the sort of ontological
claim we need. Instead, most important for our purposes (and Aristotle’s), is the priority
actualization has to potency in οὐσία. This ontological priority will make sense of why potentiality
is not-being. Metaphysics Θ.8 gives four reasons for why actualization is ontologically prior, or
has priority in οὐσία, to potency, and these each demand some attention.

The Ontological Priority of Actualization as Later in Time
The first reason for the ontological priority of actualization is that “what comes-into-being later is
prior in form and οὐσία.” 478 Aristotle gives two examples: a man comes to be later than a boy, and
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Meta. Θ.8 1049b12-17.
Meta. Θ.8 1049b18-29.
477
Meta. Θ.8 1049b29-31.
478
Meta. Θ.8 1050a4-5, τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα.
476
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a human later than a seed. This reason is, perhaps, not especially compelling. “what comes-intobeing later” is a vague status – would a corpse not come into being later than a man, boy, and seed?
Surely this is not the actualization in question. Plus, only lines before Aristotle had made the point
that there is a way in which potency itself is later than actualization!

The Ontological Priority of Actualization as Final Cause
The second reason for the ontological priority of actualization is better developed and more
compelling. Aristotle says:
everything that comes-into-being goes to a principle and end (for that for the sake
of which [something is] is a principle, and coming-into-being is for the sake of an
end), and the actualization is an end, and it is for the gratification of this that potency
is taken up.479
This argument reflects larger teleological commitments: ends, for Aristotle, are directive and even
in some way causally efficacious. Thus here he even talks about them as a principle, ἀρχή, of
coming-into-being, while earlier he characterized potencies as a kind of principle. Yet not only are
these end-principles different from potencies, really they are actualizations. Repeatedly we have
insisted that being in actualization must be understood as having an end in-itself – in this passage
we see that for Aristotle this means that actualizations are also a certain sort of principle. Further,
between these two principles – the principle of actualization and the principle of potency – the
latter is taken up or pursued to achieve the former.

479

Meta. Θ.8 1050a7-9, ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα
ἡ γένεσις), τέλος δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται.
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Aristotle illustrates this precedence of the actualized-end through a number of plausible
examples. Animals have vision (a potency) in order to see (an actualization); people learn how to
build houses so that the houses get built; I have a contemplative power so that I can contemplate. 480
Many philosophers like to knock teleology – understandably so – but they would need a fairly
complicated explanation of why, say, animals have vision, when Aristotle can easily account for
this in teleological terms. The actualization of seeing is (ontologically) primary, and animals have
the power of vision for the sake of seeing. The more technical matter/form distinction is also
brought up here: “besides, the matter is potentially because it goes to form; whenever it is
actualized, then it is in that form.” 481 This example builds on the ongoing discussion about matter
and form in the Metaphysics, and so, as interesting as it is, it is well beyond the scope of our
questions. Still, in this case we see that being-potentially is subordinated to being-actualized (and
formal being) as the genuine direction or end of the potency. After all these, there is one more
charming example, of the teacher showing-off their students in action, because this is the goal of
teaching.482 According to Aristotle, in this case the end is a motion, 483 which we can recall is a
qualified actualization, not a full actualization with the end in-itself: nevertheless the motion of
learning is better than the mere capacity to learn. A teacher wants to put their (students’)
achievement on display, and, according to Aristotle, “nature does similarly.” 484

The Ontological Priority of Actualization as Οὐσία and Form
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Meta. Θ.8 1050a10-14.
Meta. Θ.8 1050a15-15, ἔτι ἡ ὕλη ἔστι δυνάμει ὅτι ἔλθοι ἂν εἰς τὸ εἶδος· ὅταν δέ γε ἐνεργείᾳ ᾖ, τότε ἐν τῷ εἴδει
ἐστίν.
482
Meta. Θ.8 1050a17-19.
483
Meta. Θ.8 1050a16-17.
484
Meta. Θ.8, 1050a19 ἡ φύσις ὁμοίως.
481
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The third reason for the ontological priority of actualization is that “the οὐσία and the form is
actualization.”485 Obviously if οὐσίαι themselves are actualizations, and indeed in the primary,
formal sense of οὐσία, then actualization must be prior in οὐσία to potency.
To reach this conclusion, Aristotle distinguishes two sorts of ways that an end or
actualization can be “ultimate,” ἔσχατον. (1) Some ends are in the exercise or use (χρῆσις) of some
capacity. (2) Others are in some product or work (ἔργον) beyond the activity.486
(1) Seeing is the paradigm of an exercise that has no other end, but Aristotle also mentions
contemplation, life, and happiness as other kinds of unproductive employments. 487 These
activities, complete in-themselves, are identical to their actualizations. Aristotle tells us that “the
actualization belongs in these things,” 488 that is, belongs in the things that are exercising a capacity:
seeing is an actualization of the animal with sight, contemplation is in the philosopher, Lucy’s life
is in her soul, and my happiness belongs to me.
(2) A house is the paradigm case of an ultimate product that comes out of the exercise of a
capacity, namely the activity of house-building.489 Aristotle also gives the examples of something
woven coming out of the activity of weaving, and generically the moved thing as coming out of
motion.490 In each of these cases there is a potency, an incomplete activity or motion, and a final
product. Even the incomplete activity is more of an end than the mere potency: “for house-building
is in the built-house, and both comes-to-be and is at the same time as the house.” 491 But the real
end, the actualization, is in the product.
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Meta. Θ.8 1050b2-3, ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργειά ἐστιν.
Meta. Θ.8 1050a23-25.
487
Meta. Θ.8 1050a24-25, a35-b2.
488
Meta. Θ.8 1050a35, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια.
489
Meta. Θ.8 1050a26-27, 31-32.
490
Meta. Θ.8 1050a32-34.
491
Meta. Θ.8 1050a28-29, ἡ γὰρ οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, καὶ ἅμα γίγνεται καὶ ἔστι τῇ οἰκίᾳ.
486
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It is this second type of actualization that is critical for Aristotle’s argument here. This case
shows that οὐσία and form, insofar as they are the end of some production and movement, should
be thought of as being in actualization. And again, if οὐσία is actualization, then actualization must
be prior in οὐσία.

A More Authoritative Reason: The Ontological Anteriority of Potentiality as Corruptible
The fourth reason for the ontological priority of actualization gets at something “more
authoritative.” 492 Namely, everything in potency is destructible, while necessary and everlasting
things must be in actualization, and the everlasting is prior in οὐσία to the destructible. The
argument to defend this claim has three stages, with the first and second particularly important for
clarifying the sense of potentiality as not-being.
First stage: “every potency is simultaneously of contradictories.” 493 There is an intuitive
sense to this claim: when I say I can finish this dissertation, or have the potency to, I am also tacitly
allowing that I might not finish this dissertation, and have the potency not to – otherwise I would
have to say that I must finish this dissertation. Yet on the face of it, this seems to say that what is
potentially, potencies, and δυνατά do not follow the principle of non-contradiction. This is
especially so for Aristotle’s formulation here, as it directly affirms simultaneous contradictories.
So how can potency be of contradictories?
Here is Aristotle’s justification in Θ.8, with some numbers and letters added to help us
navigate the passage:

492
493

Meta. Θ.8 1050b6, κυριωτέρως.
Meta. Θ.8 1050b8-9, πᾶσα δύναμις ἅμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστιν.
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For (1) what is not δυνατόν of belonging [to something] would belong to nothing,
(2) but everything that is δυνατόν [of belonging to something] admits of not being
actualized. (3) Therefore, what is δυνατόν of being admits of both (a) being and (b)
not-being. (4) Therefore, the same thing is δυνατόν of both being and not-being.494
Let us attempt to unravel this obscure argument. (1) Aristotle starts by addressing and eliminating
what has no power to belong to anything – this is simply not. (2) Instead, the focus is on things
that do have some potency to be. But the potency of being is neither identical to nor necessarily
involves the actualization of being: a potency need not, in virtue of itself, be actualized. (3a) It is
a tautology to say that what is δυνατόν of being must admit of being. (3b) But how does Aristotle
get from a δυνατόν admitting of not being actualized, to the conclusion that it admits of not-being
simply? It would beg the question if this inference relied on the conclusion we are working towards
– namely, that being in actualization is ontologically prior, and so what is not-actualized is notbeing. But I do not think you need such an assumption here. Instead, we must recall that potency
is in-itself directed toward being in actualization: to say that Matelda is δυνατόν of meowing, or
she has the potency to meow, is to say that she can actually meow. But as only δυνατόν of
meowing, Matelda can also fail to actually meow: but here we can just drop the “actually” and
assert that she admits of not meowing. And as goes Matelda’s meowing, so goes being: if
something is capable of not being actualized, because of the concept of potency we can drop the
“actualized” and say that it is capable of not-being simply. (4) The last point of the passage follows
without any difficulty. What is δυνατόν of being also admits of not-being, so the same underlying
thing is δυνατόν of being and not-being.
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Meta. Θ.8 1050b9-12, τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸν ὑπάρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρξειεν οὐθενί, τὸ δυνατὸν δὲ πᾶν ἐνδέχεται μὴ
ἐνεργεῖν. τὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.
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If that is not enough for us, we might also glance at De Interpretatione 12. Here too
Aristotle wonders that the same thing is δυνατόν of being and not-being in the same respect. Here
he says “the account for this is that everything δυνατὸν [of being] in such a way is not always [so]
in actualization, so that the negation would also belong to it.” 495 In this abbreviated argument,
which presumably does take for granted the priority of actualization, we again see that the crucial
issue is the distinction between the δυνατόν and its actualization, a distinction that requires a
negative component to potentiality. Following this passage, Aristotle clarifies that this “negation”
of potency, i.e. that the potency to be something is also the potency to fail to be it, cannot break
the principle of non-contradiction. The contradictory of “potentially X” is not “potentially not-X,”
but “not-potentially X,” and the contradictory of “potentially not-X” is “not-potentially not-X,” or
“necessarily X” (that is, as we recognized above, the contradictory of a potency is an impossibility
or a necessity).
We should pause here to notice that the reason potencies are of contradictories is the same
as the reason why being-potentially is a way of not-being: because being-potentially is not being
actualized. This makes sense: potentiality admits of contradictories because, in some fundamental
way, it is not. There is no harm in Matelda potentially meowing or not meowing; she just better
not find a way to actually do both simultaneously.
We might also worry, before moving to the second stage of the argument, that some δυνατά
are not capable of contradictory things. The simple bodies, for example, seem to be capable of
only one thing (which they are always actually doing, as fire always heats). 496 Aristotle proposes
that these simple bodies indeed are necessarily in actualization – fire heats necessarily. But fire
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Int. 12 21b14-15, λόγος δ' ὅτι ἅπαν τὸ οὕτω δυνατὸν οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥστε ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις.
Meta. Θ.8 1050b28-30, Int. 22b35-23a6.
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need not be necessarily, and thus it admits of destruction, transformation, and (accidentally at least)
other sorts of potencies. This can remind us of how living beings do not in-themselves have the
capacity to die: this capacity is accidental to the form-matter composite, coming as a result of the
matter and the destruction of the being in question.
Second stage: whatever admits of not-being in some respect is destructible in that respect.
This stage of the argument is much easier, given that Aristotle has already shown that what is
δυνατόν of being is δυνατόν of not-being. Being δυνατόν of not-being is equivalent to admitting
of not-being, and admitting of not-being is equivalent to being destructible. 497 Now, this
destructibility needs to be qualified: it only extends as far as the potency itself. For instance,
Aristotle supposes that even though the stars have the potency to move in a circle, their οὐσία is
not destructible because this οὐσία is wholly on account of actualization, and in no way in potency.
Likewise with the case of fire, mentioned in the last paragraph: it is has a simple potency for a
qualitative change that would lead to its not-being, but whenever it is, it heats by necessity. So
wherever there is potentiality, in that respect there will be destructibility. We should also recall,
on this point, that potencies in some way must be actualized – Aristotle would not accept that pigs
can fly unless at some point a pig takes wing. So we are led to the poetic conclusion about the
ephemerality of the (sublunar) world: whatever comes to be must at some point be destroyed.
Third stage: “nothing, then, that is simply indestructible is simply in potency […]; they are
therefore all in actualization.” 498 Given the argument so far, it is clear that what is in potency
cannot be eternal, necessary, or indestructible. So if there are such eternal, necessary, indestructible
beings, their οὐσία will not be potentially. Instead, their οὐσία would have to be in actualization,
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Meta. Θ.8 1050b12-13.
Meta. Θ.8 1050b16-18, οὐθὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἁπλῶς δυνάμει ἔστιν ἁπλῶς […]· ἐνεργείᾳ ἄρα πάντα.
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without any potency, complete in themselves for all time. This is, of course, a central tenet of
Aristotle’s theology. As opposed to the concept of potency, the concept of actualization has no
negation, no supposition of contradictories, and no inherent destructibility built into it. Every
sublunar actualization will – for the reasons just discussed – come to an end, but actualization initself can persist eternally, so long as potentiality is absent.

The Not-Being of Potentiality
With this we have our fourth reason why actualization is prior to potency. Actualizations are the
ends that potencies are directed to, they are the οὐσίαι that potencies produce, they are eternal
beings that potential beings can only imitate. Because of this priority of actualization over potency,
being-potentially is a way of not-being. Potentiality as such is not-actualized. But being-actualized
is the fundamental transcategorical ontological determination. Potentiality is thus diminished. But
it is also highly productive: potencies are not eclipsed by their respective actualizations, but are a
fundamental way of being, and our sublunar lives would not get off the ground without the potency
to live, the power to be happy, and the capacity to contemplate.
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Chapter 9
Some Conclusions

i. A Synopsis of Aristotle’s Several Ways of Not-Being
Not-being always ultimately belongs to some οὐσία, which is in-itself and actualized. Insofar as
something lacks οὐσία, it is simply not. If we can speak about such a thing, we do so only
accidentally, by means of other οὐσίαι.
Not-being must always be said in a certain respect. There are four ways that things can be
– in-itself, accidentally, as true, and according to potency and actualization – of which the latter
three allow for ways of not-being. These three ways of not-being are not-being as privation, notbeing as false, and not-being as potentiality.
The in-itself, understood as the categories taken affirmatively, does not as such allow for
not-being. Yet any being which has various predicates will also accidentally lack certain other
predicates. This is more meaningful in cases where the being would naturally have the predicate –
it is more significant when a cat lacks claws than when they lack hair – and generally Aristotle
calls these cases privations most of all. But insofar as something is said to lack a predicate, in this
way we have our first sense of not-being.
Falsity is a quality that can belong to some declarative propositions, speeches, and beliefs.
Assertions and beliefs ultimately refer to things in the world. Insofar as this reference is successful
– the combination in speech and thought match the combination in things – these are true and
establish veridical being. But when the reference is not matched by the things themselves – when
what is said of things differs from what is of things – then these assertions and beliefs are false and
lack veridical being.
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The distinction between potency and actualization is developed by Aristotle to understand
the world in terms of principles and ends. Being-potentially, or in potency, is a way of being
determined by the real potencies of capable things. But potency is anterior to actualization in all
sorts of important ways. So being-potentially, as it is not being-actualized, is a way of not-being.

Not-Being, Elsewhere in Aristotle
The topic of not-being certainly comes up beyond these ontological concerns – in particular, the
discussions of change and coming-into-being in Physics I.8 and Generation and Corruption I.3
feature not-being prominently, and it is also relevant in several discussions of the predecessors
beyond those we have touched on – but I would propose that these three ways of not-being provide
the foundation for how Aristotle generally thinks about what is not. So, when we ask whether
something comes-to-be from being or not-being, or perishes to being or not-being, we must
understand that being and not-being have these several senses. I would also propose that this
understanding of privation, falsity, and potentiality as not-being might give us insight into other
Aristotelian teachings. For example, when thinking about the real possibility of future
contingencies, as in Int. 9, we should think of this as determined by being-potentially as a way of
not-being.

ii. Being, Not-Being, and Determination
There is no single sense of being-itself for Aristotle, and thus there is no dualistic idea of not-being
that is meant to serve as a principle of multiplicity or difference. Instead, both being and not-being
are already structured and determined in multiple overlapping ways. One does not need a principle
of multiplicity or difference when they are built into the structure of ontology itself.
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In Aristotle’s structured ontology, not-being is derivative of, subordinate to, and
determined by being. We might also note, in passing, that Aristotle claims not-being is worse than
being.499 Not-being always belongs to some being, and it is relative to some way of being.
Moreover, as not-being is determined in several ways, not-being itself gets elided into these
different more determinate senses. Why talk of not-being as such when one can talk of privations,
or falsehoods, or potencies? Why pick the less determinate, when the more determinate is now
available?
Still, for Aristotle, not-being is ineliminable. No matter how determinate our concept of
privation, falsehood, or potentiality might be, for Aristotle these ways of being are also necessarily
ways of not-being. Further, even if, for Aristotle, not-being as-such cannot be an object of
investigation, it still will inevitably come up in one’s investigations, and he will still have ways
for thinking about what is not.
In Chapter 4 we characterized Aristotle’s position with regard to the predecessors as
stepping beyond their debate by refusing a single Eleatic sense of being, and thus not needing to
posit not-being as a first principle (à la Democritus’ void or Plato’s idea of not-being). But here
we might also think of Aristotle as striking a compromise between Plato and Parmenides on notbeing. Like Plato’s Eleatic Stranger, Aristotle acknowledges the need to accept not-being into his
ontology: without not-being, we could not make sense of a host of problems, including the
ontological status of falsehood, differences, and change. Yet like Parmenides, Aristotle prefers to
not write about not-being as such, and not-being is in every case subordinate to being. By eliding
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GA II.1 731b24-732a11, GC II.10 336b25-34, Meta. Θ.9 1051a4-21.
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not-being into more determinate concepts, Aristotle comes closer than Parmenides himself to
achieving the Eleatic goal of a way of truth that does not speak of not-being.

iii. The Silent Legacy of Aristotle on Not-Being
In part, the legacy of Aristotle’s thinking of not-being is the continuing importance of these
determinate concepts – privation, falsity, potentiality – in the history of philosophy. But, treading
lightly here, we can also hypothesize a more general consequence of the peripatetic philosophy of
not-being.500 Aristotle removes not-being from its pride of place in ontology. From Parmenides’
On Nature, through Gorgias’ On Not-Being, and to Plato’s Sophist, questions of being necessarily
involved questions of not-being. After Aristotle not-being is no longer a central topic in ontology.
It is not that later philosophers do not think about not-being – just consider the Epicurean void,
Stoic incorporeals, Neoplatonic matter, theological apophatics, etc. Yet, after Aristotle thinkers
can investigate being, ways of being, and ontological priority, and so on, all without needing to
decide on – or even speak about – what is not. This, I take it, is one of the great silent successes of
Aristotle’s philosophy. Perhaps Parmenides would be pleased with this result – even if he would
be unhappy with my project!
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See also Chapter 1 Section ii.
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